scholarly journals Hagar and Epistemic Injustice: An Intercultural and Post-colonial Analysis of Genesis 16

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Beth E. Elness-Hanson

Having one's voice heard and being known by one's name are foundational aspects of respect and human dignity. Likewise, being able to contribute to shared understanding is at the core of epistemic justice. This intercultural and post-colonial inquiry of Gen 16 considers the Egyptian Hagar-known by her foreign Semitic name meaning "Fleeing One"-as an example of epistemic injustice. Integrating Miranda Fricker 's work on epistemic injustice, this study espouses the justice of hearing and seeing the marginalised and oppressed, as exemplified by Yhwh. As the Egyptian woman's voice- once ignored-gives testimony within the text to a fuller understanding of God, so also listening to/seeing other contemporary African scholars' voices/writings opens one's ears/eyes to fuller understandings of God today. These voices include the seminal work of David Tuesday Adamo, a vanguard in African biblical hermeneutics, in whose honour this examination is written.

Author(s):  
Alan Thomas

This chapter examines the kind of wronging of a person involved in cases of epistemic injustice and whether or not epistemic injustice, so understood, is better remedied by state action or by what Miranda Fricker calls the “corrective virtues.” It is argued that there is a trade off between arguing that such injustices are very pervasive, or identifying what it is distinctively to wrong a person in their capacity as a knower. Focusing on the idea of an epistemic capacity, it is argued that the core sense of the concept involves cases where a person attempts to disqualify another from the status of being an epistemic subject at all. It is a form of expressively injurious speech or conduct that attack a person’s status thereby indirectly undermining their rights. This attempt to introduce stratification into the standing of free and equal citizens explains why both Fricker and her critics are partially correct. There is an ethos inherent to liberal democracy that requires that citizens refrain from interfering in the legitimate projects of others. When the state speaks in its expressive capacity it both exemplifies, and seeks to entrench, such an ethos at the level of individual conduct.


Phronimon ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascah Mungwini

This essay, which reflects on the “unfinished humanistic project” of decolonisation in Africa, is an invitation to examine the problem of epistemic injustice from a philosophical standpoint. At the core of my argument is the position that there is an epistemic dimension to Africa’s problems, and the struggle for epistemic justice is as fundamental to humanity as all other struggles for social justice. Addressing the problem of epistemic injustice calls for multiple efforts and initiatives. Among these is commitment to new canon building across the disciplines, and adopting “strategic particularism” as a paradigm and philosophical framework in our academic projects. To confront epistemic injustice—and thus restore parity and equilibrium—polemics, contestations, and dialogue are inevitable. In this endeavour, the goal should be to reclaim Africa’s position in the conversation of humankind.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiren Bai

This paper describes two kinds of epistemic injustice – discriminatory and distributive. The former is provided by Miranda Fricker; the latter is based on David Coady’s work which means unequal access to epistemic goods, especially knowledge. I will firstly identify distributive epistemic justice within an epistemic structure of society and discuss its basic principles for distributing knowledge. Then I will argue that there is Fricker’s discriminatory epistemic injustice in scientific knowledge distribution. And this kind of epistemic injustice will finally lead to distributive epistemic injustice. The possible way to diminish these epistemic injustices is expanding the diversity in science.


Author(s):  
William Durch ◽  
Joris Larik ◽  
Richard Ponzio

Security and justice are both essential elements in humanity’s quest not only to survive but to thrive with dignity; neither is sustainable alone. Security is merely the appearance of order in a framework of structural violence unless tempered or leavened by concepts of justice that include human rights, human dignity, and other normative limits on the use of power. The pursuit of justice, whether at the personal, community, national, or international level can be crippled if not matched, in turn, by means to sustain security at each level. This complementarity of security and justice—despite their inherent tensions—is the core conceptual framework of the book. Achieving “just security,” we argue, is essential to the success of any global governance enterprise or architecture.


Author(s):  
Arthur W. Walker-Jones

This chapter examines the Jezebel.com website as a feminist interpretation of the biblical story of Jezebel, in order to discuss the ways digital media make reading more transparent, intertextual, and holistic. Donna Haraway’s article “A Manifesto for Cyborgs” is a seminal work for both ecofeminism and the digital humanities. This articles uses her understanding of the cyborg and naturecultures to argue that Jezebel has become a cyborg online. Cyborgs and digital media could be used to reinforce the nature–culture dualism that is related to male–female dualism and has legitimated patriarchy and the environmental crisis. This chapter, therefore, argues that the identification of cyborg naturecultures in reading both the biblical stories and digital cultures is particularly important for ecofeminist approaches to the Hebrew Bible.


Affilia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 088610992098526
Author(s):  
Marjorie Johnstone ◽  
Eunjung Lee

Using the theoretical framework of epistemic injustice articulated by philosopher Miranda Fricker as an analytic tool, we analyze recent victories of Indigenous feminist activism in gathering the stories of Indigenous women, challenging dominant meta-narratives and rewriting the herstory of Canada. We use the epistemic concept of the hermeneutic gap to consider the implications of this resistance in conjunction with the increased visibility of the intersectional positionality of Indigenous women. To illustrate our analysis, we focus on two case studies. Firstly, an individual perspective through the life journey of a feminist Anishinaabe Activist, Bridgett Perrier. Secondly, we conduct a systemic analysis of the recent Report on the National Inquiry into the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG). We close with a discussion on how critical it is for social workers—especially non-Indigenous social workers—to relearn and document the meaning of the MMIWG issues. This includes recognizing Indigenous resistance, activism, and the newly formulated hermeneutic understandings that are emerging. Then, the final task is to apply these concepts to their practice and heed the calls to action which the report calls for.


Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij

AbstractIt is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady's notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series of objections are considered and responded to.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Kanuka ◽  
Summer Cowley

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain insights into how academics understand undergraduate graduand attributes. The findings reveal some alignment in views about student attributes, including that they are engaged citizens, are self-directed, have imagination, are questioning, are flexible, display leadership, are problem solvers, and possess character. This consistency, however, does not include the spectrum of views on how these attributes are conceived and developed. The findings reveal a range of interpretations regarding the kinds and levels of understandings of how graduand student attributes are developed throughout an undergraduate program of study. The findings indicate that (i) a shared understanding does not exist on how academics construe student attributes, (ii) academics do not share common meanings about the core achievements of a higher education, or how these are developed through students’ undergraduate programs, and (iii) student attributes tend not to be perceived as developing from the usual process of an undergraduate education.  


Author(s):  
Daniela Goya Tocchetto

Abstract: The overwhelming majority of contemporary theories of justice is grounded in the rationalist tradition (Frazer, 2010). As a consequence, political philosophers such as John Rawls (1971) have interpreted moral systems as axiomatic, substantially based on concepts of inalienable rights and duties—usually guided by the core value attached to human dignity. Once ethicists started working under an axiomatic framework, empirical evidence has become less and less useful. This road has been conducive to the current prevalence of ideal theories in the field. On a dissonant note, recent debate in political philosophy has rekindled our attention to the development of nonideal theories of justice. Yet before one argues in favor of nonideal (or comparative) theories of justice, one has to be certain that all arguments against the broader incorporation of empirical evidence in the development of political philosophical theories are not valid. Therefore the focus of the present paper is the assessment—and dismissal—of these arguments.Keywords: Theories of Justice; Nonideal Theories; Empirical Evidence; MethodologyResumo: A grande maioria das teorias de justiça contemporâneas se baseiam na tradição racionalista (Frazer, 2010). Como consequência, filósofos políticos como John Rawls (1971) têm interpretado sistemas morais como axiomáticos, baseados substancialmente em conceitos de direitos e deveres inalienáveis – geralmente guiados pelo valor central concedido à dignidade humana. Uma vez que os eticistas começaram a utilizar uma moldura axiomática, as evidências empíricas se tornaram cada vez menos úteis. Esse caminho foi relevante para a atual prevalência de teorias ideais nesse campo. De maneira dissonante, o debate recente na filosofia política reacendeu a atenção para o desenvolvimento de teorias de justiça não ideais. Contudo, antes que alguém argumente em favor de teorias de justiça não ideais (ou comparativas), é preciso estar certo de que todos os argumentos contrários a uma incorporação mais ampla de evidências empíricas no desenvolvimento de teorias políticas filosóficas não são válidos. Portanto, o foco deste artigo é a avaliação – e rejeição – destes argumentos.Palavras-chave: Teorias de justiça; Teorias não ideais; Evidência empírica; Metodologia.


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