Opposition Parties and the Timing of Successful No-Confidence Motions

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
The Government ◽  
Policy Direction ◽  
Parliamentary Politics ◽  
Opposition Parties

The power to remove the government via no-confidence motion is a powerful tool afforded to the opposition. By triggering the government’s downfall, opposition parties can substantially influence policy direction in parliamentary democracies. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how government and opposition parties interact to determine the occurrence of no-confidence motions and their chance of success. In this project, I develop a simple formal model that identifies the factors influencing when opposition parties propose no-confidence motions and their outcomes. I find support for these expectations by estimating an empirical model that is explicitly derived from the underlying theoretical model. Unlike previous empirical studies of government stability, this project honors the strategic interactions that occur between government and opposition parties. In addition to the possibility of the motion passing, opposition parties are motivated by electoral considerations, which induce different behaviors at various stages of the electoral cycle. This project offers a number of implications for the study of parliamentary politics, including theories of opposition behavior, democratic accountability, and government duration and termination.

Unsuccessful Success? Failed No-Confidence Motions, Competence Signals, and Electoral Support

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (11) ◽  
pp. 1474-1499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
The Government ◽  
Opposition Parties

If no-confidence motions are primarily motivated by bringing down governments, why do only approximately 5% of no-confidence motions in advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 result in the termination of government? In this project the author addresses this puzzle by developing a formal model of the electoral benefits of no-confidence motions and tests these hypotheses with the use of an original data set. No-confidence motions represent highly visible opportunities for opposition parties to highlight their strength or ability compared to the government in the hopes of improving their vote shares. The author finds support for the signal-based theory on a sample of 20 advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 to 2008. Although no-confidence motions result in decreases for the government parties, the opposition parties that propose the motion experience boosts in vote share. This relationship is even stronger when the proposing party is an alternative governing possibility—illustrated by the conditioning impacts of the number of parliamentary parties and the opposition party’s ideological extremism. This provides an explanation as to why opposition parties would continue to challenge the government even though the motions are likely to fail.

Divided We Fall: Opposition Fragmentation and the Electoral Fortunes of Governing Parties

2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Clarity Of Responsibility ◽  
Election Results ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Opposition Parties

This article introduces the concept of opposition fragmentation into the study of the determinants of election results. Empirical studies have demonstrated that anti-government economic voting is likely to take place where the clarity of responsibility (the degree to which voters can attribute policy responsibility to the government) is high. This argument is extended by focusing on the effects of the degree of opposition fragmentation in influencing the extent to which poor economic performance decreases the government’s vote share. With data from seventeen parliamentary democracies, it is shown that when there are fewer opposition parties, the relationship between economic performance and governing parties’ electoral fortune is stronger. Opposition fragmentation appears to be as strong a factor as the clarity of responsibility.

scholarly journals Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110243
Author(s):  
Hanna Bäck ◽  
Wolfgang C. Müller ◽  
Mariyana Angelova ◽  
Daniel Strobl
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Government Reform ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Limited Impact ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Institutional Settings ◽  
The Government

One of the most important decisions coalition partners make when forming a government is the division of ministries. Ministerial portfolios provide the party in charge with considerable informational and agenda-setting advantages, which parties can use to shape policies according to their preferences. Oversight mechanisms in parliaments play a central role in mitigating ministerial policy discretion, allowing coalition partners to control each other even though power has been delegated to individual ministers. However, we know relatively little about how such mechanisms influence the agenda-setting and gatekeeping powers of ministers and how much influence minister parties have on policy output relative to the government as a whole in different institutional settings. We fill this gap by analyzing original data on over 2000 important social and economic policy reform measures adopted in nine Western European countries over 20 years, based on a coding of more than 1200 country reports issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We find that parliaments with strong oversight powers constrain the agenda-setting capacity of minister parties but have limited impact on their gatekeeping capacity. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of policy-making and democratic accountability.

The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Huber
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Vote Procedure ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Conflict ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Significant Control ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
The Government

I present a formal model of the confidence vote procedure, an institutional arrangement that permits a prime minister to attach the fate of a particular policy to a vote on government survival. The analysis indicates that confidence vote procedures make it possible for prime ministers to exercise significant control over the nature of policy outcomes, even when these procedures are not actually invoked. Neither cabinet ministers, through their authority over specific portfolios, nor members of parliament, through the use of no-confidence motions, can counteract the prime minister's policy control on the floor of parliament. The analysis also illuminates the circumstances under which prime ministers should invoke confidence vote procedures, focusing attention on the position-taking incentives of the parties that support the government, rather than on the level of policy conflict between the government and parliament.

Internal Opposition Dynamics and Restraints on Authoritarian Control

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 883-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant T. Buckles
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
The Government ◽  
Opposition Parties

Autocrats rely on co-optation to limit opposition mobilization and remain in power. Yet not all opposition parties that pose a threat to their regime are successfully co-opted. This article provides a formal model to show that reliance on activists influences whether an opposition leader receives and accepts co-optation offers from an autocrat. Activists strengthen a party’s mobilization efforts, yet become disaffected when their leader acquiesces to the regime. This dynamic undermines the co-optation of parties with a strong activist base, particularly those with unitary leadership. Activists have less influence over elite negotiations in parties with divided leadership, which can promote collusion with the regime. The results ultimately suggest that party activism can erode authoritarian control, but may encourage wasteful conflicts with the government.

Party Systems and Government Stability

1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Taylor ◽  
V. M. Herman
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Government Stability ◽  
Strong Relation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Opposition Parties

Arguments are presented for and against a series of hypotheses about the influence of the parliamentary party system on the stability of governments, and the hypotheses are tested against data on 196 governments in parliamentary democracies since 1945. A strong relation is found between the duration of governments and the fragmentation of the parliamentary party system and of the government parties, but the fragmentation of the opposition parties seems not to affect stability. One-party governments are more stable than coalition governments, and majority governments more than minority governments. The ideological dispersion of the parties—in the whole parliament, in the government, or in the opposition—does not explain stability any better than fragmentation, which is based upon only the number and sizes of parties; but the proportion of seats held by ‘anti-system’ parties (communists and neo-fascists, mainly) is a good indicator of stability. The best explanation of government stability found here is the combined linear influence of the size of the anti-system parties and the fragmentation of the pro-system parties.

scholarly journals Credit Risk Management and Efficiency of Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies: A Review of Literature

2020 ◽  
pp. 99-120
Author(s):  
Josiah Aduda ◽  
Stephen Obondy
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Credit Risk ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Conduct Literature ◽  
Credit Risk Management ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government ◽  
Policy Direction ◽  
The Relationship

The objective of this paper was to conduct literature review on how credit risk management impacts efficiency and to identify the knowledge gaps in the relationship between the two variables. This study will help the government in policy direction as far as growing the financial sector as a precursor to credit risk management and its contribution to growth in terms of improved savings, improved per capita income, improved credit to private sector and increased employment levels both directly and indirectly. From the empirical studies reviewed, credit risk management was found to influence financial performance but there is no concrete evidence on the relation that credit risk management has with efficiency of SACCOs. The previous studies have mostly focused on financial performance instead of efficiency and they also differ on the direction of the relationship between the two variables. The difference in findings among the scholars might arise from methodological differences and operationalization of the study variables. Contextual differences might also explain the inconsistent findings as most of the studies have focused on commercial banks and in different economies. Future studies should investigate underlying variables that can explain the relationship between credit risk management and efficiency of SACCOs. Keywords: Credit risk management, efficiency, SACCOs.

What is opposition good for?

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Betul Demirkaya
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Misleading Information ◽  
Policy Alternative ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Policy Alternatives ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Government ◽  
Opposition Parties

Governments in representative democracies may have incentives to pursue policies that do not align with voters’ preferences. When voters lack information about the policy bias of the government and the consequences of policy alternatives, they will have difficulty holding the government accountable. I propose a formal model that explores whether an opposition party can help solve this problem by providing information about policy alternatives. The model acknowledges that opposition parties may have incentives to mislead voters because of their own policy biases or election concerns. Despite this challenge, the model shows that the presence of an opposition party may induce a biased government to adjust its policies. For this disciplining equilibrium to work, the reputations of the opposition and the government should be close to each other, or the voter should believe that one policy alternative is much more likely to be good for her than another alternative. In addition, the government should be sufficiently concerned about winning the elections, and the opposition should be sufficiently concerned about policy. Under the same conditions, however, misleading information on the opposition may cause an unbiased government to implement policies that are detrimental to voter welfare.

Factors Influencing Green Warehouse Practices in Malaysian Warehouse Industry: An Empirical Analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 54
Author(s):  
Siti Norida Wahab ◽  
Nazura Mohamed Sayuti ◽  
Azimah Daud
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Development ◽  
Data Gathering ◽  
Global Market ◽  
Acceptance Rate ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
Industry Competition ◽  
Management Commitment ◽  
Top Management Commitment ◽  
The Government

The purpose of this study is to provide an understanding of the factors influencing green warehouse practices (GWP) in the Malaysian warehouse industry. Both stakeholder theory (ST) and institutional theory (IT) act as the foundation in developing the theoretical framework. Six factors were identified resulted from preliminary data gathering and an extensive literature review for constructing the model. The sample size consists of 226 respondents with the acceptance rate of 89 per cent. The findings revealed that customer demand, owner support, employee involvement, top management commitment, industry competition, and governmental pressure are positively associated with GWP. Based on the findings, warehouse companies and relevant authorities in Malaysia should focus on the importance of GWP towards becoming more competitive in the global market. The study provides a theoretical gap by proposing a valuable implication to scholars and practitioners in promoting sustainable industrial development which aligns with the government national agenda.

Factors influencing the structure of the Russian companies' capital

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (7) ◽  
pp. 1647-1660
Author(s):  
O.N. Likhacheva ◽  
A.S. Belikevich
Keyword(s):  
Correlation Analysis ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Systems Approach ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
Oil Contracts ◽  
Economic Landscape ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Trade Wars ◽  
The Capital Structure

Subject. In the uncertain market environment, the optimal structure of capital is getting more important because it influences the competitiveness of a firm, its financial sustainability and solvency and, consequently, a success. Herein we dwell upon the hypothesis presuming the existence of capital structure determinants. Objectives. We review empirical studies on the subject, analyze determinants of the Russian companies’ capital structure. Methods. The study is based on the systems approach and methods of statistical analysis. Results. It is necessary to monitor how capital is shaped and formed. We investigated proceedings on factors influencing the capital structure and discovered relevant hypotheses, carrying out the correlation analysis of such factors. Conclusions and Relevance. It is especially important to examine factors influencing the capital structure, and find the appropriate format for the economy struggling through the crisis. The coronavirus pandemic unavoidably reshapes the global economic landscape, which has already been under the pressure of deglobalization processes (trade wars, repudiation of oil contracts). The correlation analysis did not reveal any relationship of the variables in question (the company’s age, ROE, ROA, MOEX, key rate, GDP, PPI) and the capital structure. Further research should be devoted to other factors and consider the unreasonableness and psychological background of managers’ behavior who make decisions concerning the capital structure.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document