scholarly journals Knowledge and reasoning

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mona Simion
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Drop Out ◽  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Epistemic Function ◽  
In Virtue Of

AbstractThis paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.

The Epistemic Norms of Action

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Epistemological Principle ◽  
Knowledge Norms

Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.

Is Epistemic Normativity Value-Based?

Dialogue ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHARLES CÔTÉ-BOUCHARD
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Normative Authority ◽  
In Virtue Of

What is the source of epistemic normativity? In virtue of what do epistemic norms have categorical normative authority? According to epistemic teleologism, epistemic normativity comes from value. Epistemic norms have categorical authority because conforming to them is necessarily good in some relevant sense. In this article, I argue that epistemic teleologism should be rejected. The problem, I argue, is that there is no relevant sense in which it is necessarily good to believe in accordance with epistemic norms, including in cases where the matter at hand is completely trivial. Therefore, if epistemology is normative, its normativity won’t come from value.

Epistemic Consequentialism

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Formal Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Epistemic Utility ◽  
Traditional Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Consequentialism ◽  
In Virtue Of

An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent in virtue of the fact that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the familiar family of consequentialist views in ethics. Recently, philosophers from both formal epistemology and traditional epistemology have shown interest in such a view. In formal epistemology, there has been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of decision theory where instead of maximizing expected utility one maximizes expected epistemic utility. In traditional epistemology, there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism about justification and whether such views are analogous to—and so face similar problems to—versions of rule consequentialism in ethics. This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics as well as others related to epistemic consequentialism, by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.

Taking Stock

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
A Value ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Similar Explanation

This chapter considers some general issues about the nature of the account that is emerging. It asks whether moral reasoning should have been treated as it was in Chapter 5. It also askes whether an explanation of practical reasons by appeal to value could be mirrored by a similar explanation of theoretical reasoning if one thinks of truth as a value. One might also think of the probability of a belief as a respect in which it is of value. The chapter ends by introducing the idea of a focalist account, and maintains that the account offered of practical reasoning is focalist.

Practical Nous in the Nicomachean Ethics

2020 ◽  
pp. 219-248
Author(s):  
Benjamin Morison
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Know How ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

The paper presses an analogy between Aristotle’s conception of practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning. It argues that theoretical reasoning has two optimal cognitive states associated with it, episteme and (theoretical) nous, and that practical reasoning has two counterpart states, phronēsis and (practical) nous. Theoretical nous is an expertise which enables those who have it to understand principles as principles, i.e. among other things, to know how to use them to derive other truths in their domain. It is a cognitively demanding state, which only experts have. Aristotelian practical nous is structurally similar to theoretical nous in that it requires the agent not only to know certain everyday truths, but also to know how and when to use them in deliberative reasoning. It is also a cognitively demanding notion, and only moral experts will have it.

scholarly journals Distinguishing Practical and Theoretical Reasoning: A Critique of Deanna Kuhn's Theory of Informal Argument

1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Wilks Keefer
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Informal Argumentation ◽  
Evidence Model ◽  
Adequate Evidence ◽  
Practical Arguments

Deanna Kuhn's theory of informal argumentation (1991) evaluates arguments according to a theory/evidence model where subjects first articulate a theory and then must provide critical testing of alternatives on the basis of evidence. Using this model, Kuhn reports that many subjects fail to supply adequate evidence for their 'theories' and are often unable or unwilling to generate alternatives. In this paper an account of practical reasoning is provided that suggests an alternate interpretation for Kuhn's subjects' poor perfonnance. It is argued that treating practical arguments as failed theoretical justifications causes Kuhn to misrepresent the contribution of many of her subjects' arguments.

scholarly journals Diskursus Akhlak dalam Filsafat Mulla Sadra

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 78
Author(s):  
Thuba Kermani
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Short Discussion ◽  
Moral Science ◽  
Mulla Sadra ◽  
The World ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Moral Ethics ◽  
Human Psyche ◽  
Moral Questions

<div><p><strong>Abstract :</strong> In Mulla Sadra’s system of thought, the discussion of  philosophy of  moral (ethics), morality, the nature of morality and matters related, that is the soul (nafs) and the spirit, is not a short discussion. All forms of action and the nature of malakah imprinted in the human psyche that will participate in the world hereafter. Therefore, some of the matters of the soul is a postulate of science of moral. Yet despite the differences in the ethics’s school of thoughts, it can be said that almost Muslim philosophers agree to the connection of moral with the perfection of soul. And the foundation of moral questions rests on the principle of perfection of the soul and the effects of the moral act. Without them, there will be no perfect rational and philosophical explanations of the good and bad character. However, in understanding how the process of perfection of the soul through moral acts, it is necessary to understand the perfection of the soul and make it a goal for human.</p><p><em>Keywords : philosophy of moral, science of moral, theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning, intuition, meta-ethics. </em></p><p><em><br /></em></p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Dalam  struktur  pemikiran Mulla Sadra pembahasan  filsafat  akhlak,  akhlak,  sifat-sifat akhlak dan  hal yang berkaitan  dengannya,  yaitu  jiwa  (nafs) dan ruh, bukan  pembahasan  yang  ringkas. Segala bentuk tindakan dan sifat malakah yang terpatri dalam jiwa manusia akan menyertainya di alam akhirat kelak. Oleh karena itu  sebagian  dari  persoalan-persoalan  jiwa  merupakan  postulat  ilmu  akhlak.  Namun  meskipun  terdapat perbedaan dalam aliran-aliran pemikiran filsafat akhlak, dapat dikatakan hampir semua filsuf Islam sepakat bahwa akhlak berkaitan dengan kesempurnaan jiwa. Dan fondasi persoalan-persoalan akhlak bersandar pada prinsip kesempurnaan jiwa dan pengaruh dari perbuatan akhlak. Tanpa hal itu, penjelasan rasional dan filosofis atas kebaikan dan keburukan akhlak tidak akan sempurna. Bagaimanapun juga, dalam memahami bagaimana proses kesempurnaan jiwa melalui perbuatan-perbuatan akhlak, perlu untuk memahami kesempurnaan jiwa dan menjadikannya sebagai tujuan bagi diri manusia.</p><p><em>Kata-kata Kunci : filsafat akhlak, ilmu akhlak, akal teori, akal praktis, jiwa, intuisi, meta-etika.</em></p></div>

scholarly journals Value and Epistemic Normativity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Owens
Keyword(s):  
Emotional Engagement ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Human Good ◽  
Good For

Many writers have sought to ground epistemic normativity in the value of knowledge or truth, or else in the value of successful agency. Here it is proposed that epistemic norms derive their authority from the fact that it is good for us to subject ourselves to such norms by forming beliefs. And being subject to the relevant norms may be good for us whether or not conformity to those norms is good for us. In particular, beliefs serve our interest in being subject to the norms that govern our emotions. Unless I believe that Tom stole my bike, I can hope or fear that he did, but I cannot be pleased or angry that he did. Having the capacity for this sort of emotional engagement with things that matter to us is a human good, even though we may suffer from the exercise of that capacity.

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