Minderheitsregierung im Bund? Lehren zum Oppositionsverhalten aus Schweden

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Melanie Müller ◽  
Marcus Höreth
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Minority Government ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Alternative Function ◽  
The Government ◽  
German Bundestag ◽  
Western Democracies ◽  
Opposition Parties

Government stability in the German Bundestag is traditionally tied to a parliamentary majority and an opposition minority . Nonetheless, minority governments in other Western democracies show that, despite the lack of a parliamentary majority, they govern stable and effectively together with the opposition . In this article, on the Swedish case, we examine how opposition parties in parliament are involved in the legislative process in a minority government and what patterns they follow in order to maintain governmental stability without neglecting their alternative function . The paper combines theoretical and concep­tual considerations on the adequate understanding of the opposition in the Federal Repub­lic of Germany with empirical findings on cooperation and conflicts between opposition party groups and minority governments . The results show that opposition parties strategi­cally switch between confrontational (Westminster-style) and consensual patterns of behav­ior (republican) . Through this flexible majority finding, opposition parties in parliament can alternately present themselves as policymakers or as an alternative counterpart to the government . This opposition behavior is functionally adequate under the conditions of a pluralized and fragmented party system and the resulting difficulties in forming a stable government majority .

Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico

2005 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 103-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Klesner
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
The South ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
The North ◽  
Social Bases ◽  
Ideological Differences ◽  
Opposition Parties

Abstract Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.

Opposition Party Behavior and Minority Government Support

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie Müller
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Methods ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Oppositional Behavior ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Minority Government ◽  
Government Stability ◽  
Party Behavior ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Methods ◽  
Opposition Parties

Opposition parties in minority governments are partly responsible for government stability without being able to neglect their accountability to the electorate, a dilemma that, as this book shows, has many electoral as well as policy advantages for opposition parties. This book’s analysis of opposition behavior in the Swedish Riksdag (1991–2018) sheds light on the rationality of minority governments from an opposition perspective: receiving political influence without jeopardizing one's party profile. The author studies oppositional behavior in Swedish minority governments using quantitative and qualitative methods.

Oppositionsverhalten in den Plenardebatten zum Migrationspakt: Der „Neue Dualismus“ auf dem Prüfstand

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 618-639
Author(s):  
Michael Bannert ◽  
Marcus Höreth
Keyword(s):  
Far Right ◽  
Global Compact ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Analytic Methods ◽  
Left Party ◽  
The Government ◽  
German Bundestag ◽  
First Time ◽  
Alternative For Germany

In the 19th election period, the Alternative for Germany entered the German Bundestag for the first time . Being the largest opposition party, it is conspicuous for its aggressive and provocative behaviour . The smaller and established opposition parties FDP, Left Party, and Greens appear occasionally to distance themselves from their opposition colleague by form­ing an alliance together with the government with the purpose of challenging the far-right populist opposition party . By performing a case study analyzing plenary debates regarding the Global Compact for Migration, utilizing content and frequency analytic methods we study opposition party behaviour with regard to conflict patterns . The findings suggest that the “new dualism” between the governing majority and the opposition is supplemented by the confrontation between established parties and the AfD .

Het effekt van de oppositie op het regeringsbeleid in België van 1965 tot 1971

Res Publica ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-170
Author(s):  
Wilfried Dewachter ◽  
Edith De Graeve-Lismont ◽  
Guy Tegenbos
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Absolute Number ◽  
Correct Evaluation ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
The Government ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Party Strength ◽  
The Given ◽  
Opposition Parties

The government-opposition scheme of a two-party system does not function that clearly in a multiparty system which is the case in Belgium. To examine to what extent the opposition parties in a multi-partysystem are functional for policymaking, the period 1965-1971 was chosen for Belgium, providing a complete scale of government and opposition parties.A content analysis of all political parties' platforms in 1965 permits to determine the policy objectives, classified in policy areas, so that at the end of the six years a survey could be made about the completely andpartly realised planks of the platforms according to government and opposition parties, according to the party-strength which was congruent with the duration of government participation. In Belgium a distinctioncan also be made between the traditional opposition parties and the nonelitist opposition parties, which during the given period were not accepted as possible government parties by the political elite.To obtain a correct evaluation of the realisations, the approach took successively into account the absolute number of platform-planks, the number of specific items of a party and the degree of importance andsocial repercussion of the distinct planks that could be realised.Although respectively for 6, 4 and 2 years in the government the CVP, the BSP and the PVV realise approximately the same number of planks. The non-elitist opposition party Volksunie realised a smaller butstill considerable number of objectives. So did also, but to a smaller extent the RW, KP and FDP. The interpretation of these results could be the loss of distinctiveness of the government-opposition scheme in amultiparty system, the elite-consensus in Belgium, the function of the «zweeppartij» strategy and the definition of the opposition in terms of action.

Support Party Strategies on Important Policy Issues: Results from Swedish Minority Governments

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Melanie Müller
Keyword(s):  
Government Support ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Policy Influence ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Minority Government ◽  
Party Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Party Voting ◽  
Core Issues

Abstract The survival of minority governments depends on support from non-cabinet parties that strive to safeguard government stability while also fulfilling their accountability to the electorate. This article argues that non-cabinet parties' propensity to support the government depends on their desire to uphold distinctiveness when accountability is at stake. This even applies to opposition parties that are officially committed to minority government support and, as a trade-off, receive policy pay-offs. By analysing opposition party voting in 23 years of Swedish minority governments (1991–2018), the article suggests that ideologically distant support parties are more likely to oppose the government on their core issues since compromise would involve too-large concessions. These results question our understanding of support party pay-offs as a trade-off for minority government support and highlight the rationality of entering a support agreement, which gives the support party a certain degree of policy influence while also keeping a distinct party profile.

Party Systems and Government Stability

1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Taylor ◽  
V. M. Herman
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Government Stability ◽  
Strong Relation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Opposition Parties

Arguments are presented for and against a series of hypotheses about the influence of the parliamentary party system on the stability of governments, and the hypotheses are tested against data on 196 governments in parliamentary democracies since 1945. A strong relation is found between the duration of governments and the fragmentation of the parliamentary party system and of the government parties, but the fragmentation of the opposition parties seems not to affect stability. One-party governments are more stable than coalition governments, and majority governments more than minority governments. The ideological dispersion of the parties—in the whole parliament, in the government, or in the opposition—does not explain stability any better than fragmentation, which is based upon only the number and sizes of parties; but the proportion of seats held by ‘anti-system’ parties (communists and neo-fascists, mainly) is a good indicator of stability. The best explanation of government stability found here is the combined linear influence of the size of the anti-system parties and the fragmentation of the pro-system parties.

What is opposition good for?

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Betul Demirkaya
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Misleading Information ◽  
Policy Alternative ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Policy Alternatives ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Government ◽  
Opposition Parties

Governments in representative democracies may have incentives to pursue policies that do not align with voters’ preferences. When voters lack information about the policy bias of the government and the consequences of policy alternatives, they will have difficulty holding the government accountable. I propose a formal model that explores whether an opposition party can help solve this problem by providing information about policy alternatives. The model acknowledges that opposition parties may have incentives to mislead voters because of their own policy biases or election concerns. Despite this challenge, the model shows that the presence of an opposition party may induce a biased government to adjust its policies. For this disciplining equilibrium to work, the reputations of the opposition and the government should be close to each other, or the voter should believe that one policy alternative is much more likely to be good for her than another alternative. In addition, the government should be sufficiently concerned about winning the elections, and the opposition should be sufficiently concerned about policy. Under the same conditions, however, misleading information on the opposition may cause an unbiased government to implement policies that are detrimental to voter welfare.

scholarly journals Keeping power through opposition: party system change in Turkey

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 ◽  
pp. 27-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Düzgün Arslantaş ◽  
Şenol Arslantaş
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Party System ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
System Change ◽  
Spatial Distance ◽  
Party Government ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Public Opinion Surveys ◽  
Opposition Parties

AbstractThis paper re-evaluates the party system change in Turkey based on Sartori’s framework. It also explores the role of opposition parties in this. The paper suggests that, while a fragmented opposition may lead to the emergence of a one-party government and/or military intervention because of the high levels of polarization it induces, bilateral opposition prolongs one-party governments. The paper relies on an analysis of party programs and public opinion surveys in order to position the parties in terms of spatial distance and to understand the level of polarization.

scholarly journals The authoritarian origins of well-organized opposition parties: The rise of Chadema in Tanzania

2018 ◽  
Vol 118 (473) ◽  
pp. 692-711 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Paget
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
Social Actors ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Party Building ◽  
Organizational Expansion ◽  
Party System Institutionalization ◽  
Deviant Case ◽  
Opposition Parties

Abstract This article concerns the organizational expansion undertaken by the opposition party, Chadema, in Tanzania between 2003 and 2015. It argues that Chadema’s extensive party-building enabled it to mobilize on the ground. These organizational developments, as much as elite action, underpinned recent changes in the party system and the opposition’s improved showing in recent elections. Chadema established branches even though many of the prerequisite circumstances typically recognized in the literature were absent. This makes Chadema a deviant case and this deviance has implications for the historical institutionalist literature on party-building. This article complicates Rachel Riedl’s account of state substitution. She links the incorporation or substitution of social actors to different paths of party system institutionalization. This article demonstrates that the character and consequences of state substitution depend upon the balance of power between state and social actors. It also builds on accounts by Adrienne LeBas and others that when social actors are strong, they can endow opposition parties with resources which make branch establishment possible, and when they are weak, they can only act as surrogate party branches. This article illustrates that when social actors are absent from partisan politics, parties have no way to organize except by founding green-site branches.

If you can beat them, confront them: Party-level analysis of opposition behavior in European national parliaments

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Or Tuttnauer
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Considerable Influence ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Open Structure ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Systemic Level ◽  
Specific Factors ◽  
The Government ◽  
Level Analysis ◽  
Opposition Parties

This article explains the variation in opposition behavior by investigating parliamentary voting of opposition parties across 16 European national parliaments. It finds that features of an opposition party that increase its likelihood of winning office in future elections—its size and experience in government—increase the party’s tendency toward confrontation with the government, as do features that increase the party’s need to differentiate itself from the government. At the systemic level, features that increase the attractiveness of cooperation—such as an open structure of competition and considerable influence of the opposition on parliamentary decision-making—decrease tendencies toward confrontation. Together, party-specific and systemic features explain two-thirds of the observed variation in the behavior of opposition parties, even without controlling for vote-specific factors.

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