The Constitutional Right to Asylum and Humanitarianism in Indonesian Law: “Foreign Refugees” and PR 125/2016

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Bilal Dewansyah ◽  
Ratu Durotun Nafisah

Abstract Article 28G(2) in Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution reflects a human rights approach to asylum; it guarantees “the right to obtain political asylum from another country,” together with freedom from torture. It imposes an obligation upon the state to give access to basic rights to those to whom it offers asylum, following an appropriate determination procedure. By contrast, in Presidential Regulation No. 125 of 2016 concerning the Treatment of Refugees, the Indonesian government’s response to asylum seekers and refugees is conceptualized as “humanitarian assistance,” and through a politicized and securitized immigration-control approach. We argue that the competition between these three approaches—the human right to asylum, humanitarianism, and immigration control—constitutes a “triangulation” of asylum and refugee protection in Indonesia, in which the latter two prevail. In light of this framework, this article provides a socio-political and legal analysis of why Article 28G(2) has not been widely accepted as the basis of asylum and refugee protection in Indonesia.

Author(s):  
Antje Missbach ◽  
Trish Cameron

Abstract This article presents an account of Faduma, a Somali woman currently living in Jakarta, Indonesia, in order to illustrate the creativity, resilience and adaptability required to make do as a refugee with little to no formal support in a rather hostile environment. For Faduma, Indonesia presents such an environment. As it offers no formal protection for asylum seekers and refugees and only tolerates their temporary presence without guaranteeing them any fundamental rights, such as the right to work, it can be characterised as a ‘deviant destination’ for refugees in search of durable and effective solutions. This article analyses Faduma's strategies, embedded in the macro-political context of forced migration, the Global North's externalised border policies, the absence of safe pathways, and the lack of proper refugee protection in Southeast Asia, for finding informal employment, attaining new skills and education, and forming strategic friendships with Indonesians and expatriates as a means of dealing with racism, exploitation and multifaceted precarity. We selected Faduma's case from amongst a number of encounters that we had with Somali refugees in Indonesia because of her extraordinary involvement with the Somali community. While the current toleration of refugee activities by Indonesian authorities enables refugees to survive in transit, we argue that such unintentional and informal protection is not a durable approach for larger groups of refugees enduring prolonged periods of waiting.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen ◽  
Nikolas F. Tan

Asylum seekers and refugees continue to face serious obstacles in their efforts to access asylum. Some of these obstacles are inherent to irregular migration, including dangerous border crossings and the risk of exploitation. Yet, refugees also face state-made obstacles in the form of sophisticated migration control measures. As a result, refugees are routinely denied access to asylum as developed states close their borders in the hope of shifting the flow of asylum seekers to neighboring countries. Restrictive migration control policies are today the primary, some might say only, response of the developed world to rising numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. This has produced a distorted refugee regime both in Europe and globally — a regime fundamentally based on the principle of deterrence rather than human rights protection. While the vast majority of European states still formally laud the international legal framework to protect refugees, most of these countries simultaneously do everything in their power to exclude those fleeing international protection and offer only a minimalist engagement to assist those countries hosting the largest number of refugees. By deterring or blocking onward movement for refugees, an even larger burden is placed upon these host countries. Today, 86 percent of the world's refugees reside in a low- or middle-income country, against 70 percent 20 years ago (Edwards 2016; UNHCR 2015, 15). The humanitarian consequences of this approach are becoming increasingly clear. Last year more than 5,000 migrants and refugees were registered dead or missing in the Mediterranean (IOM 2016). A record number, this makes the Mediterranean account for more than two-thirds of all registered migrant fatalities worldwide (IOM 2016). Many more asylum seekers are subjected to various forms of violence and abuse during the migratory process as a result of their inherently vulnerable and clandestine position. As the industry facilitating irregular migration grows, unfortunately so too do attempts to exploit migrants and refugees by smugglers, criminal networks, governments, or members of local communities (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2013). The “deterrence paradigm” can be understood as a particular instantiation of the global refugee protection regime. It shows how deterrence policies have come to dominate responses to asylum seekers arriving in developed states, and how such policies have continued to develop in response to changes in migration patterns as well as legal impositions. The dominance of the deterrence paradigm also explains the continued reliance on deterrence as a response to the most recent “crisis,” despite continued calls from scholars and civil society for a more protection-oriented and sustainable response. The paper argues that the current “crisis,” more than a crisis in terms of refugee numbers and global protection capacity, should be seen a crisis in terms of the institutionalized responses so far pursued by states. Deterrence policies are being increasingly challenged, both by developments in international law and by less wealthy states left to shoulder the vast majority of the world's refugees. At the same time, recent events suggest that deterrence policies may not remain an effective tool to prevent secondary movement of refugees in the face of rising global protection needs, while deterrence involves increasing direct and indirect costs for the states involved. The present situation may thus be characterized as, or at least approaching, a period of paradigm crisis, and we may be seeing the beginning of the end for deterrence as a dominant policy paradigm in regard to global refugee policy. In its place, a range of more or less developed alternative policy frameworks are currently competing, though so far none of them appear to have gained sufficient traction to initiate an actual paradigm shift in terms of global refugee policy. Nonetheless, recognizing this as a case of possible paradigm change may help guide and structure this process. In particular, any successful new policy approach would have to address the fundamental challenges facing the old paradigm. The paper proceeds in four parts. Firstly, it traces the rise of the deterrence paradigm following the end of the Cold War and the demise of ideologically driven refugee protection on the part of states in the Global North. The past 30 years have seen the introduction and dynamic development of manifold deterrence policies to stymie the irregular arrival of asylum seekers and migrants. This array of measures is explored in the second part of the paper through a typology of five current practices that today make up “normal policymaking” within the deterrence regime. Third, the paper argues that the current paradigm is under threat, facing challenges to its legality from within refugee and human rights law; to its sustainability due to the increasing unhappiness of refugee-hosting states with current levels of “burden-sharing”; and to its effectiveness as direct and indirect costs of maintaining the regime mount. Finally, the paper puts forward three core principles that can lay the groundwork in the event of a paradigm shift: respect for international refugee law; meaningful burden-sharing; and a broader notion of refugee protection that encompasses livelihoods and increased preparedness in anticipation of future refugee flows.


2019 ◽  
pp. 264-286
Author(s):  
William Edward Heuva

Namibia is one of the emerging democracies that have not yet enacted the Access to Information legislation. While the country has guaranteed freedom of expression and media in its constitution, it has not provided for Access to Information as a constitutional right. This chapter seeks to examine Namibia's reluctance to adopt an Access to Information legislation. It interrogates views that locate the omission of this fundamental human right in the country's constitutional (legal) and policy frameworks. It underscores the failure by Namibia to reverse the information black-out suffered under the Apartheid dispensation. The chapter starts with a theoretical/philosophical rationale for the right to know to elicit an understanding of this discourse and its relevance to emerging democracies, such as Namibia. It then examines attempts by state and civil society to introduce the legislation in the country. Predicted on praxis, the chapter in conclusion provides some suggestions that may help resolving the impasse in adopting the Access to Information legislation in the county.


2021 ◽  
pp. 189-207
Author(s):  
Barbara Herman

This chapter considers the structural effect on the system of duties that would come with recognizing a human right to housing. If there is such a right, there is pressure on the interpretation of a property system to support hybrid moral value connecting possession and the conditions of moral status. An extended example shows how, as a system constraint, the right requires a division of moral labor between individuals and public institutions, juridical and ethical duties, especially when there are natural or social crises around housing. The arguments around a right to housing are then extended to the conditions of refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons. The claim in innate right to be somewhere implies that wherever such persons present themselves counts as a moral port of entry to temporary residence and subsequent patriation that all states have a duty to support.


Author(s):  
Veronika A. Fadeeva ◽  

Introduction. The addition of the section “Information on the cost of medical services rendered” to “Public Services”, the state information system, allowed the citizens of the Russian Federation to receive relevant information promptly. This possibility soon exacerbated the problem of unreliability of information about the medical services provided to the insured persons under compulsory medical insurance. The article defends a position based on the legal analysis of the legislation of the Russian Federation in the sphere of compulsory medical insurance. According to this position, the problem can be overcome by appropriate changes in the regulatory documents governing the control powers of the territorial funds of compulsory medical insurance, health insurance organizations. Theoretical analysis. The right to reliable information is enshrined in a number of regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation, the analysis of which allows us to investigate the problem of unreliability of information in the system of compulsory medical insurance (“medical prescriptions”). Empirical analysis. Identification of unreliability of information about the provided medical services can be carried out both by the insured persons under compulsory medical insurance and through the control of the competent authorities. In this regard, the article analyzes the control powers of the territorial funds of compulsory medical insurance, medical insurance organizations. Results. The result of the author’s analysis of the problem of unreliability of information in the system of compulsory medical insurance (“medical attributions”) is a proposal to improve the procedure for organizing and monitoring the volume, timing, quality and conditions of providing medical care for compulsory medical insurance.


2020 ◽  
pp. 140-162
Author(s):  
Celia Fernández Aller

It is not true that the idea of the right to subsistence should not give rise to much controversy. In fact, social rights are not considered as fundamental rights by everyone. The aim of this paper is to analyze whether abstract social rights –and the right to subsistence in particular- should be put in constitutions and laws and if judges should be given powers to interpret them. The philosophical foundations and the content of the right are studied and five great challenges are presented, although the most powerful one is to focus on the social and political enforceability of the fundamental right to subsistence. Assessing the effectiveness of the right to subsistence, and the right to food particularly, is a complex issue. In the legal discourse, the question seems to be only suggested.  Even when the Constitutions expressly recognize this right in some countries, its implementation faces many constraints. The progressive realization of ESC rights requires a complex interaction of policies and programs in a wide range of sectors and institutions.The scientific method used in this work is the legal-sociological method, regarding the understanding of the rules, the lack of them, their effectiveness,  etc.   Several methodological techniques have been used, such as social and legal analysis, legal deduction and induction, description and interdisciplinarity.


Author(s):  
Caiphas Brewsters Soyapi

The southern African region’s water-related problems are quite diverse. From the struggles of indigenous communities in Botswana to the cholera outbreaks in Zimbabwe; from the difficulties of poor communities in accessing basic water services to the disputes between municipal councils and individual well-to-do water users, it is abundantly evident that water security is a goal/vision that needs to be pursued by governments. Yet, much of the holistic scholarly focus on water security within the region has been on transboundary water management, to the exclusion of local/national water constitutional frameworks. Through four cases from Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe the paper addresses selected aspects of the varied water issues, in particular the constitutional right to water and how that impacts on water security within the region. The literature and case law reviewed in the paper indicate that while there are benefits to constitutionalising the right to water as a fundamental right, courts are still able to read the right to water into existing rights, especially the right to life. However, reading in has its own limitations, including that courts sometimes leave hanging/unpronounced government duties/responsibilities where the right to water is not provided for. Accordingly, the paper attempts to show that while the right to water could be read into other existing rights like the right to life, water security could be better achieved through an independent constitutional human right to water, which creates constitutional duties on the state. 


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 614-644 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Kanstroom

This article considers the relationship between two human rights discourses (and two specific legal regimes): refugee and asylum protection and the evolving body of international law that regulates expulsions and deportations. Legal protections for refugees and asylum seekers are, of course, venerable, well-known, and in many respects still cherished, if challenged and perhaps a bit frail. Anti-deportation discourse is much newer, multifaceted, and evolving. It is in many respects a young work in progress. It has arisen in response to a rising tide of deportations, and the worrisome development of massive, harsh deportation machinery in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Mexico, Australia, and South Africa, among others. This article's main goal is to consider how these two discourses do and might relate to each other. More specifically, it suggests that the development of procedural and substantive rights against removal — as well as rights during and after removal — aids our understanding of the current state and possible future of the refugee protection regime. The article's basic thesis is this: The global refugee regime, though challenged both theoretically and in practice, must be maintained and strengthened. Its historical focus on developing criteria for admission into safe states, on protections against expulsion (i.e., non-refoulement), and on regimes of temporary protection all remain critically important. However, a focus on other protections for all noncitizens facing deportation is equally important. Deportation has become a major international system that transcends the power of any single nation-state. Its methods have migrated from one regime to another; its size and scope are substantial and expanding; its costs are enormous; and its effects frequently constitute major human rights violations against millions who do not qualify as refugees. In recent years there has been increasing reliance by states on generally applicable deportation systems, led in large measure by the United States' radical 25 year-plus experiment with large-scale deportation. Europe has also witnessed a rising tide of deportation, some of which has developed in reaction to European asylum practices. Deportation has been facilitated globally (e.g., in Australia) by well-funded, efficient (but relatively little known) intergovernmental idea sharing, training, and cooperation. This global expansion, standardization, and increasing intergovernmental cooperation on deportation has been met by powerful — if in some respects still nascent — human rights responses by activists, courts, some political actors, and scholars. It might seem counterintuitive to think that emerging ideas about deportation protections could help refugees and asylum seekers, as those people by definition often have greater rights protections both in admission and expulsion. However, the emerging anti-deportation discourses should be systematically studied by those interested in the global refugee regime for three basic reasons. First, what Matthew Gibney has described as “the deportation turn” has historically been deeply connected to anxiety about asylum seekers. Although we lack exact figures of the number of asylum seekers who have been subsequently expelled worldwide, there seems little doubt that it has been a significant phenomenon and will be an increasingly important challenge in the future. The two phenomena of refugee/asylum protections and deportation, in short, are now and have long been linked. What has sometimes been gained through the front door, so to speak, may be lost through the back door. Second, current deportation human rights discourses embody creative framing models that might aid constructive critique and reform of the existing refugee protection regime. They tend to be more functionally oriented, less definitional in terms of who warrants protection, and more fluid and transnational. Third, these discourses offer important specific rights protections that could strengthen the refugee and asylum regime, even as we continue to see weakening state support for the basic 1951/1967 protection regime. This is especially true in regard to the extraterritorial scope of the (deporting) state's obligations post-deportation. This article particularly examines two initiatives in this emerging field: The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens and the draft Declaration on the Rights of Expelled and Deported Persons developed through the Boston College Post-Deportation Human Rights Project (of which the author is a co-director). It compares their provisions to the existing corpus of substantive and procedural protections for refugees relating to expulsion and removal. It concludes with consideration of how these discourses may strengthen protections for refugees while also helping to develop more capacious and protective systems in the future. “Those guarantees of liberty and livelihood are the essence of the freedom which this country from the beginning has offered the people of all lands. If those rights, great as they are, have constitutional protection, I think the more important one — the right to remain here — has a like dignity.” Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, 19522 “We need a national effort to return those who have been rejected … and we are working on that at the moment with great vigor.” Angela Merkel, October 15, 20163


Author(s):  
Sarah Song

Immigration and Democracy develops an intermediate ethical position on immigration between closed borders and open borders. It argues that states have the right to control borders, but this right is qualified by an obligation to assist those outside their borders. In democratic societies, the right of immigration control must also be exercised in ways that are consistent with democratic values. Part I explores the normative grounds of the modern state’s power over immigration found in US immigration law and in political theory. It argues for a qualified, not absolute, right of states to control immigration based on a particular interpretation of the value of collective self-determination. Part II considers the case for open borders. One argument for open borders rests on the demands of global distributive justice; another argument emphasizes the value of freedom of movement as a fundamental human right. The book argues that both arguments fall short of justifying open borders. Part III turns to consider the substance of immigration policy for democratic societies. What kind of immigration policies should democratic societies adopt? What is required is not closed borders or open borders but controlled borders and open doors. Open to whom? The interests of prospective migrants must be weighed against the interests of the political community. Specific chapters are devoted to refugees and other necessitous migrants, family-based immigration, temporary worker programs, discretionary admissions, and what is owed to noncitizen residents, including unauthorized migrants living in the territory of democratic states.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1029-1051
Author(s):  
Rashri Baboolal-Frank ◽  
Fola Adeleke

Abstract In South Africa, the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) gives effect to the right of access information in Section 32 of the South African Constitution (the Constitution). Section 7 of PAIA provides that PAIA does not apply to records required for criminal or civil proceedings after commencement of proceedings where access to that record is already provided for in any other law. Where records are obtained in contravention of Section 7, they are not admissible as evidence in criminal or civil proceedings. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the discovery rules of Court limit the constitutional right of everyone to access information. Consequently, the methodology employed in this paper involves a legal analysis namely: a limitations analysis utilising Section 36, the limitations clause of the Constitution. This paper further engages in case law analysis interpreting the exercise of the right of access to information before PAIA was passed and after PAIA was passed to highlight the anomaly of the application of Section 7. This paper argues that Section 7 unconstitutionally limits the ambit of the right of access to information and a direct constitutional challenge on this provision is necessary.


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