scholarly journals The Freegan Challenge to Veganism

Author(s):  
Josh Milburn ◽  
Bob Fischer

AbstractThere is a surprising consensus among vegan philosophers that freeganism—eating animal-based foods going to waste—is permissible. Some ethicists even argue that vegans should be freegans. In this paper, we offer a novel challenge to freeganism drawing upon Donaldson and Kymlicka’s ‘zoopolitical’ approach, which supports ‘restricted freeganism’. On this position, it’s prima facie wrong to eat the corpses of domesticated animals, as they are members of a mixed human-animal community, ruling out many freegan practices. This exploration reveals how the ‘political turn’ in animal ethics can offer fertile lenses through which to consider ethical puzzles about eating animals.

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 709-735
Author(s):  
Sue Donaldson ◽  

Many theorists of the ‘political turn’ in animal rights theory emphasize the need for animals’ interests to be considered in political decision-making processes, but deny that this requires self-representation and participation by animals themselves. I argue that participation by domesticated animals in co-authoring our shared world is indeed required, and explore two ways to proceed: 1) by enabling animal voice within the existing geography of human-animal roles and relationships; and 2) by freeing animals into a revitalized public commons (‘animal agora’) where citizens encounter one another in spontaneous, unpredictable encounters in spaces that they can re-shape together.


2019 ◽  
pp. 133-152
Author(s):  
Eva Meijer

Chapter 5 draws on recent work in the so-called “political turn” in animal ethics, most notably Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s political theory of non-human animal rights, to discuss how these concepts can guide relations between groups of non-human animals and human political communities. The author discusses their proposals for animal citizenship and sovereignty. In the second half of this chapter, the author explains problems with traditional interpretations of sovereignty that rely on claims made by the powerful to legitimize the territorial domination of others. In order to challenge human sovereignty, we should challenge human superiority on all levels, including existing political systems. However, existing institutions and systems also hold a promise for other animals, and, like citizenship, these concepts can bring into focus new forms of interacting with other animals and institutionalizing these relations. In the final section, the author turns to examples of new ways of relating to other animals that can function as beginnings for further reformulating laws and political practices.


Author(s):  
Sue Donaldson ◽  
Will Kymlicka

Western political theorists have largely ignored the animal question, assuming that animals have no place in our theories of democracy, citizenship, membership, sovereignty, and the public good. Conversely, animal ethicists have largely ignored political theory, assuming that we can theorize the moral status and moral rights of animals without drawing on the categories and concepts of political theory. This chapter traces the history of this separation between animals and political theory, examines the resulting intellectual blind spots for animal ethics, and reviews recent attempts to bring the two together. Situating animal rights within political theory has the potential to identify new models of justice in human-animal relations, and to open up new areas of scholarship and research.


Author(s):  
Kristin Armstrong Oma

In archaeology, changes in human–animal relationships are rarely considered beyond the moment of domestication. This is influenced by Ingold’s idea that domestication led to a shift in the human engagement with animals (Ingold 2000: 61–76; see Armstrong Oma 2007: 62–4, 2010 for critique). I do not question the validity of such a claim; however, I argue that changes in terms of engagement also happened beyond domestication, and that various configurations of human–animal relationships have existed throughout history. Further, I argue that such changes also have consequences for the environment, by choice of land use strategies and husbandry regimes. A twofold purpose is pursued: first, to investigate how changes in social systems, in my case changes in terms of engagement between humans and animals, affect land use in such a way as to impinge upon natural systems and ecosystems. Second, I wish to grasp the political underpinnings of the models that are employed by archaeologists and, by doing so, to deconstruct the political use of the past (see also Stump, Chapter 10 this volume). Alternative models regarding economic strategies are sought, and the implications of these are discussed. Human–environment studies frequently deal with the impact of human intrusive land use strategies on ecosystems. Awareness has been created around these processes regarding land use techniques and practices (for example Denham and White 2007; Mazoyer and Roudart 2006). However, in European archaeology the impact of husbandry practices upon ecosystems has received considerably less, if any, attention. People in past societies from the Neolithic onwards made the conscious decision to live with animals as herders or as farmers, blending together social and economic choices that had repercussions for landscape developments and ecosystems. Investigations into the relationship between environmental changes caused by husbandry practices and the social systems that instigated those changes are an important contribution to research on past environmental development. These changes are identifiable in the archaeological record.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Baranzke ◽  

Ever since Schopenhauer´s accusation, it has been disputed whether Kant´s few remarks concerning the ethical human-animal-relationship in the Lectures and in the Doctrine of Virtue fail to support ethical arguments on behalf of animals. One critique that plays a central role is whether Kant would have forbidden cruelty to brutes for educational purposes. In addition to these old objections, Kant´s ethics is charged to be speciesistic by animal ethicists and animal rights philosophers at present.The following article examines especially §17 of the Doctrine of Virtue, which is the only animal ethical text authorized by Kant himself. The interpretation starts by taking the context of §17 into account, particularly the “Episodic Section on an Amphiboly in Moral Concepts”. The systematic output of the cruelty-account and of the duty classes is then analyzed. Central for the understanding of Kant´s argumentation relating to animals are the perfect duties to oneself, which are linked to Kant´s foundation of human dignity. Finally the roles of the physical and emotional needs of brutes and humans in Kant´s ethics are compared with each other. Some conclusions are then drawn concerning human and animal rights in relation to a duty-based argumentation. The article therefore appreciates Kant´s integration of animal suffering into the very core of his virtue ethics, an integration that may be able to open the door for an enlightened animal ethics based on human responsibility.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arash Abizadeh

The two traditional justifications for bicameralism are that a second legislative chamber serves a legislative-review function (enhancing the quality of legislation) and a balancing function (checking concentrated power and protecting minorities). I furnish here a third justification for bicameralism, with one elected chamber and the second selected by lot, as an institutional compromise between contradictory imperatives facing representative democracy: elections are a mechanism of people’s political agency and of accountability, but run counter to political equality and impartiality, and are insufficient for satisfactory responsiveness; sortition is a mechanism for equality and impartiality, and of enhancing responsiveness, but not of people’s political agency or of holding representatives accountable. Whereas the two traditional justifications initially grew out of anti-egalitarian premises (about the need for elite wisdom and to protect the elite few against the many), the justification advanced here is grounded in egalitarian premises about the need to protect state institutions from capture by the powerful few and to treat all subjects as political equals. Reflecting the “political” turn in political theory, I embed this general argument within the institutional context of Canadian parliamentary federalism, arguing that Canada’s Senate ought to be reconstituted as a randomly selected citizen assembly.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cara Nine

Do territorial rights include the right to exclude? This claim is often assumed to be true in territorial rights theory. And if this claim is justified, a state may have a prima facie right to unilaterally exclude aliens from state territory. But is this claim justifiable? I examine the version of territorial rights that has the most compelling story to support the right to exclude: territorial rights as a kind of property right, where ‘territory’ refers to the public and common spaces included in the domain of state jurisdiction. I analyse the work of A. J. Simmons, who develops the political theory of John Locke into one of the most well-articulated and defended theories of territorial rights as a kind of property right. My main argument is that Simmons’ justification for rights of exclusion, which are derived from individual rights of self-government, does not apply to many kinds of public spaces. An upshot of this analysis is that most Lockean-based theories of territorial rights will have a hard time justifying the right to exclude as a prima facie right held by states against aliens.


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