scholarly journals A Theory-Driven Design Research Agenda: Exploring Dual-Process Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1373-1382
Author(s):  
Philip Cash ◽  
Jaap Daalhuizen ◽  
Dagny Valgeirsdottir ◽  
Robin Van Oorschot
Keyword(s):  
Design Research ◽  
Theory Development ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Common Element ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Development Approach ◽  
Practical Impact

AbstractDesign research faces a critical 'impact gap' where the potential for scientific and practical impact is yet to be fully realised. A key means of bridging this gap is the adoption of fundamental theory from other fields to support clarification and synergy in design research. In this paper we examine one of the main candidates for adoption: dual-process theory of cognition. Cognition forms a common element across much of the design literature and leads to fundamental dual-process theories of reasoning. While dual- process theory has started to be recognised in design research, its widespread recognition and potential utility have not been widely explored. Following a conceptual theory development approach we identify and logically describe interactions between dual-process theory and design research. We conclude the paper with a proposition of a design research framework with a core rooted in dual-process theory, and based on this, an agenda for theory-driven design research. This contributes to the debate on how to improve impact, and theoretical and scientific rigour in design research, and provides a concrete agenda for discussion and development within the community.

Introspection, confabulation, and dual-process theory

2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
Higher Cognition ◽  
Dual Process Theories

AbstractThis excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.

Freud's dual process theory and the place of the a-rational

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda A. W. Brakel ◽  
Howard Shevrin
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Rational System ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Evolutionary Fitness

In this commentary on Stanovich & West (S&W) we call attention to two points: (1) Freud's original dual process theory, which antedates others by some seventy-five years, deserves inclusion in any consideration of dual process theories. His concepts of primary and secondary processes (Systems 1 and 2, respectively) anticipate significant aspects of current dual process theories and provide an explanation for many of their characteristics. (2) System 1 is neither rational nor irrational, but instead a-rational. Nevertheless, both the a-rational System 1 and the rational System 2 can each have different roles in enhancing evolutionary fitness. Lastly, System 1 operations are incorrectly deemed “rational” whenever they increase evolutionary fitness.

scholarly journals Dual Process Theories in Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics: a Critical Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Grayot
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Standard View ◽  
Realistic Description ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Abstract Despite their popularity, dual process accounts of human reasoning and decision-making have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Cognitive scientists and philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of the ‘standard view’ of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance of evidence in support of it. Moreover, attempts to modify and refine dual process theory in light of these challenges have generated additional concerns about its applicability and refutability as a scientific theory. With these concerns in mind, this paper provides a critical review of dual process theory in economics, focusing on its role as a psychological framework for decision modeling in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. I argue that the influx of criticisms against dual process theory challenge the descriptive accuracy of dualistic decision models in economics. In fact, the case can be made that the popularity of dual process theory in economics has less to do with the empirical success of dualistic decision models, and more to do with the convenience that the dual process narrative provides economists looking to explain-away decision anomalies. This leaves behavioral economists and neuroeconomists with something of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-making and give up the narrative, or they revise and restate their scientific ambitions.

Is Splintering Dual-Process Theories a Good Strategy for Theory Development?

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-21
Author(s):  
Victor N. Keller ◽  
Jenna A. Harder ◽  
Joseph Cesario
Keyword(s):  
Theory Development ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Good Strategy ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

The Influence of Effortful Thought and Cognitive Proficiencies on the Conjunction Fallacy: Implications for Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning and Judgment

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (6) ◽  
pp. 874-887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura D. Scherer ◽  
J. Frank Yates ◽  
S. Glenn Baker ◽  
Kathrene D. Valentine
Keyword(s):  
Conjunction Fallacy ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Human Judgment ◽  
Conjunction Errors ◽  
Judgment Error ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Human judgment often violates normative standards, and virtually no judgment error has received as much attention as the conjunction fallacy. Judgment errors have historically served as evidence for dual-process theories of reasoning, insofar as these errors are assumed to arise from reliance on a fast and intuitive mental process, and are corrected via effortful deliberative reasoning. In the present research, three experiments tested the notion that conjunction errors are reduced by effortful thought. Predictions based on three different dual-process theory perspectives were tested: lax monitoring, override failure, and the Tripartite Model. Results indicated that participants higher in numeracy were less likely to make conjunction errors, but this association only emerged when participants engaged in two-sided reasoning, as opposed to one-sided or no reasoning. Confidence was higher for incorrect as opposed to correct judgments, suggesting that participants were unaware of their errors.

scholarly journals Smooth coping: an embodied, Heideggerian approach to dual-process theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 105971232110173
Author(s):  
Zachariah A Neemeh
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Process Model ◽  
High Capacity ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Reflective Thought ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand ( Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.

Reflective Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chienkuo Mi ◽  
Shane Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Recent Account

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.

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