decolonisation in Africa since the latter generally implied that a compromise between the colonial power and the nationalist movement(s) is worked out in a constitutional conference which not only shaped the political system of the new post-colonial state, but also worked out the economic and financial obligations and arrangements of the new state vis-a-vis its previous colonial power. Frelimo's position that the Lusaka conference could only discuss the conditions of the transfer of power and not the content of the new power was accepted in the end by the Portuguese delegation. Furthermore, no agreements were made with respect to financial and economic ties as a carry-over from the colonial period. The concrete mechanism of the transfer of power was to take place through the immediate instalment of a transitional government in which Frelimo was the majority partner with Portuguese officials as the only remaining other partner. The immediate response to the agreements was the aborted attempt on the part of section of the settler population to seize power by means of Rhodesia-type unilateral declaration of independence. The period of the transitional government (up to independence in June 1975) and roughly the first two years after independence were characterised by the massive emigration of the settler population accompanied by an intense struggle waged by the colonial bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in an attempt to destabilise the economy as well as to export most of its capital (in whatever form). Hence economic sabotage in its various forms - destruction of equipment, and economic infrastructure; killing of cattle stock; large-scale dismissal of workers from productive enterprises and complete production standstills - were practised on a large scale all over the country. The export of capital also assumed enormous proportions and took various forms: the collapse of the (colonial) state apparatus and the fact that banks were privately owned meant that it was easy to arrange for acquiring foreign exchange to import goods without any imports subsequently materialising, or to export cashew, cotton, etc., without the foreign exchange ever returning to the national bank; furthermore, initially no control was organised over the export of personal belongings of returning settlers which led to massive buying in shops and depletion of stock of commodities; finally, the direct illegal exportation across the borders to South Africa and Rhodesia of trucks, tractors, equipment, cattle, etc., further depleted the available means of production in the country. With this context economic policy was dictated by the necessity to fight against the destabilisation of the economy propelled by the actions of the colonial bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie (as well as of skilled and admin-istrative workers). The legal weapon was a decree of February 1975 which specified that in proven cases of acts of sabotage (which included the massive dismissal of workers and deliberate production stoppages) the government could intervene by transferring the management of the enterprise to an appointed administrative council composed of workers and often members of the old management as well. The social force which concretised this policy were the dynamising groups - popular organisations of militants which were constituted at community level as well as in enterprises, public institutions and government administrations. The outcome of this intense struggle was a sharp production crisis which