scholarly journals Evolutionary institutionalism

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Fürstenberg
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Genetics ◽  
Ecological Stability ◽  
Institutional Stability ◽  
The Third ◽  
Ecosystem Effects ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism ◽  
Agency And Structure

Background. Institutions are hard to define and hard to study. Long prominent in political science have been two theories: Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI). Arising from the life sciences is now a third: Evolutionary Institutionalism (EI). Comparative strengths and weaknesses of these three theories warrant review, and the value-to-be-added by expanding the third beyond Darwinian evolutionary theory deserves consideration.Question.Should evolutionary institutionalism expand to accommodate new understanding in ecology, such as might apply to the emergence of stability, and in genetics, such as might apply to political behavior?Methods.Core arguments are reviewed for each theory with more detailed exposition of the third, EI. Particular attention is paid to EI’s gene-institution analogy; to variation, selection, and retention of institutional traits; to endogeneity and exogeneity; to agency and structure; and to ecosystem effects, institutional stability, and empirical limitations in behavioral genetics.Findings.RCI, HI, and EI are distinct but complementary.Conclusions. Institutional change, while amenable to rational-choice analysis and, retrospectively, to critical-juncture and path-dependency analysis, is also, and importantly, ecological. Stability, like change, is an emergent property of institutions, which tend to stabilize after change in a manner analogous to allopatric speciation. EI is more than metaphorically biological in that institutional behaviors are driven by human behaviors whose evolution long preceded the appearance of institutions themselves.

scholarly journals Institutionalisation and implementation of the selected participatory instruments. The case of Poland

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (57) ◽  
pp. 113-134
Author(s):  
Anna Kołomycew
Keyword(s):  
Civic Engagement ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
New Institutionalism ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Final Part ◽  
The Third ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism ◽  
Depth Interviews

The article traces the process of the institutionalisation of selected elements of the mechanisms of public participation, whose consequence was the unification of the rules of implementation and formalisation. The process, however, did not result in an increase in civic engagement on the part of the citizens of all the territorial units under consideration. The article presents the outcome of both quantitative and qualitative (in-depth interviews) research conducted by the author in Polish municipalities. The theoretical framework of the article is provided by ‘new institutionalism’, and especially by ‘rational choice institutionalism’. The structure of the article is as follows: the first part focuses on the principles of new institutionalism with reference to the mechanisms of public participation. The second part presents a succinct analysis of the step-by-step institutionalisation of selected participatory mechanisms that have ensued in recent years. The third part contains a methodological overview of empirical research, while the fourth, and final, part includes the outcome of the research and its interpretation.

3. Institutional Perspectives

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lise Rakner ◽  
Vicky Randall
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Sociological Institutionalism ◽  
The Third ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Electoral Quotas

This chapter examines the role of institutions and how institutionalism is applied in the analysis of politics in the developing world. It begins with a discussion of three main strands of institutionalism: sociological institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and historical institutionalism. It then considers political institutions in developing countries as well as the interrelationship between formal and informal institutions. Three cases are presented: the case from sub-Saharan Africa illustrates the salience of neo-patrimonial politics and competing informal and formal institutions, the second case relates to campaign clientelism in Peru and the third is concerned with electoral quotas in India. The chapter concludes by addressing the question of the extent to which the new institutionalism is an appropriate tool of analysis for developing countries.

scholarly journals The constitutions of international organisations: How institutional design seeks to foster diplomatic deliberation

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 571-604
Author(s):  
DIANA PANKE ◽  
FRANZISKA HOHLSTEIN ◽  
GURUR POLAT
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
International Organisations ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
Combination Of Theories ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism ◽  
High Politics

Abstract:Whether we look at constitutions of states or founding treaties of International Organisations (IO), it is striking that many rules on interaction between delegates create room for deliberation, whilst simultaneously limiting the time for discussion. While the latter speeds up decision making, it risks reducing its quality and legitimacy by hampering the exchange and contestation of information and ideas. How are these competing elements balanced in IOs? Do IOs differ in this respect, and if so, how and why? The article draws on a unique and novel dataset and assesses variation in the extent to which institutional design fosters or inhibits diplomatic deliberation in more than 110 diverse IOs. To this end, the article uses a combination of theories of functionalism, rational choice institutionalism and liberal approaches on variation, fit, and mismatch of deliberative institutional design within and across IOs. The hypotheses are analysed with quantitative methods. The article shows that diplomatic deliberative institutional design elements are the most pronounced when IOs are small in size, deal in high politics, and are regional in character.

scholarly journals No Evidence on Directional vs. Proximity Voting

1999 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey B. Lewis ◽  
Gary King
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Decision Processes ◽  
Statistical Assumption ◽  
Statistical Assumptions ◽  
Growing Body ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
Proximity Voting

The directional and proximity models offer dramatically different theories for how voters make decisions and fundamentally divergent views of the supposed microfoundations on which vast bodies of literature in theoretical rational choice and empirical political behavior have been built. We demonstrate here that the empirical tests in the large and growing body of literature on this subject amount to theoretical debates about which statistical assumption is right. The key statistical assumptions have not been empirically tested and, indeed, turn out to be effectively untestable with existing methods and data. Unfortunately, these assumptions are also crucial since changing them leads to different conclusions about voter decision processes.

Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change

2008 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Weyland
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Welfare States ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
New Approach ◽  
The Core ◽  
Developmental States ◽  
Rational Learning ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism

Going beyond historical and rational choice institutionalism, this article elaborates the core of a new theory that can account for the discontinuous, disproportionate, and frequently wave like-nature of institutional change. Cognitive-psychological findings on shifts in actors' propensity for assuming risk help explain why periods of institutional stasis can be followed by dramatic breakthroughs as actors eventually respond to a growing problem load with efforts at bold transformation. And insights on boundedly rational learning explain why solutions to these problems often occur as emulation of other countries' innovations and experiences. The new approach, which elucidates both the demand and the supply side of institutional change, is illustrated through an analysis of the transformation of developmental states, welfare states, and political regimes.

The Mobilization of Campaign Activists By the Party Canvass

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER W. WIELHOUWER
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Participation ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
The Political ◽  
Rational Choice Model ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Election Studies

This research examines the role of the personal contacting activities of the political parties as mobilizing forces in what Verba and Nie termed campaign activities. A reformulated rational choice model is discussed in which parties seek to reduce certain avoidable and unavoidable costs associated with political participation. Using data from the 1952 through 1994 American National Election Studies, it is shown that the party contact has been and continues to be a major factor in mobilizing campaign activists. Its influence is remarkably robust, maintaining statistical and substantive significance even after controlling for other important factors usually associated with political behavior.

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