Collective Religious Freedom as Associational Action: How Sociological Concepts Can Help Make Sense of the Jurisprudence

Author(s):  
Amy Swiffen

Abstract Religious freedom is protected by section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Historically, the right has been understood in individual terms, though the courts have acknowledged a collective dimension to religion as expressed in a community of believers. Yet, the precise meaning of collective religious freedom has not been fully fleshed out. The current case law only encompasses a limited range of forms of collective religious expression and does not articulate a coherent theory as to why some collective 2(a) claims succeed while others fail. This paper draws on concepts from interpretive sociology to help clarify the existing jurisprudence and reveal a tension that is otherwise invisible over the status of volition/voluntariness in the collective religious freedom framework. Addressing this tension can help rationalize the Court’s jurisprudence and give resources to critics looking to change how the law encompasses collective religious experience.

Author(s):  
Frans Viljoen

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is the newest of the three regional human rights courts. This brief analysis provides an overview of the most salient aspects of the Court’s 2018 case-law with respect to jurisdiction, provisional measures, admissibility, merits decisions, and reparations orders. Continuing its trajectory of increasing productivity, the Court in 2018 handed down the highest number of merits decisions in its brief history. As in previous years, most of these were fair-trial-related cases against Tanzania. The Court’s 2018 case-law contains a number of firsts. In Gombert v. Côte d’Ivoire, the Court for the first time ruled as inadmissible a case previously settled by an African subregional court, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States. In Anudo v. Tanzania, dealing with the right to nationality, the Court for the first time found a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the basis that the Declaration has attained the status of customary international law. In Makungu v. Tanzania, it for the first time ordered the applicant’s release as an appropriate remedy for serious fair trial violations. The Court’s most significant decision of 2018 is the Mali Marriage case, in which it held aspects of the 2011 Malian Family Code to be in violation not only of human rights treaties emanating from the African Union, but also the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 3-13 ◽  

The right to freedom of religion, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights has been frequently tested, both in UK courts and in the European Court of Human Rights, where successive decisions over a number of years led to the establishment of several well-known principles. However, in recent years religious extremism has brought into focus a tension between the right of freedom of religious expression and the well-being of individuals (not least children) and society. The Strasbourg court requires neutrality on the part of the state and its courts. However, unlike the European Court of Human Rights, the domestic courts have had to face situations where religious observance can be seen to be causing serious harm and where interference in religious freedom and family life has been shown to be justified.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Baines

This article addresses a research gap by analysing the way the Australian legal system is balancing the right to religious autonomy of organisations and the right of lgbti individuals not to be discriminated against, and considers what ought to be the case. I argue that the Australian legal system recognises the value of religious freedom on the one hand, and on the other hand, does not place a high priority on protecting it as an existing human right. My findings reveal that the Australian legal system is not always defining the religion and society relationship in ways that reflect the lived reality of religion in society. The issue is compounded by the wording of religious exemptions under anti-discrimination law which is contested within faith communities. As a consequence, religious freedom can be unfairly restricted. I conclude with recommendations to improve the status quo.


2019 ◽  
pp. 103-123
Author(s):  
Joanna Wojciechowicz

This article discusses the practical aspects of recognizing an occurrence as a work-re­lated injury. The Act of 30 October 2002 on Social Insurance against Work-related Injuries and Occupational Diseases (consolidated text of 2018, item 1376) contains only a general definition of a ‘work-related injury.’ Moreover, it does not specify the meaning of the terms which are used in it, particularly of terms such as a ‘sud­den occurrence’ or an ‘external cause.’ Many problems stem from a lack of criteria which should be used while deciding whether a ‘considerable contribution to the injury’ due to being under the influence of alcohol or drugs as defined in Article 21 of the Act has occurred. Therefore, during a preliminary investigation, a dis­ability pension authority must determine whether the occurrence in question is a work-related injury. To that end it investigates whether the insured person has contributed to this occurrence to a considerable degree because if he has, such a conduct excludes the right to a work injury benefit. Accordingly, employees of the Social Insurance Company examine the accident scene and collect information in the workplace, from the prosecutor’s office, the police, or the healthcare centre, or by interviewing witnesses. Having documented the factual circumstances and explained all the existing doubts they are then able to define the terms and draw correct conclusions which result in a decision to award a benefit or to refuse it. Owing to the fact that the regulations concerning issues of recognizing an oc­currence as a work-related injury and rights to a benefit are general clauses, it is necessary to be familiar with the current case-law. Without following the trends in the case-law of the Supreme Court one is not able to interpret facts and occur­rences properly and hence the assessment of whether the insured is entitled to a work injury benefit is not possible.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-80
Author(s):  
Rui Lanceiro

Since its inception, the concept of EU citizenship, as well as the rights and duties deriving therefrom, has evolved considerably, particularly in the area of social rights. ECJ case law has played a central role in defining the right of EU citizens to access social benefits in the host Member States, which meant a decrease in their degree of discretion to restrict the access to national social securities systems. However, the recent Dano and Alimanovic judgments represent a significant change from previous case-law, setting limits on the right of EU citizens to social benefits in the host Member States. The right of residence in another Member State appears to be dependent on the status of a worker citizen in accordance with the new methodology in order to avoid being an excessive burden on the social system of the host Member State. However, the new approach still leaves several unanswered questions. Were these decisions an attempt to address the “social security tourism” debate? Is the CJEU falling behind with regard to the protection of social rights? What will remain of previous jurisprudence?


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Panara

This article analyses the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the regions. It argues that there is a discrepancy between the progressive framing of a ‘Europe with the regions’ in the political sphere and the limited impact of the Court in this field. This discrepancy does not emerge everywhere, nor does it emerge with the same intensity in all sectors. Indeed, in a number of areas, the CJEU has acknowledged the role and responsibilities of the regions. Examples include the right/duty of the regions to implement EU obligations, the protection of regional languages, as well as the ‘sufficient autonomy’ test developed by the CJEU in relation to state aid. There is no ‘ideological opposition’ of the CJEU to an increasing ‘regionalisation’ of the EU. There are, however, structural hindrances that prevent the Court from promoting further advancements of the status of the regions in the European edifice, particularly as regards their participation in EU processes. Since the EU remains a ‘union of states’, the ‘Europe with the regions’ has developed so far, and is likely to continue to develop, via advancements reflected in policy-making practices, soft-law arrangements and Treaty amendments rather than via the ‘judge-made federalism’ of the Court.


2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-92
Author(s):  
Noel G. Villaroman

Abstract This article analyses the ramifications to the right to religious freedom when the design of proposed places of worship is subjected to architectural design controls imposed by Australian planning authorities. First, such design controls can impinge on the freedom of religious expression—that is, the ability of religious communities to express their beliefs through their built structures. Such expression of beliefs may be vital to their prescribed manner of worship, observance, practice or teaching. Second, they can pose a physical obstacle to a religious group’s freedom of religious exercise—that is, their actual conduct of rituals, ceremonies and other kinds of worship. It is argued that the rigid application of design controls hinders the ability of religious groups in Australia to fully exercise their right to establish and maintain places of worship which is a constituent element of the right to religious freedom as guaranteed in international human rights law.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cássia Juliana de Souza Monteiro

In this study, we used as a basis the examination of the German Constitutional Court case law of January 27th, 2015, in which the right of two Muslim employees at public schools to use hijab in the workplace was discussed. We cover the protection of religious freedom in Germany, as defined in art. 4th of the German Basic Law; the relevance of abstract risk and concrete risk in the rationale for an eventual restriction on the fundamental right to religious freedom; the difference and the application of “weighting” and “proportionality”, within the scope of the constitutional interpretation principle of “practical agreement”, where the legal assets to be protected must be coordinated with each other, so that each of them, individually, gain reality, being applied in the relationship “positive religious freedom v. negative religious freedom”; and we highlight the importance of the concept of “neutrality” adopted by States, where some of them are based on secularity and others on secularism.


Temida ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
Milica Kovacevic

The paper deals with rights and position of victims in international documents, with special reference to the standards created by the European Court of Human Rights through its practice. This paper aims to provide brief analysis of some of the most important international documents, which set forth basic rights for victims, including: right to participate in the criminal proceedings, right to protection and the right to compensation. The paper intends to analyze these key right (standards, principles) through relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, given that the wording of the relevant documents does not determine what entails the realization of a specific standard in real life. The main purpose of the article is to examine the compliance of regulations and practices in Serbia with international standards on the status and the rights of victims, from which some recommendations for improvement might arise.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.


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