The Influence of Effortful Thought and Cognitive Proficiencies on the Conjunction Fallacy: Implications for Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning and Judgment

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (6) ◽  
pp. 874-887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura D. Scherer ◽  
J. Frank Yates ◽  
S. Glenn Baker ◽  
Kathrene D. Valentine
Keyword(s):  
Conjunction Fallacy ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Human Judgment ◽  
Conjunction Errors ◽  
Judgment Error ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Human judgment often violates normative standards, and virtually no judgment error has received as much attention as the conjunction fallacy. Judgment errors have historically served as evidence for dual-process theories of reasoning, insofar as these errors are assumed to arise from reliance on a fast and intuitive mental process, and are corrected via effortful deliberative reasoning. In the present research, three experiments tested the notion that conjunction errors are reduced by effortful thought. Predictions based on three different dual-process theory perspectives were tested: lax monitoring, override failure, and the Tripartite Model. Results indicated that participants higher in numeracy were less likely to make conjunction errors, but this association only emerged when participants engaged in two-sided reasoning, as opposed to one-sided or no reasoning. Confidence was higher for incorrect as opposed to correct judgments, suggesting that participants were unaware of their errors.

scholarly journals The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omid Ghasemi ◽  
Simon Handley ◽  
Stephanie Howarth
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Processing Time ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiment 1 and 4), likeability (Experiment 1, 2, and 3) and brightness (Experiment 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments. However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Rationality, Intelligence, and the Functional Architecture of the Mind

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West ◽  
Maggie E. Toplak
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Functional Architecture ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Mental Construct ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
The Mind

Because the operationalization of rational thinking comes from the heuristics and biases tradition, this chapter explicates the logic of heuristics and biases tasks in terms of contemporary theories of the functional architecture of the human mind. A tripartite model of the mind is described that is based on current dual-process theories. With this model as a framework, it is easy to see that the concept of rationality and the concept of intelligence are two different things. Rationality is actually a more encompassing mental construct than is intelligence. Thus, as measures of rationality, the tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, while tapping intelligence in part, actually encompass more cognitive processes and knowledge than are assessed by IQ tests.

Introspection, confabulation, and dual-process theory

2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
Higher Cognition ◽  
Dual Process Theories

AbstractThis excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.

EXPRESS: The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110446
Author(s):  
Omid Ghasemi ◽  
Simon J Handley ◽  
Stephanie Howarth
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Processing Time ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgments were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument’s conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Freud's dual process theory and the place of the a-rational

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda A. W. Brakel ◽  
Howard Shevrin
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Rational System ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Evolutionary Fitness

In this commentary on Stanovich & West (S&W) we call attention to two points: (1) Freud's original dual process theory, which antedates others by some seventy-five years, deserves inclusion in any consideration of dual process theories. His concepts of primary and secondary processes (Systems 1 and 2, respectively) anticipate significant aspects of current dual process theories and provide an explanation for many of their characteristics. (2) System 1 is neither rational nor irrational, but instead a-rational. Nevertheless, both the a-rational System 1 and the rational System 2 can each have different roles in enhancing evolutionary fitness. Lastly, System 1 operations are incorrectly deemed “rational” whenever they increase evolutionary fitness.

scholarly journals A Theory-Driven Design Research Agenda: Exploring Dual-Process Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1373-1382
Author(s):  
Philip Cash ◽  
Jaap Daalhuizen ◽  
Dagny Valgeirsdottir ◽  
Robin Van Oorschot
Keyword(s):  
Design Research ◽  
Theory Development ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Common Element ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Development Approach ◽  
Practical Impact

AbstractDesign research faces a critical 'impact gap' where the potential for scientific and practical impact is yet to be fully realised. A key means of bridging this gap is the adoption of fundamental theory from other fields to support clarification and synergy in design research. In this paper we examine one of the main candidates for adoption: dual-process theory of cognition. Cognition forms a common element across much of the design literature and leads to fundamental dual-process theories of reasoning. While dual- process theory has started to be recognised in design research, its widespread recognition and potential utility have not been widely explored. Following a conceptual theory development approach we identify and logically describe interactions between dual-process theory and design research. We conclude the paper with a proposition of a design research framework with a core rooted in dual-process theory, and based on this, an agenda for theory-driven design research. This contributes to the debate on how to improve impact, and theoretical and scientific rigour in design research, and provides a concrete agenda for discussion and development within the community.

scholarly journals Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 135 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Godden
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Psychology Of Reasoning ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
System 2 ◽  
The Common ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explicates an account of argumentative rationality by articulating the common, basic idea of its nature, and then identifying a collection of assumptions inherent in it. Argumentative rationality is then contrasted with dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. It is argued that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This result challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms derives if they derive at all from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive capacities. In response, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning which retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying that activity.

scholarly journals Of two minds or one? A registered replication of Rydell et al. (2006)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Heycke ◽  
Sarah Marie Gehrmann ◽  
Julia M. Haaf ◽  
Christoph Stahl
Keyword(s):  
Impression Formation ◽  
Evaluative Conditioning ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Target Person ◽  
Implicit Measures ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Reliability And Robustness ◽  
Selective Influence ◽  
Behavioral Information

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition in dual-process theories of attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Evidence for the automaticity of EC comes from studies claiming EC effects for subliminally presented stimuli. An impression-formation study by Rydell and colleagues (2006) showed a selective influence of briefly presented primes on implicitly measured attitudes, whereas supraliminally presented behavioral information about the target person was reflected in explicit ratings. This finding is considered one of the strongest pieces of evidence for dual process theories (Sweldens, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2014), and it is therefore crucial to assess its reliability and robustness. The present study presents two registered replications of the Rydell et al. (2006) study. In contrast to the original findings, the implicit measures did not reflect the valence of the subliminal primes in both studies.

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