Rents, Administrative Sanctions and Conventional Corruption-Control Approach: Evidence from the Prevention of Corruption Act, India.
Abstract This study challenges the argument that making it mandatory for the anti-corruption agencies to obtain prior administrative approvals from public authorities before detecting and prosecuting the corrupt can bring-in efficiency in corruption control. Applying the political economy concepts rents and rent seeking, this study explores the intricate relationships that exist between discretions available with the public authorities and their decisions to allow the anti-corruption enforcement to detect and prosecute public servants in corruption cases. Issue of similar facts getting differently appreciated by different public authorities has also been brought out by this study. This study argues that prior approvals by public authorities in high discretionary and low risk environments can promote rent seeking behaviour in public organizations. Findings of this study shows that limiting the discretions of authorities that decide administrative approvals and holding them accountable for their decisions can be the conditions critical for efficient anti-corruption enforcement in India.