The fall and rise of the American petty bourgeoisie

Class Counts ◽  
2000 ◽  
pp. 67-78
Keyword(s):  
1973 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikki R. Keddie

The Middle East, as a geographical term, is generally used today to cover the area stretching from Morocco through Afghanistan, and is roughly equivalent to the area of the first wave of Muslim conquests plus Anatolia. It is a predominantly Muslim area with widespread semi-arid and desert conditions where agriculture is heavily dependent on irrigation and pastoral nomadism has been prevalent. With the twentieth-century rise of exclusive linguistic nationalisms, which have taken over many of the emotional overtones formerly concentrated on religious loyalties, it becomes increasingly doubtful that the Middle East is now much more than a geographical expression – covering an area whose inhabitants respond to very different loyalties and values. In Turkey since the days of Atatürk, the ruling and educated élites have gone out of their way to express their identification with Europe and the West and to turn their backs on their traditional Islamic heritage. A glorification of the ‘modern’ and populist elements in the ancient Turkish and Ottoman past has gone along with a downgrading of Arab and Persian cultural influences–indeed the latter are often seen as having corrupted the pure Turkish essence, which only re-emerged with Atatürk’s swepping cultural reforms. Similarly the Iranians are increasingly emulating the technocratic and rationalizing values of the capitalist West, and in the cultural sphere identify with the glorious civilization of pre-Islamic Iran. This identification goes along with a downgrading of Islam and particularly of the Arabs, which has characterized both radical nationalists like the late nineteenth-century Mîrzâ Âqâ Khân Kirmânî and the twentieth-century Ahmad Kasravâ1 and more conservative official nationalists such as the Pahlavi Shahs and their followers. The recent celebrations of the 2500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy, for example, were notable for their virtual exclusion of the Muslim ulama, though religious leaders of other religious were invited, and their lack of specifically Islamic references. In both Iran and Turkey, traditional Islam has become largely a class phenomenon, with the traditional religion followed by a majority of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, but rejected or radically modified by the more educated classes. With the continued spread of Western-style secular education it may be expected that the numbers of people identifying with nationalism and with the West (or with the Communist rather than the Islamic East) will grow.


Author(s):  
Marija Sakac

A philistine is a person who tends to present himself/herself as being more worthy then he/she is indeed. This phenomenon has its origin in the social class of the petty bourgeoisie that appeared on the historical scene in the from of petty shopkeepers and craftsmen. The petty bourgeoisie can be seen as a social class, but, as philistinism, it can be seen as a form of a person's behavior determined by his/her specific mental structure. The following characteristics can be ascribed to a philistine: egoism, hatred, envy, and extreme moods. Competition for success is an important philistine's characteristic. A philistine uses etiquette as a means of his/her resourcefulness. As a result of social changes, on the social and cultural scene there are some new forms of philistinism called 'sponsorship'.


Author(s):  
Viktor F. Isaychikov

Тhe peasant revolts, wars, and revolutions known in history had both revolutionary and reactionary sides. A particularly complex interweaving was observed in Russia (USSR) in the first third of the 20th century due to the maximum number of economic structures and classes in the country and four revolutions. The main reason for the struggle of the peasant classes, including re-volts, was poverty, caused by both agrarian overpopulation and social causes, among which the main one before the October revolution was the remnants of feudalism. All four revolutions in Russia were largely peasant revolutions, but they differed in class composition and class leader-ship. As a result of the Great October socialist revolution, a joint dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry (the petty bourgeoisie) was established in the country, not predicted by K. Marx, but foreseen by V.I. Lenin. However, the small working class after V.I. Lenin’s death could not hold on to power, and as a result of the “Stalinist” counter-revolution, an internally unstable dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie (peasantry) was established in the country. We reveal the class processes in the peasantry that led to revolts and revolutions.


decolonisation in Africa since the latter generally implied that a compromise between the colonial power and the nationalist movement(s) is worked out in a constitutional conference which not only shaped the political system of the new post-colonial state, but also worked out the economic and financial obligations and arrangements of the new state vis-a-vis its previous colonial power. Frelimo's position that the Lusaka conference could only discuss the conditions of the transfer of power and not the content of the new power was accepted in the end by the Portuguese delegation. Furthermore, no agreements were made with respect to financial and economic ties as a carry-over from the colonial period. The concrete mechanism of the transfer of power was to take place through the immediate instalment of a transitional government in which Frelimo was the majority partner with Portuguese officials as the only remaining other partner. The immediate response to the agreements was the aborted attempt on the part of section of the settler population to seize power by means of Rhodesia-type unilateral declaration of independence. The period of the transitional government (up to independence in June 1975) and roughly the first two years after independence were characterised by the massive emigration of the settler population accompanied by an intense struggle waged by the colonial bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in an attempt to destabilise the economy as well as to export most of its capital (in whatever form). Hence economic sabotage in its various forms - destruction of equipment, and economic infrastructure; killing of cattle stock; large-scale dismissal of workers from productive enterprises and complete production standstills - were practised on a large scale all over the country. The export of capital also assumed enormous proportions and took various forms: the collapse of the (colonial) state apparatus and the fact that banks were privately owned meant that it was easy to arrange for acquiring foreign exchange to import goods without any imports subsequently materialising, or to export cashew, cotton, etc., without the foreign exchange ever returning to the national bank; furthermore, initially no control was organised over the export of personal belongings of returning settlers which led to massive buying in shops and depletion of stock of commodities; finally, the direct illegal exportation across the borders to South Africa and Rhodesia of trucks, tractors, equipment, cattle, etc., further depleted the available means of production in the country. With this context economic policy was dictated by the necessity to fight against the destabilisation of the economy propelled by the actions of the colonial bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie (as well as of skilled and admin-istrative workers). The legal weapon was a decree of February 1975 which specified that in proven cases of acts of sabotage (which included the massive dismissal of workers and deliberate production stoppages) the government could intervene by transferring the management of the enterprise to an appointed administrative council composed of workers and often members of the old management as well. The social force which concretised this policy were the dynamising groups - popular organisations of militants which were constituted at community level as well as in enterprises, public institutions and government administrations. The outcome of this intense struggle was a sharp production crisis which


Author(s):  
Christian Klösch

Division and Radicalisation. German Liberals and German Nationals 1850–1918. The developments in the 19th century laid the foundation for the spectrum of political parties that have determined the political landscape of Austria to the present day. Initially, German nationalism was shaped by a “liberal-thinking upper bourgeoisie”, but when the German National bloc broke up in the 1880s, an “aristocratically thinking petty bourgeoisie” took the lead. The political biography of Georg von Schönerer (1842–1921) reflects this development. From the remains of the German liberal ideology arose not only social democracy and Christian socialism but a German national “right wing”, economically liberal and state-supporting, and a “left wing”, ethnic, racist and anti-Semitic. These wings overlapped in many ways and their proponents often changed positions. Ultimately, Austrian German nationalist parties laid the ideological foundation upon which in the 20th century National Socialism built its ideology.


1994 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Baines

Studies of the politics of urban African communities in South Africa have focused on the sporadic manifestations of mass protest, identifying formal labour and political organizations as the prime agents of mobilization. Whilst some recognition has been accorded to the role played by vigilance and civic associations in contributing to the growth of community politics, Advisory Boards and other government-created institutions have been portrayed as ‘collaborationist’ bodies, and those serving on such Boards dismissed as ‘stooges’. Looking beyond the political rhetoric that has surrounded the Advisory Boards, the historical reality has been more complex. Although Advisory Boards lacked legitimacy, and were often powerless in policy terms, even progressive political organisations were prepared to use these ‘institutions of the oppressor’ to further their aims in the 1940s and 1950s. This case study of the politics of the New Brighton Advisory Board demonstrates the way in which such institutions provided a platform (albeit a limited one) from which African communities might be mobilized around the everyday issues of urban life. In this way, the Advisory Board contributed to the formation of a strong political tradition in the Port Elizabeth township. This tradition was appropriated by different political groups and used to mobilize the African community around a variety of social, economic and political issues affecting the township.


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