Selection of sustainable municipal water reuse applications by multi-stakeholders using game theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 650 ◽  
pp. 2512-2526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gyan Chhipi-Shrestha ◽  
Manuel Rodriguez ◽  
Rehan Sadiq
1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 1537-1543 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. H. Bruvold

Models recommended for public involvement in environmental planning call for: 1) early and full involvement with technical planners from the start, 2) involvement at an intermediate phase once technical planners have developed a short list of the most feasible alternatives, and 3) later involvement only by ratification of the one alternative selected and developed by technical planners. The present study reports results assessing public involvement in planning at the intermediate phase using results from three general population surveys of the greater San Diego area done in 1989, 1990, and 1991 which dealt with municipal water reuse alternatives. Feasibility of the intermediate approach was demonstrated by correspondence between survey and technical planning evaluations and by consistency between and within survey findings.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1443
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Dong ◽  
Ai-Guo Wu

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.


Desalination ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 152 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 339-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Safaa Abdelraouf Ahmed ◽  
Shadia Ragheb Tewfik ◽  
Hala Ahmed Talaat

2014 ◽  
Vol 989-994 ◽  
pp. 5148-5151
Author(s):  
Tong Ying Guo ◽  
Jie Jia Li ◽  
Bin Ma ◽  
Jin Xiang Pian ◽  
Hai Chen Wang ◽  
...  

In this paper, the necessity and significance of combined training of Postgraduate is analyzed. Game rules, strategies and payoffs is introduced about the combined training of Postgraduate. The application problem is researched based on game theory about the mode selection of combined postgraduate.


Power control is the intelligent selection of transmitter power output in a communication system to achieve good performance within the system. The notion of good performance can depend on context and may include optimizing metrics such as link data rate, network capacity, geographic coverage and range, and life of the network and network devices. Power control algorithms are used in many contexts, including cellular networks, sensor networks, and wireless LANs. Typically, there is no simple answer to the problem of power control, and a good algorithm must strike a balance between the benefits and drawbacks associated with targeting a particular transmit power based on the performance criteria of most importance to the designer. This chapter discusses power control schemes.


Author(s):  
Pramod Kumar Goyal ◽  
Pawan Singh

In a heterogeneous wireless network (HWN) environment, performing an efficient vertical handoff requires the efficient qualitative evaluation of all stakeholders like wireless networks (WN) and mobile users (MU) and mutual selection of best WN-MU. In the literature, most of the work deals with both these requirements jointly in the techniques proposed by them for the vertical handoffs (VHO) in HWNs, leaving very little scope to manipulate the above requirements independently. This may result in inefficient vertical handoffs. Hence, this chapter proposed a generalized two-stage two players, iterative non-cooperative game model. This model presents a modular framework that separates the quantitative evaluation of WNs and MUs (at Stage 1) from the game formulation and solution (at Stage 2) for mutual selection of best WN-MU pair for VHO. The simulation results show a substantial reduction in the number of vertical handoffs with the proposed game theory-based two-stage model as compared to a single-stage non-game theory method like multiple attribute decision making.


2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 313-320
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Jing Chang ◽  
Ming Dong

2013 ◽  
Vol 295-298 ◽  
pp. 2177-2180
Author(s):  
Zhi Da Guo

The selection of global climate partners and the establishment of global climate partnership touch vital interests all over the world. Under the global climate game, the cooperation and confrontation behavior among contracting parties is analyzed in the course of establishment of global climate partnership. Taken as a whole, the complex game process of the establishment of global climate partnership is submitted to analysis according to game theory. In the meantime, a partner selection model of climate cooperative partnership is built and some phenomena of the benefit struggles are explained in detail and policy and suggestion are drawn.


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