scholarly journals Investor asset valuation under a wealth tax and a capital income tax

Author(s):  
Petter Bjerksund ◽  
Guttorm Schjelderup

AbstractWe study how a capital income tax and a wealth tax affect an investor's valuation of a company's stock in an efficient international capital market. Using a one-period model, a model of infinite horizon where the asset generates a future cash flow that is a martingale, and a finite horizon model where we abandon the martingale assumption, we find that a wealth tax and/or a capital income tax do not lead investors to value an investment differently from untaxed investors. Investors who seek a higher pre-tax rate of return due to capital taxes harm their own wealth.

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Conesa ◽  
Sagiri Kitao ◽  
Dirk Krueger

We quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity differences of households. The optimal capital income tax rate is significantly positive at 36 percent. The optimal progressive labor income tax is, roughly, a flat tax of 23 percent with a deduction of $7,200 (relative to average household income of $42,000). The high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life-cycle structure of the model, whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system. (JEL E13, H21, H24, H25)


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-306
Author(s):  
Lars Kunze

Abstract This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between capital income taxation and economic growth within an overlapping generations model when individuals may bequeath wealth. The altruistic concern is modeled as a synthesis of joy-of-giving and family altruism so that individuals may derive utility from the amount of bequest itself and by providing children with a disposable income later on in life. Using this framework, it is shown that, in contrast to the existing literature, increasing the capital income tax rate may well enhance growth under operative bequests.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 339-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Kellner

Tax evasion is punishable. However, by tax amnesty the state waives punishment and gives tax dodgers the chance to return to honesty. The “Act To Promote Tax Honesty” offers people who evaded taxes between the years 1993 and 2002 an opportunity to wipe the slate clean by declaring their concealed income up to 2005. This offer applies to income tax, corporate tax, turnover tax, wealth tax, trade tax, inheritance tax, gift tax and tax deductions pursuant to the Einkommensteuergesetz (Income Tax Act). Amnesty participants must pay a reduced tax rate of 25 percent on declared income within ten days after the declaration. For income and corporate tax the assessment basis is reduced to 60 percent. Thereby the new law grants the repentant tax evaders a tax rate of 15 percent rather then usual up to 48 percent on the profits they gained in the past ten years.


2014 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Salem Abo-Zaid

AbstractThe optimality of the long-run capital-income tax rate is revisited in a simple neoclassical growth model with credit frictions. Firms pay their factors of production in advance, which requires borrowing at the beginning of the period. Borrowing, in turn, is constrained by the value of collateral that they own at the beginning of the period, leading to inefficiently low amounts of capital and labor. In this environment, the optimal capital-income tax in the steady state is non zero. Specifically, the quantitative analyses show that the capital-income tax is negative and, therefore, the distortions stemming from the credit friction are offset by subsidizing capital. However, when the government cannot distinguish between capital-income and profits, the capital-income tax is positive as the government levies the same tax rate on both sources of income. These results stand in contrast to the celebrated result of zero capital-income taxation of Judd (Judd, K. 1985. “Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model.”


2016 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-281
Author(s):  
Sasa Randjelovic

This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the effects of income taxation on personal savings in Serbia, by taking into account both transmitting channels: the direct impact of capital income tax on the rate-of-return and the indirect impact of labour income tax on disposable income. The estimated elasticity of bank deposits to the rate of return of 0.3 and the estimated elasticity of employment income to a labour tax wedge of −0.38 suggest that income tax function aimed at minimising the efficiency losses should not considerably differentiate the tax burden on labour and capital income. We show that in the case of the introduction of a revenue-neutral income tax, with a single marginal tax rate of 15% and considerably larger labour income exemption, households’ savings in Serbia would decline by 0.27%. This means that the negative impact of a rise in the capital income tax wedge on savings would prevail over the positive effects of a labour tax wedge cut. The results imply that the overall possibility to boost savings using tax policy is modest.


2001 ◽  
Vol 23 (s-1) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine C. Bauman ◽  
Mark P. Bauman ◽  
Robert F. Halsey

This study utilizes a sample comprised of Fortune 500 firms to examine earnings management via changes in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance. The study extends existing research in three ways. First, we document that the earnings effect of a valuation allowance change often cannot be determined from financial statement disclosures. Based on an analysis of sample firms' income tax footnotes, we offer suggestions to improve disclosure policy. Second, prior research uses the net change in the valuation allowance account as a proxy for the earnings effect of valuation allowance changes. We argue that the amount reported in the effective tax rate reconciliation is a better measure of the income statement effect and document certain significant differences between the measures. Third, prior research employs cross-sectional regression models in an effort to make generalizations about earnings management behavior. In contrast, we use a contextual approach to assess whether observed valuation allowance changes are consistent with different motivations for earnings manipulation. The contextual analyses are based on identifying firms in the position to engage in various forms of earnings management and examining the earnings effect of valuation allowance changes made by firm managers. Cross-sectional tests find virtually no evidence in support of earnings management. Of particular note, we find that the incidence of “big bath” behavior may be exaggerated. In contrast, a contextual approach identifies specific instances in which earnings management may exist. Thus, the analysis of valuation allowance changes is contextual and requires careful consideration of activity in the allowance account. This point underscores the deficiency in income tax reporting and the need for increased disclosure in this area.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 258-279
Author(s):  
Manfred Gärtner

AbstractSwiss banking secrecy tempts foreigners to remain silent about capital incomes and, thus, not pay taxes as obliged by law, but residents of Switzerland as well. Therefore, Switzerland introduced a withholding tax on capital income in order to make domestic residents report levels of wealth and capital incomes properly. We ask whether a withholding tax rate of 35 percent achieves this goal. For this purpose, marginal income tax rates are computed and income distributions are estimated for each canton. From these we identify income levels and shares of tax payers for whom the withholding tax does not work as intended.


Author(s):  
Peter J. Lambert ◽  
Thor O. Thoresen

Abstract A dual income tax system, combining progressive taxation of labor income with proportional taxation of income from capital, may or may not be unambiguously inequality reducing. Examples show that the degree of correlation between the distributions of wage and capital income, the degree of tax rate differentiation in the DIT, and reranking of tax-payers can be expected to complicate a clear-cut analysis. We trace out what can be said definitively, obtaining sufficient conditions for unambiguous inequality reduction in certain cases, and more generally identifying the nature of the implicit redistribution between labor and capital income components which is sufficient to ensure overall inequality reduction.


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