Platform or direct channel: government-subsidized recycling strategies for WEEE

Author(s):  
Shizhen Bai ◽  
Ling Ge ◽  
Xuelian Zhang
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 3236
Author(s):  
Gan Wan ◽  
Gang Kou ◽  
Tie Li ◽  
Feng Xiao ◽  
Yang Chen

Due to the popularization of the concept of “new retailing”, we study a new commercial model named O2O (online-to-offline), which is a good combination model of a direct channel and a traditional retail channel. We analyze an O2O supply chain in which manufacturers are responsible for making green products and selling them through both online and offline channels. The retailer is responsible for all online and offline channels’ orders, and the manufacturer gives the retailer a fixed fee. We construct a mathematical function model and analyze the greenness and pricing strategies of centralized and decentralized settings through the retailer Stackelberg game model. Due to the effects of the double marginalization of supply chain members, we adopt a simple contract to coordinate the green supply chain. The paper’s contributions are that we obtain pricing and greening strategies by taking the cooperation of offline channels and online channels into consideration under the O2O green supply chain environment.


1981 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 443-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Majumdar ◽  
A. Roy Chowdhury ◽  
T. Roy

Abstract Differential scattering cross-sections for the elastic scattering of α by C12 at laboratory bombarding energies from 11.0 to 16.0 MeV have been evaluated in the direct channel Regge-pole formalism, taking into account the contributions from a few nearby dominant excited levels of the compound nucleus O16 and incorporating the background effect. The relevant pole-parameters have also been predicted.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 44-47
Author(s):  
Zhaoqiong Qin

This study aims to investigate the literature in product distribution and channel competition. In this study, past work related to the product distribution through different channels is extensively reviewed. Based on the channel differentiation, channel competition is also reviewed. Finally, the study proposes that the future research may focus on helping the producer make a decision whether to sell the product through its own direct channel (online) through a physical channel or both based on the difference between these two channels.


1990 ◽  
Vol 258 (6) ◽  
pp. C1006-C1015 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Y. Kwan ◽  
H. Takemura ◽  
J. F. Obie ◽  
O. Thastrup ◽  
J. W. Putney

The Ca2(+)-mobilizing actions of the muscarinic receptor agonist, methacholine (MeCh), and the microsomal Ca2+ pump inhibitor, thapsigargin, were investigated in lacrimal acinar cells. As previously shown for parotid cells (J. Biol. Chem. 264: 12266-12271, 1989), thapsigargin activates both internal Ca2+ release and Ca2+ entry from the extracellular space without increasing cellular inositol phosphates. The inorganic Ca2+ antagonist La3+ inhibited MeCh- or thapsigargin-activated Ca2+ entry. However, when added before MeCh or thapsigargin, La3+ inhibited the extrusion of Ca2+ at the plasma membrane. This phenomenon was exploited in protocols designed to investigate the pathways for filling agonist-sensitive Ca2+ stores in lacrimal cells. The results show that, in contrast to previous suggestions that external Ca2+ is required to replenish agonist-regulated Ca2+ stores, the inhibition of Ca2+ extrusion permits recycling of Ca2+ released by MeCh back into an MeCh- and thapsigargin-sensitive pool. Thus, although extracellular Ca2+ is the major source for refilling the intracellular Ca2+ stores under physiological conditions, the pathway by which this Ca2+ enters the pool need not be a direct one. These results are consistent with the recently revised capacitative model for the refilling of intracellular Ca2+ stores through Ca2+ influx subsequent to Ca2+ depletion, according to which refilling of intracellular Ca2+ stores occurs via a cytoplasmic route rather than a direct channel between intracellular Ca2+ stores and the extracellular space.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangdong Wu ◽  
Qingshan Kong ◽  
Jian-gang Shi ◽  
Hamid Reza Karimi ◽  
Wei Zhang

Information sharing and marketing channel building have become an important problem of supply chain management theory and practice. The research of information sharing focused on traditional channel of supply chain between upstream and downstream enterprises; however, the research ignores the behavior of information sharing with potential entrants and composite structure characteristics about traditional marketing channel with the direct channel. This paper uses the model to research the effects brought about sharing demand information with potential entrants and building marketing channel, which reveals information sharing and channel building mechanism in the supply chain. The study found that the five-force model of Porter regards potential entrants only as a threat that is one-sided. When the channel competitiveness meets certain conditions, manufacturer and retailer will share demand information with potential entrants. Building composite marketing channel is the manufacturer's absolute dominant strategy. Channel construction will increase the entry barriers for potential entrants and weaken the effect of double marginalization; meanwhile, the performance of supply chain will be augmented.


1998 ◽  
Vol 349 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Chapell ◽  
Joseph Martin ◽  
Tina K Machu ◽  
Nancy J Leidenheimer

1967 ◽  
Vol 18 (14) ◽  
pp. 565-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bipin R. Desai ◽  
David T. Gregorich ◽  
R. Ramachandran

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Binshuo Bao

In is very important for the corresponding author to have a linked ORCID (Open Researcher and Contributor ID) account on MTS. To register a linked ORCID account, please go to the Account Update page (http://mts.hindawi.com/update/) in our Manuscript Tracking System and after you have logged in click on the ORCID link at the top of the page. This link will take you to the ORCID website where you will be able to create an account for yourself. Once you have done so, your new ORCID will be saved in our Manuscript Tracking System automatically.”"?>this paper, two noncooperative dynamic pricing strategies are used in a supply chain. Two dynamic Stackelberg game models have been built involving both a manufacturer and a retailer assumed to be the leader in order. In the two models, the manufacturer sells national-brand (NB) product to an independent retailer or directly to consumers through a direct channel. The retailers sell a store-brand (SB) product when they sell the NB product coming from the manufacturer. Thus, there is competition both in different channels and in products with different brands. To analyze the complexity of the model, parameter bifurcation diagrams and strange attractor diagrams have been therefore plotted. The results show that the game leader has advantages when the market is stable, but it turns disadvantageous if the state falls into unstable as the game follower can quickly adjust the strategy to seize the market. The wholesale price and the direct selling price are high that they incur larger profits if the manufacturer is dominant, but it gets worse when the adjustment speed increases. While in the model where the retailer plays a dominant role, the increase in the adjustment speed is unfavorable to retailer. By controlling the total cost of the direct channel and increasing channel competition strength and brand competition strength, the manufacturers can increase their profits in the game dominated by the retailer. In addition, the stable region within the system will be narrow since the market is sensitive to the channel competition, brand competition, and advertising indifference.


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