Home-State Interest, Nationalism, and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Nathan T. Carrington ◽  
Claire Sigsworth
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Survey Experiment ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Home State ◽  
Institutional Costs ◽  
Nationally Representative

Although legitimacy is crucial for courts’ efficacy, the sources identified as legitimizing domestic institutions are weaker or absent altogether for international institutions. We use an original, preregistered, nationally representative survey experiment to show that perceived home-state interest strongly affects the legitimacy afforded by UK citizens to the International Criminal Court. Importantly, this relationship is moderated by nationalism. Our findings have implications for state actors in a position to act vis-á-vis international courts, elites seeking to alter opinions toward courts, and courts themselves weighing possible institutional costs of acting against noncompliant states.

scholarly journals What Determines Perceptions of Bias toward the International Criminal Court? Evidence from Kenya

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 1443-1469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoff Dancy ◽  
Yvonne Marie Dutton ◽  
Tessa Alleblas ◽  
Eamon Aloyo
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Exposure To Violence ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Justice ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Psychological Studies

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has struggled with the perception that it is biased against Africans, especially in relation to its investigation in Kenya. But which Kenyans are most likely to believe the ICC is biased? Building on pluralistic models of public opinion and psychological studies, we aim to contribute to emerging research on attitudes toward international courts. We expect that group attachments will drive attitudes toward international institutions. Yet, we also theorize that exposure to violence makes individuals more likely to support international justice and reject narratives that would have the effect of insulating those who have committed crimes from being held accountable. Using new survey data from 507 Kenyans in the fall of 2015, we find support for our hypotheses.

From Classroom to a Criminal Courtroom

2021 ◽  
pp. 31-38
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Ethical Conduct ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
International Courts ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
The Core ◽  
Criminal Courtroom

This chapter discusses the author’s transition from being a teacher to being an international criminal Judge. The life of a Judge is much more circumscribed by rules and traditions than the life of a teacher. Both national and international courts have typically adopted codes of professional and ethical conduct, which often include or are accompanied by disciplinary rules to ensure compliance and accountability. It is important to understand that the core mandate of an international criminal court is to try individuals within a governing legal framework and to determine whether—given the specific evidence presented and admitted by the court—the responsibility of an individual accused of international crimes has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The chapter then recounts the author’s experience as an international criminal Judge and assesses whether academics make good criminal Judges.

The Creation and Expansion of the International Criminal Court: A Legal Explanation

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilia Justyna Powell ◽  
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
State Level ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
International Courts ◽  
The Creation

International courts have proliferated in the international system in the past century, with one hundred judicial or quasi-judicial bodies currently in existence. While the supply of international courts has increased substantially, state level support for international courts varies across states, across courts, and over time. This paper focuses on the cross-sectional and temporal variation in state level support for a particular court, the International Criminal Court (ICC). The authors argue that domestic legal systems create different predispositions with respect to states’ willingness to join adjudicatory bodies and the design of their commitments to international courts. Negotiators involved in the creation of the ICC pushed for rules and procedures that mimicked those of their domestic legal systems to help reduce uncertainty regarding the court’s future behavior and decision-making processes. This interesting process of legal bargaining led to the creation of a sui generis court, one which represents a mixture of common law and civil law systems. The hybrid nature of the court’s design enhanced the attractiveness of the court to civil and common law states, making them significantly more likely to sign and ratify the Rome Statute. Empirical models demonstrate that common and civil law states were fervent supporters of the ICC in preliminary negotiations and that they have shown higher levels of support for the Court since the ICC’s inception in comparison to Islamic law or mixed law states.

Kimberly Prost

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 243-244
Author(s):  
Kimberly Prost
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Political Context ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Context ◽  
International Courts ◽  
International Court ◽  
Judicial Role

This is one of the issues that is perhaps the most challenging for judges who come to international courts from a national context. It is particularly important that a judge understands the political context in which they are judging. There is a tendency to say—and I have heard many colleagues at the ICTY and International Criminal Court (ICC) saying—“I am going to keep completely out of the politics because that's none of my business, I'm here to just to do my judicial role.” With great respect I think that is a fundamental mistake, because the reality is if a judge is going to defend her independence on an international court, she really has to understand the political context in which she is defending it.

Prosecutor v. Omar Al-Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral Re Al-Bashir Appeal (Int'L Crim. Ct.)

2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (6) ◽  
pp. 1177-1233
Author(s):  
Thomas Weatherall
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Trial Chamber ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
International Courts ◽  
The Third ◽  
Heads Of State

On May 6, 2019, the Appeals Chamber (AC) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) delivered its judgment in Jordan's appeal of the December 11, 2017 decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) in Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir. The first and second grounds of appeal concerned whether Jordan had complied with its duty to cooperate with the request of the Court to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir. The third ground of appeal concerned whether the PTC abused its discretion in referring Jordan's noncompliance to the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (ASP) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Prior to the judgment, ICC PTCs had created divergent jurisprudence regarding the immunity of incumbent heads of state before international courts.

scholarly journals Ruling through the International Criminal Court’s rules

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-201
Author(s):  
Luisa Giannini Figueira ◽  
Roberto Vilchez Yamato ◽  
Claudia Alvarenga Marconi
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Social Role ◽  
International System ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal Justice ◽  
The Social

This article investigates sovereign (in)equality as a phenomenon that is manifested in thedifferent levels of international institutions. The analysis is developed from the process againstOmar Al Bashir, Sudan’s President-in-Office, at the International Criminal Court. Consideringthat norms and rules have a social role in the multiple relations existing between agents andstructures, that is, they transform relations in the international system, the article investigates the dispositions and principles present within the scope of the International Criminal Courtthat authorize a discrimination between States. This distinction implies the imposition ofinternational rules for some actors and the maintenance of certain sovereign prerogativesfor others. More specifically, international criminal justice is characterized by selectivityin judgments, as some countries are given certain authority over the regime. In this sense,it is argued that the sovereign (in)equality that is present in international criminal law issimultaneously a manifestation and condition of possibility for the hierarchy in the social,and therefore institutional normative, and political architecture of the international system.It is argued that the presence of this sovereign (in)equality can be identified at the differentlevels of the institutions of international society, insofar as they influence one another.

La Corte Penal Internacional: Traducción, Interpretación y Terminología Propia

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 194-199
Author(s):  
Andrea Vargas Lobé
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Language Management ◽  
Legal Translation ◽  
Sobre Todo

Resumen: Uno de los campos más importantes dentro de la Traducción e Interpretación en los Servicios Públicos son los tribunales. Entre la gran variedad de tribunales que existen encontramos uno con unas características propias muy llamativas: la Corte Penal Internacional. El presente artículo sostiene la hipótesis de que, como institución única, va a actuar de una manera propia en lo referente a la gestión lingüística y, sobre todo, va a tener una terminología propia muy diferente a la que nos vamos a encontrar en la traducción e interpretación jurídica habitual. Con el fin de confirmar dicha hipótesis hemos realizado el análisis tanto de la documentación bibliográfica disponible como de la página web de la CPI y del documento fundacional de la misma: el Estatuto de Roma (2011). Gracias a esto hemos podido concluir que, en efecto, la Corte posee una terminología propia pero que su gestión de los servicios de traducción e interpretación no difiere en exceso de la que realizan instituciones internacionales como la Unión Europea o la Organización de las Naciones Unidas.Abstract: Courts are one of the most important fields in Public Services Translation and Interpreting. Among all existing courts, we may find one whose specific characteristics are quite interesting: The International Criminal Court. The hypothesis this article supports is that the Court is a unique institution and so is going to manage its languages and, above all, is going to have a specific terminology, very different to that found in usual legal translation. In order to confirm our hypothesis, we have analyzed both the Court’s official documents we were able to find within its webpage and the foundational document of the Court: The Rome Statute (2011). Thanks to this we were able to conclude that the Court has indeed a specific terminology. However, its language management is not very different from that carried out by international institutions such as the European Union or the United Nations.     

Judicialization and its Challenges

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Sands
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Small Community ◽  
Late Professor ◽  
International Courts ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Future

As an epilogue to the volume, Philippe Sands lays out several of the challenges to international courts. He recalls conversations with the late Professor Vladimir Ibler from Croatia, who recommended that one should not draw conclusions about the legitimacy of international courts and tribunals (ICs) too quickly. Sands reminds us that international courts and tribunals are young, compared to national courts. Several of the ICs have encountered challenges, from accusations that the International Criminal Court is a neo-colonial instrument, to revelations about leakages and unacceptable communication in the boundary arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia. Sands encourages the relatively small community of practitioners and scholars engaged in the workings of ICs to speak out about the deficiencies of the system. However, he ends on a positive note with a sense of optimism for the future of the international courts and tribunals.

Why Do Individuals Surrender to the International Criminal Tribunals?

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 926-948 ◽  
Author(s):  
James David Meernik
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Courts ◽  
International Criminal Tribunals ◽  
International Tribunals ◽  
Significant Support

Most observers of the International Criminal Court (icc), as well as the several ad hoc tribunals have argued that one of the greatest challenges facing these institutions is their lack of power to enforce their indictments and apprehend suspects. In view of the justifiable concern with the ability of international courts to secure the detention of suspects, it is rather remarkable that nearly one-third of those indicted by the most successful ad hoc tribunals (icty, ictr, scsl) and the icc have surrendered. I offer a theory of surrender that centres on those factors that tend to minimise the costs of surrender and enhance its benefits to explain this phenomenon. I demonstrate how international tribunals and other actors can manipulate the parameters of this calculation and encourage surrender by individuals whose expected utility for surrender is not minimal, but movable. The analysis provides significant support for the minimisation and benefit enhancement model of surrender.

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