Introspection, confabulation, and dual-process theory
2009 ◽
Vol 32
(2)
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pp. 142-143
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Keyword(s):
AbstractThis excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.
2019 ◽
Vol 1
(1)
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pp. 1373-1382
2019 ◽
Vol 11
(1)
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pp. 105-136
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2013 ◽
Vol 8
(3)
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pp. 223-241
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2017 ◽
Vol 43
(6)
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pp. 874-887
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Keyword(s):
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2004 ◽
Vol 98
(4)
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pp. 1315
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Keyword(s):