Pricing behavior of monopoly market with the implementation of green technology decision under emission reduction subsidy policy

If an emission reduction agreement with participation of all players is not enforceable because politicians are too myopic or costs of reducing emissions are too high, strategic investments in research and development (R&D) of green technology, for example, sustainable drivetrains, can pave the way for a future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty with full participation can be achieved in future periods through time consistent sustainable policies.

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Can Green Finance Development Reduce Carbon Emissions? Empirical Evidence from 30 Chinese Provinces

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su132112137 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (21) ◽

pp. 12137

Author(s):

Xi Chen ◽

Zhigang Chen

Keyword(s):

Carbon Emissions ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Carbon Emission ◽

Economic Transformation ◽

Green Technology ◽

Financing Constraints ◽

Carbon Emission Reduction ◽

Dynamic Panel Model ◽

Green Finance ◽

The Impact

Dealing with the relationship between environment and economic development is the core issue of China’s sustainable development. At present, China’s economic transformation is urgent, and green finance is being widely concerned. This paper measured the development level of China’s green finance from the perspective of green credit, green securities, green investment, and green insurance. Then, it used a spatial dynamic panel model to empirically test the mechanism of the impact of green finance on carbon emissions with panel data of 30 Chinese provinces from 2005 to 2018. The following can be seen from the results: (1) The development of green finance contributes to carbon emission reduction. (2) The spatial spillover effect of green finance is significant. Specifically, the development of green finance can not only reduce the carbon emissions of the local region but also inhibit that of adjacent areas. (3) The development of green finance indirectly leads to a decrease in carbon emissions by reducing financing constraints and boosting green technology innovation. In order to stimulate the carbon emission reduction effect of green finance to a greater extent, we should further support the development of green finance, reduce the financing constraints of energy-saving and environmental-protection enterprises, and encourage the research and development of green innovative technologies.

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Air Pollutants Emission Reduction and the Optimal Tax-Subsidy Policy for Japan

Studies in Regional Science ◽

10.2457/srs.30.3_85 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 30 (3) ◽

pp. 85-104 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Takeshi MIZUNOYA ◽

Yoshiro HIGANO

Keyword(s):

Air Pollutants ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Subsidy Policy ◽

Tax Subsidy ◽

Optimal Tax ◽

Pollutants Emission

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Investment Game Model Analysis of Emission-Reduction Technology Based on Cost Sharing and Coordination under Cost Subsidy Policy

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su12062203 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 12 (6) ◽

pp. 2203 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Shan Yu ◽

Qiang Hou ◽

Jiayi Sun

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Equilibrium Strategy ◽

Game Model ◽

Carbon Trading ◽

Subsidy Policy ◽

Investment Game ◽

The Cost ◽

Over Time

Climate change and greenhouse gas emission reduction have become common concerns. Carbon trading systems and low-carbon cost subsidies are important emission reduction measures. Impacts of a combination of the two policies on micro-supply chain emission-reduction technology investment have become a focal research area. This paper: (1) constructs an investment game model based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy between manufacturers and retailers; (2) examines the equilibrium strategy and optimal results according to the interests and game relationships of each stakeholder; and (3) explores the effectiveness of supply chain enterprise behavior based on cost-sharing coordination under the cost subsidy. This paper uses a numerical simulation method to compare the path evolution under different scenarios and to analyze the sensitivity of parameters, identifying the influence of various parameters on the general structure and pathways. The study finds that the cost subsidy policy has a regulatory effect on enterprise emission reduction investment and enterprise profit under a carbon trading system, and the difference caused by the regulation effect is enhanced over time. The study also shows that the dynamic path of each parameter strengthens over time.

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Competing Retailers’ Environmental Investment: An Analysis under Different Power Structures

Energies ◽

10.3390/en11102719 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 11 (10) ◽

pp. 2719

Author(s):

Xuyue Li

Keyword(s):

Emission Reduction ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Green Technology ◽

Power Structures ◽

Unit Tax ◽

Nash Game ◽

Effect Factor ◽

Investment Cost ◽

High Investment ◽

Sustainable Investment

Sustainability issues in supply chains have received increasingly significant concern. Facing incentives such as environmental tax and consumer environmental awareness, firms and even retailers have started to make sustainability investments. To evaluate the retailer’s contribution to sustainability issues, we study a supply chain with one manufacturer and two symmetric competing retailers who have the option to make sustainable investment in their upstream members directly in green technology or clean production. We investigate the optimal sustainable investment and operation decisions under three power structures: (1) firms have the same power (Nash game); (2) the manufacturer is more powerful (Manufacturer-lead Stackelberg game) and (3) the retailers are more powerful (Retailer-lead Stackelberg game). By analyzing the optimal decisions and the economic performances, we show that the retailers always have incentives to make sustainable investment in all power structures. However, the retailers’ power affects firms’ decisions, the economic and the environmental performances. When the investment cost is low, the emission reduction due to investment is the most significant with less powerful retailers. With relatively high investment cost, whether the retailers having more power make more sustainable investment depends on the unit tax saving and effect factor of emission reduction on the demand. From the environmental perspective, simultaneous games may conduct the most significant total emission reduction in most cases. We also consider an asymmetric case and compare it with the symmetric one.

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