scholarly journals Tryb postępowania przed organem rentowym w sprawach świadczeń z tytułu wypadku przy pracy

2019 ◽  
pp. 103-123
Author(s):  
Joanna Wojciechowicz

This article discusses the practical aspects of recognizing an occurrence as a work-re­lated injury. The Act of 30 October 2002 on Social Insurance against Work-related Injuries and Occupational Diseases (consolidated text of 2018, item 1376) contains only a general definition of a ‘work-related injury.’ Moreover, it does not specify the meaning of the terms which are used in it, particularly of terms such as a ‘sud­den occurrence’ or an ‘external cause.’ Many problems stem from a lack of criteria which should be used while deciding whether a ‘considerable contribution to the injury’ due to being under the influence of alcohol or drugs as defined in Article 21 of the Act has occurred. Therefore, during a preliminary investigation, a dis­ability pension authority must determine whether the occurrence in question is a work-related injury. To that end it investigates whether the insured person has contributed to this occurrence to a considerable degree because if he has, such a conduct excludes the right to a work injury benefit. Accordingly, employees of the Social Insurance Company examine the accident scene and collect information in the workplace, from the prosecutor’s office, the police, or the healthcare centre, or by interviewing witnesses. Having documented the factual circumstances and explained all the existing doubts they are then able to define the terms and draw correct conclusions which result in a decision to award a benefit or to refuse it. Owing to the fact that the regulations concerning issues of recognizing an oc­currence as a work-related injury and rights to a benefit are general clauses, it is necessary to be familiar with the current case-law. Without following the trends in the case-law of the Supreme Court one is not able to interpret facts and occur­rences properly and hence the assessment of whether the insured is entitled to a work injury benefit is not possible.

2019 ◽  
pp. 159-173
Author(s):  
Joanna Wojciechowicz

This paper deals with the problems relating to the obligation to return the sickness benefit in the event when an insured person takes up paid employment during confirmed incapacity for work due to illness. The reason for this analysis is the non-uniform or inconsistent practice of the Supreme Court. In the majority of its issued verdicts, the opinion of the Supreme Court is that the the claim for returning the undue bene-fit paid ought to be withdrawn and cancelled if there was no information provided in the instruction about the circumstances that may lead to the forfeiture of the entitlement to statutory sickness benefit under Article 17(1) of the Act of 25 June 1999 on cash benefits from social insurance in case of sickness and maternity. However, there is also a different standpoint according to which the lack of instruction is not a sufficient basis for adjudicating that the insured party is not obliged to return this benefit. In its judgments, the Supreme Court emphasises the importance of the way in which the insured person acts. Submitting a sick leave and performing paid work is tantamount to misleading the disability pension body as to the circumstances that determine the right to a sickness be-nefit. Divergences in the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court have an impact on the judgments issued by common courts, which results in different decisions in cases of identical factual status. The non-uni-form case law of common courts has a direct impact on the situation of individual beneficiaries. Despite the same factual circumstances some insured individuals have to return the benefit whereas others are exempted from this obligation. This creates secondary inequality of the insured persons who constitute a group of similar subjects and is inconsistent with the principle of equality expressed in Article 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenggang Liu

Although the country has achieved leapfrog development in recent years, all walks of life have made great progress, but due to the short development time, there is still a certain gap in laws and systems compared with developed countries, and there is still a lot to improve the place. For example, the current legal concept of "work-related injury" is absent, and the concepts of "occupational infectious disease" and "occupational disease" have not been censored. Actually, there are no clear regulations and implementation when the identification is carried out. At this stage, the lack of general provisions for the identification of workrelated injuries and the closure of the identification of occupational infectious diseases have made the application of the law for the identification of work-related injuries of infectious diseases quite embarrassing. Based on this, this article elaborates on the legal application dilemma existing in the identification of work-related injuries of infectious diseases, and puts forward some opinions based on its own practical experience, hoping to have a certain reference significance for improving the legal application of workrelated injury identification of infectious diseases in my country.


Author(s):  
Amy Swiffen

Abstract Religious freedom is protected by section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Historically, the right has been understood in individual terms, though the courts have acknowledged a collective dimension to religion as expressed in a community of believers. Yet, the precise meaning of collective religious freedom has not been fully fleshed out. The current case law only encompasses a limited range of forms of collective religious expression and does not articulate a coherent theory as to why some collective 2(a) claims succeed while others fail. This paper draws on concepts from interpretive sociology to help clarify the existing jurisprudence and reveal a tension that is otherwise invisible over the status of volition/voluntariness in the collective religious freedom framework. Addressing this tension can help rationalize the Court’s jurisprudence and give resources to critics looking to change how the law encompasses collective religious experience.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 151-166
Author(s):  
Sonja Lučić ◽  

By participating in social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, network participants are increasingly revealing private information on the Internet. Once published data, whether images or other personal data, can be accessed with virtually no time limit. The idea of developing a "right to be forgotten" for the online area came from the French government. In the meantime, the European Commission has taken up this idea and proposed that, in the context of the revision of the Data Protection Directive 95/46, the "right to be forgotten" be considered in more detail. Although the representatives of the European Commission increasingly pointed out the importance of this right at public hearings, there were obstacles and serious resistance to its introduction, i.e. legal regulation. It was only with the discovery of Edward Snowden about the widespread surveillance of the Internet by the American State Security Agency (NSA) in connection with the increasingly widespread use of the Internet that the question of the need for the "right to be forgotten" became topical again. The author pointed out the specifics of “the right to be forgotten”. In addition, the author dealt with the comparative legal analysis of this institute, and give a special review of the current case law, which has as its subject “the right to be forgotten”. The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Hurbain v Belgium provides further clarification of the "right to be forgotten" and a broader approach than that taken in the case law of other courts to balance conflicting legal interests. Recognition of the right of an individual to request a change in the digital archive of a newspaper publisher has expanded the tools for individuals seeking „the right to be forgotten“.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Kapuy

For more than twenty years now, the European Convention on Human Rights has been used to solve disputes in social security. This is peculiar since the Convention itself and its Protocols primarily comprise civil and political rights and do not include a right to social security. This article analyses the supervisory bodies' case law to establish how national disputes over contributions or cash-benefits under statutory social insurance and social assistance scheme have attracted the protection of the Convention. It also provides an overview of the types of social security cases which today fall within the ambit of particular rights guaranteed by the Convention. It concludes that the right to a fair trial (Article 6(1)) and the protection of property (Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention) are, as a general rule, applicable in the field of social security. By contrast, the protection of family life and the protection of private life (Article 8) have, in social security matters only, only been accepted as applicable in the context of particular branches of social security or in relation to particular groups of beneficiaries.


2009 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shlomit Wallerstein

Does a person who is voluntarily drunk remain capable of giving valid consent to sex? The Court of Appeal in Bree held that ‘a drunken consent is still (valid) consent’, though it further recognises that the capacity to consent may evaporate well before a complainant becomes unconscious. This decision is a move in the right direction, yet this article argues that it has not gone far enough, and that s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which governs these scenarios allows—and even requires—a more drastic interpretation: a drunken consent is not consent when the person is very drunk. Based on a distinction between factual and legal consent, the article starts by setting up the legal framework as set out in s. 74, and developed in Bree and H. It then goes on to criticise the current case law and its interpretation of s. 74 for not being restrictive enough, by examining two possible theoretical rationales, mentioned in the judgments. The first, which is based on an analogy with the law relating to intoxicated offenders, is criticised on the grounds of differences between consent and intent. The second, which is based on the general argument that this position recognises the positive aspect of sexual autonomy, is criticised for its failure to distinguish between claims of normative facts and claims of public policy and for giving too much weight to the latter considerations. From the discussion an alternative, more restrictive position, emerges in line with s. 74 of the 2003 Act, according to which a drunken consent is not consent. This position can be adopted by judges, through the provision of better guidance to juries, but failing that a reform of the law might be needed.


BMJ Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. e045143
Author(s):  
Malin K Johansson ◽  
Marie Hasselberg ◽  
Ritva Rissanen

IntroductionThere is a lack of studies that focus exclusively on return to work (RTW) and sick leave patterns following a work injury among young adults. This study aims to close the gap by contributing with knowledge regarding young adults’ sick leave pattern after a work injury and their experience of RTW after a work injury in Sweden.Methods and analysisThe present study is a multimodal study, which will use Swedish national register data and qualitative data collection by photovoice. Injuries classified as work injuries according to the Swedish injury classification were included. Registry data will be retrieved from the Swedish National-based registers of Swedish Information System on Occupational Accidents and Work-related diseases, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency’s database MicroData for Analysis of Social Insurance and the Swedish Longitudinal Integration Database for Health Insurance and Labour Market Studies. Persons who have registered a work injury at the Swedish Work Environment Authority in 2012 will be included. Sick leave patterns will be analysed using group-based trajectory models and multivariate analyses to explore how sick leave patterns have developed over 5 years. Subsequently, a participatory approach using photovoice method will be conducted to explore young adults’ perceptions of barriers and facilitators in RTW after a work injury. Results from the photovoice group sessions will be analysed using a grounded theoretical approach.Ethics and disseminationThe study has been reviewed and approved by the Ethical Review Board (case number 2019/028-6) in Sweden. Results of the study will be disseminated through peer-reviewed journals, print and media presentation, conferences and via reports to the funding agency.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Joel Weddington ◽  
Charles N. Brooks ◽  
Mark Melhorn ◽  
Christopher R. Brigham

Abstract In most cases of shoulder injury at work, causation analysis is not clear-cut and requires detailed, thoughtful, and time-consuming causation analysis; traditionally, physicians have approached this in a cursory manner, often presenting their findings as an opinion. An established method of causation analysis using six steps is outlined in the American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine Guidelines and in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Disease and Injury Causation, Second Edition, as follows: 1) collect evidence of disease; 2) collect epidemiological data; 3) collect evidence of exposure; 4) collect other relevant factors; 5) evaluate the validity of the evidence; and 6) write a report with evaluation and conclusions. Evaluators also should recognize that thresholds for causation vary by state and are based on specific statutes or case law. Three cases illustrate evidence-based causation analysis using the six steps and illustrate how examiners can form well-founded opinions about whether a given condition is work related, nonoccupational, or some combination of these. An evaluator's causal conclusions should be rational, should be consistent with the facts of the individual case and medical literature, and should cite pertinent references. The opinion should be stated “to a reasonable degree of medical probability,” on a “more-probable-than-not” basis, or using a suitable phrase that meets the legal threshold in the applicable jurisdiction.


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