Rent seeking, supervisor approvals and conventional corruption control approach—an Indian experience

Author(s):  
Kannan Perumal
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kannan Perumal

Abstract This study challenges the argument that making it mandatory for the anti-corruption agencies to obtain prior administrative approvals from public authorities before detecting and prosecuting the corrupt can bring-in efficiency in corruption control. Applying the political economy concepts rents and rent seeking, this study explores the intricate relationships that exist between discretions available with the public authorities and their decisions to allow the anti-corruption enforcement to detect and prosecute public servants in corruption cases. Issue of similar facts getting differently appreciated by different public authorities has also been brought out by this study. This study argues that prior approvals by public authorities in high discretionary and low risk environments can promote rent seeking behaviour in public organizations. Findings of this study shows that limiting the discretions of authorities that decide administrative approvals and holding them accountable for their decisions can be the conditions critical for efficient anti-corruption enforcement in India.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 64-65
Author(s):  
Jothydev Kesavadev ◽  
Shashank Joshi ◽  
Banshi Saboo ◽  
Pradeep Pillai ◽  
Arun Shankar ◽  
...  

Liquidity ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Andilo Tohom

Indonesia is one of many countries in the world so called resource-rich country. Natural resources abundance needs to be managed in the right way in order to avoid dutch diseases and resources curses. These two phenomena generally happened in the country, which has abundant natural resources. Learned from Norwegian experiences, Indonesian Government need to focus its policy to prevent rent seeking activities. The literature study presented in this paper is aimed to provide important insight for government entities in focusing their policies and programs to avoid resources curse. From the internal audit perspective, this study is expected to improve internal audit’s role in assurance and consulting.


2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.


2010 ◽  
pp. 58-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Oleinik

In the article two types of rent are differentiated: resource rent and administrative rent. The latter is linked to restrictions on the access to the field of interactions. The contribution of the theory of public choice and the theory of rent-seeking and directly-unproductive activities is further developed by shifting the emphasis from individual decision-making to interactions between three actors: C, who controls access to the field, A, who gets a competitive edge as a result, and B, who assumes a subjacent position with regard to both A and C, yet still receives a positive gain from transacting. Domination by virtue of a constellation of As, Bs, and Cs interests is illustrated with the help of an in-depth case study of a Russian region. This study combines quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as their triangulation.


2010 ◽  
Vol 130 (11) ◽  
pp. 1002-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Morel ◽  
Hassan Bevrani ◽  
Teruhiko Ishii ◽  
Takashi Hiyama

2017 ◽  
Vol 137 (8) ◽  
pp. 596-597
Author(s):  
Kenta Koiwa ◽  
Kenta Suzuki ◽  
Kang-Zhi Liu ◽  
Tadanao Zanma ◽  
Masashi Wakaiki ◽  
...  

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