scholarly journals Dispute Settlement in Investment-Related Matters: South Africa and the BRICS

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 212-216
Author(s):  
Engela C. Schlemmer

Many states use investment treaties to spur economic development by granting legal protections to foreign investors and providing for direct enforcement before international arbitral tribunals. Yet South Africa has taken a different course. As explained below, South Africa originally signed onto a number of investment treaties despite barely considering how the resulting obligations would affect its constitutional commitments and the authority of its domestic courts. After the shock of losing its first two treaty-based investment disputes, the country shifted from avidly entering into bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to opposing BITs absent compelling economic and political reasons to conclude them. Today South Africa seeks to replace investment treaties and investor-state arbitration with protections under domestic legislation, along with mediation and dispute resolution before domestic courts. In this essay, I describe this shift and explore three difficult and yet-to-be-resolved questions that it presents: (1) Will foreign investors still be able to rely on protections under international law when bringing domestic cases? (2) If so, will the South African Constitution, as a matter of domestic law, displace any relevant commitments under international law? And (3) is the new South African approach consistent with international law?

Author(s):  
Enelia Jansen van Rensburg

The Commentaries to the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital are at times consulted by South African courts when double taxation agreements are interpreted. The question considered in this article is the nature of the interaction, if any, between these Commentaries and section 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 233 requires a court to prefer a reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law over other interpretations that are not consistent with international law. The contribution analyses various aspects of the wording of section 233, including the meaning of the phrase ‘international law’. It points out the various roles that transnational sources may play with regard to section 233, for example these sources may either constitute the ‘international law’ to which section 233 refers, or they may be aids to the interpretation of those sources that constitute ‘international law’. The contribution considers which of these roles the Commentaries are most likely to play for purposes of section 233.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-263
Author(s):  
Tarcisio Gazzini

The South African Protection of Investment Act 2015 is a strong response to the perceived inadequacy of investment treaties, which are facing growing criticism for their unbalanced character, the undue restrictions on policy space and the shortcomings of the mechanism for the settlement of disputes. While other states have opted for a revision of their treaty models (i.e. India), concluded innovative BITs (i.e. the BIT between Morocco and Nigeria, not yet in force) or preferred facilitation agreements (i.e. Brazil), South Africa has taken a different route based on the assumption that domestic legislation is more appropriate than international legal instruments to regulate foreign investment. The Act is firmly anchored to the Constitution and provides a level of substantive and procedural protection that efficiently preserves South African sovereign prerogatives, but definitely falls short of that commonly ensured under international investment treaties. While states obviously need to balance the private and public rights and obligations at stake with a view to pursuing their economic and social development policies, it remains to be seen whether the drastic reduction in the protection of foreign investors operated by the Act was unavoidable and what impact it may have on the flow of foreign investment to South Africa. The article ultimately reflects on the implications of the Act from the standpoint of the protection enjoyed by foreign investors under both customary international law and investment treaties currently binding South Africa.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Alli Chicktay

The right to strike is a fundamental human right recognized in international law and the South African Constitution. If “strike” is defined too narrowly it would deny protection that would normally be given to employees who would otherwise be participating in a strike. On the other hand if “strike” were defined too broadly it would categorize as strike action that would not normally be regarded as a strike: thus subjecting these employees to serious consequences that result from participating in an unprotected strike. These may include dismissals, interdicts and claims for compensation. South Africa has a constitutional obligation to comply with international law when interpreting human rights. The purpose of this article is to determine whether South African law defines “strike” in compliance with International Labour Organisation standards and to make suggestions for amendments to the lawwhere it fails to do so.


Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter explores umbrella clauses. In order to protect investor–state commitments and obligations from obsolescence, many investment treaties contain a clause defining the treatment that the host state will give to obligations it has made to investors or investments covered by the treaty. Known commonly as ‘umbrella clauses’, such provisions generally stipulate that ‘each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to the investments of investors of the other Contracting Party’. The umbrella clause creates an exception to a well-established principle of international law concerning state contracts with, and obligations to, foreign investors. Its intent is to impose an international treaty obligation on host countries that requires them to respect obligations they have entered into with respect to investments protected by the treaty. This places such obligations under the protective umbrella of international law, not just the domestic law that would otherwise normally apply exclusively. The chapter then looks at the formulations and application of the umbrella clause.


Author(s):  
Laurence Juma ◽  
James Tsabora

This article discusses the possibility of South Africa enacting a new law regulating private military/security companies (PMSCs) beyond the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act of 2006. It argues that such a possibility arises from the policy direction expressed in the Defence Review of 2012, and the recent developments at the international level, which indicate a shift towards accommodation of PMSCs as legitimate players in the security sector. The article surveys the current state of national and international law relating to PMSCs and illustrates how the emerging shift from prohibition to regulation has affirmed the need for legislative intervention in this field. It concludes that since the future is on the side of regulation and not prohibition, legislation that furthers the policy agenda envisioned by the Defence Review 2012 may be the best tool to unlock the inhibitions of the past and create a viable climate for reframing the debate on domestic law governing private militarism in South Africa.


Author(s):  
Enelia Jansen van Rensburg

General renvoi clauses in DTAs based on article 3(2) of the OECD MTC provide that an undefined term in a DTA shall have the meaning that it has in the domestic law of the contracting state applying the DTA unless the context otherwise requires. All South African DTAs include such a clause. Many interpretational issues remain with regard to the application and interpretation of general renvoi clauses. This article considers four of these issues in the light of South African cases in which general renvoi clauses were referred to. The following cases are considered: ITC 789 (1954) 19 SATC 434, Baldwins (South Africa) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue (1961) 24 SATC 270 and Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 15 (SCA). The first of the issues considered in the article is relevant in those cases where a DTA includes a general renvoi clause based on the pre-1995 version of article 3(2) and where amendments were made to a relevant domestic meaning after the conclusion of the particular DTA. These clauses do not expressly state whether the relevant domestic meaning is the domestic meaning existing at the time of the conclusion of the DTA, or at the time of the application of the DTA. The second issue arises if the expression used in the domestic law is not identical to the undefined treaty term. The question is whether the expression in the domestic law can be used to give meaning to the treaty term under the general renvoi clause. Another interpretational issue considered in the article concerns deeming provisions in the domestic law. The issue is whether a meaning that a term is deemed to have under a provision in domestic legislation can be used under the general renvoi clause to give meaning to the undefined term in the DTA. The last issue deals with the meaning of the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires". The question raised is whether this phrase means that the domestic meaning should be given only as a "last resort", or whether it should apply unless "reasonably strong" arguments to the contrary are made


Author(s):  
Erika De Wet

The Fick case which was decided by the Constitutional Court on 27 June 2013 was the first time since its inception that the Constitutional Court was confronted with the status of a binding international decision within the domestic legal order. It concerned a binding decision by the (now suspended) Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal against Zimbabwe, which was also enforceable in South Africa. A key issue before the Court was whether or not the South African statutory rules of civil procedure for the enforcement of foreign judgments also covered judgments of international courts and tribunals (as anticipated by Article 32(1) of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal). As none of the relevant statutory legislation was applicable in this instance, the common law remained the only possible avenue through which the SADC Tribunal’s decision could be enforced in South Africa. At the time of the decision, the common law on the enforcement of civil judgments had developed only to a point where it provided for the execution of judgments made by domestic courts of a foreign state (ie decisions of other national courts). The Court was therefore confronted with whether or not an international decision in the form of a cost order of the SADC Tribunal amounted to a “foreign judgment” as recognized by the South African common law. The Court answered this question in the affirmative by relying on those clauses in the Constitution that committed South Africa to the rule of law, as well as its obligations under international law, and to an international-law friendly interpretation of domestic law. Although the decision is to be welcomed and applied the law correctly to the facts of the case, it does raise the issue of the wisdom of equating international judgments with foreign judgments on a more general scale. This relates to the fact that it is generally accepted in most jurisdictions that the recognition and enforcement of a “foreign judgment” can be denied where it would result in a violation of domestic public policy. The public policy exception does not, however, fit well in a regime based on public international law, which does not permit States to use their domestic law as an excuse for not implementing their international obligations.


Author(s):  
Gus Van Harten

Governments are rightly discussing reform of investment treaties, and of the powerful system of ‘investor–state dispute settlement’ (ISDS) upon which they rest. It is therefore important to be clear about the crux of the problem. ISDS treaties are flawed fundamentally because they firmly institute wealth-based inequality under international law. That is, they use cross-border ownership of assets, mostly by multinationals and billionaires, as the gateway to extraordinary protections, while denying equivalent safeguards to those who lack the wealth required to qualify as foreign investors. The treaties thus have the main effect of safeguarding an awe-inspiring set of rights and privileges for the ultra-wealthy at the expense of countries and their populations. This book shows how ISDS came to explode in a global context of extreme concentration of wealth and of widespread poverty. The history of early ISDS treaties is highlighted to show their ties to decolonization and, sometimes, extreme violence and authoritarianism. Focusing on early ISDS lawsuits and rulings reveals how a small group of lawyers and arbitrators worked to create the legal foundations for massive growth of ISDS since 2000. ISDS-based protections are examined in detail to demonstrate how they give exceptional advantages to the wealthy. Examples are offered of how the protections have been used to reconfigure state decision making and shift sovereign minds in favour of foreign investors. Finally, the ongoing efforts of governments to reform ISDS are surveyed, with a call to go further or, even better, to withdraw from the treaties.


Author(s):  
M K Ingle

The Bill of Rights contained within South Africa’s Constitution features a number of ‘socio- economic rights’. Although these rights are justiciable they are subject to various limitations. They generally entail a positive onus on the part of the state to provide some good – not immediately, but ‘progressively’. Women have a direct interest in the realization of these rights and, where given effect to, they should exert a positive developmental impact. Some authorities are, however, of the opinion that socio-economic rights are not really enforceable. This article contends that the provision of social goods, by the state, should be the concomitant of the disciplined implementation of policy. Delivery should not therefore be contingent upon the legalistic vagaries of the human rights environment.Keywords: Socio-economic rights; justiciability; Bill of Rights; development; South African Constitution; womenDisciplines: Development Studies;Human Rights; Gender Studies; Political Science


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