The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Huber
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Vote Procedure ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Conflict ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Significant Control ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
The Government

I present a formal model of the confidence vote procedure, an institutional arrangement that permits a prime minister to attach the fate of a particular policy to a vote on government survival. The analysis indicates that confidence vote procedures make it possible for prime ministers to exercise significant control over the nature of policy outcomes, even when these procedures are not actually invoked. Neither cabinet ministers, through their authority over specific portfolios, nor members of parliament, through the use of no-confidence motions, can counteract the prime minister's policy control on the floor of parliament. The analysis also illuminates the circumstances under which prime ministers should invoke confidence vote procedures, focusing attention on the position-taking incentives of the parties that support the government, rather than on the level of policy conflict between the government and parliament.

Unsuccessful Success? Failed No-Confidence Motions, Competence Signals, and Electoral Support

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (11) ◽  
pp. 1474-1499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
The Government ◽  
Opposition Parties

If no-confidence motions are primarily motivated by bringing down governments, why do only approximately 5% of no-confidence motions in advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 result in the termination of government? In this project the author addresses this puzzle by developing a formal model of the electoral benefits of no-confidence motions and tests these hypotheses with the use of an original data set. No-confidence motions represent highly visible opportunities for opposition parties to highlight their strength or ability compared to the government in the hopes of improving their vote shares. The author finds support for the signal-based theory on a sample of 20 advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 to 2008. Although no-confidence motions result in decreases for the government parties, the opposition parties that propose the motion experience boosts in vote share. This relationship is even stronger when the proposing party is an alternative governing possibility—illustrated by the conditioning impacts of the number of parliamentary parties and the opposition party’s ideological extremism. This provides an explanation as to why opposition parties would continue to challenge the government even though the motions are likely to fail.

scholarly journals Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies

2011 ◽  
Vol 105 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
TORUN DEWAN ◽  
ARTHUR SPIRLING
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Scottish Parliament ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Simple Variant ◽  
The Government ◽  
Empirical Regularity

Cohesive government-versus-opposition voting is a robust empirical regularity in Westminster democracies. Using new data from the modern Scottish Parliament, we show that this pattern cannot be explained by similarity of preferences within or between the government and opposition ranks. We look at differences in the way that parties operate in Westminster and Holyrood, and use roll call records to show that the observed behavior is unlikely to be determined by preferences on any underlying issue dimension. Using a simple variant of the agenda-setting model—in which members of parliament can commit to their voting strategies—we show that the procedural rules for reaching collective decisions in Westminster systems can explain this phenomenon: in the equilibrium, on some bills, members of the opposition vote against the government irrespective of the proposal. Such strategic opposition can reinforce government cohesiveness and have a moderating effect on policy outcomes. We introduce new data from the House of Lords, the Welsh Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly to distinguish our claims from competing accounts of the data.

Citizen Representation and Electoral Systems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ferland ◽  
Matt Golder
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Citizen Preferences ◽  
The Government ◽  
Ideological Dimension ◽  
Ideological Congruence

One common way to think about citizen representation is in terms of the ideological distance between citizens and their representatives. Are political elites ideologically congruent with citizen preferences? Electoral systems are an especially important political institution to consider when studying citizen representation because they influence the size and ideological composition of party systems, how votes are translated into legislative seats, the types of governments that form after elections, and the types of policies that get implemented. In effect, electoral institutions affect each stage of the representation process as one moves from citizen preferences to policy outcomes. Research on ideological congruence indicates that electoral rules can cause distortions in citizen-elite congruence to emerge and disappear as one moves through the representation process. In this regard, studies show that proportional electoral systems enjoy a representational advantage over majoritarian systems when it comes to legislative congruence (the ideological distance between the median legislative party and the median citizen) but that this advantage disappears when it comes to government congruence (the ideological distance between the government and the median citizen). Although research on citizen-elite ideological congruence has made significant progress over the last two decades, several new lines of inquiry are still worth pursuing. One is to move beyond the traditional focus on the left–right ideological dimension to evaluate citizen representation in a truly multidimensional framework. Another is to develop a unified theoretical framework for thinking about ideological congruence and ideological responsiveness. For too long, scholars have conducted studies of citizen-elite congruence and responsiveness in relative isolation, even though they address fundamentally related issues. In terms of measurement issues, progress can be made by developing better instruments to help locate citizens and elites on a common metric and paying more attention to the policymaking dynamics associated with minority and coalition governments. Existing studies of ideological congruence focus on the United States and the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe. Scholars might fruitfully extend the study of citizen representation to presidential democracies, other regions of the world, and even authoritarian regimes. Among other things, this may require that scholars think about how to conceptualize and measure citizen representation in countries where parties are not programmatic or where elites are not necessarily elected.

Opposition Parties and the Timing of Successful No-Confidence Motions

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
The Government ◽  
Policy Direction ◽  
Parliamentary Politics ◽  
Opposition Parties

The power to remove the government via no-confidence motion is a powerful tool afforded to the opposition. By triggering the government’s downfall, opposition parties can substantially influence policy direction in parliamentary democracies. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how government and opposition parties interact to determine the occurrence of no-confidence motions and their chance of success. In this project, I develop a simple formal model that identifies the factors influencing when opposition parties propose no-confidence motions and their outcomes. I find support for these expectations by estimating an empirical model that is explicitly derived from the underlying theoretical model. Unlike previous empirical studies of government stability, this project honors the strategic interactions that occur between government and opposition parties. In addition to the possibility of the motion passing, opposition parties are motivated by electoral considerations, which induce different behaviors at various stages of the electoral cycle. This project offers a number of implications for the study of parliamentary politics, including theories of opposition behavior, democratic accountability, and government duration and termination.

Policy Differences Among Parliamentary and Presidential Systems

2019 ◽  
pp. 379-403
Author(s):  
Sebastian M. Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Public Spending ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Presidential Democracies ◽  
Presidential Regimes ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Common Situation

This chapter examines how the organization of power and authority affects policy outcomes. The focus is on: (1) statutory law; (2) public spending; and (3) policy reversals. The empirical evidence suggests that, compared to prime ministers, presidents enjoy lower levels of legislative success. Yet, deadlocks or stalemates are rare events, even in the case of single-party minority governments under presidential democracies. Regarding public spending, the results suggest that one should look at governments’ partisan composition rather than constitutional structures. Government spending over GDP is lower in countries with single-minority governments. This is a common situation under presidentialism. As such, the negative relationship between presidentialism and public spending previously documented in the literature might be spurious. Finally, in terms of the connection between constitutional structures and policy reversals, there is a concrete policy choice: sovereign debt repayment. The analysis reveals that parliamentary democracies are less likely to reschedule their sovereign debts than presidential regimes.

Maximizing Utility vis-à-vis Developing Countries

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Blodgett Bermeo
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Developing Country ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
The Government ◽  
Development Outcomes

This chapter develops a formal model of targeted development. It starts from the assumption that governments in industrialized states seek to maximize their own utility in interactions with developing countries. Development concerns compete with other policy goals for scarce government resources. The level of development resources an industrialized country government targets to a particular developing country depends on the weight the government places on development in that country as well as the efficiency of the country in turning resources into development outcomes that the industrialized state values. One of the key insights of the model is that, as governments work to maximize the utility gained per dollar (or euro, yen, etc.) spent, development motives will influence policy in multiple issue areas. The chapter also draws out implications of the theory for each of the issue areas examined in the empirical chapters.

scholarly journals A signed network perspective on the government formation process in parliamentary democracies

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Fontan ◽  
Claudio Altafini
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Formation Process ◽  
Signed Graph ◽  
Balance Theory ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Dynamical Models ◽  
Average Correlation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Signed Network ◽  
The Government

AbstractIn parliamentary democracies, government negotiations talks following a general election can sometimes be a long and laborious process. In order to explain this phenomenon, in this paper we use structural balance theory to represent a multiparty parliament as a signed network, with edge signs representing alliances and rivalries among parties. We show that the notion of frustration, which quantifies the amount of “disorder” encoded in the signed graph, correlates very well with the duration of the government negotiation talks. For the 29 European countries considered in this study, the average correlation between frustration and government negotiation talks ranges between 0.42 and 0.69, depending on what information is included in the edges of the signed network. Dynamical models of collective decision-making over signed networks with varying frustration are proposed to explain this correlation.

The use and non-use of the government financial report by Maltese Members of Parliament

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 1124-1144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josette Caruana ◽  
Brady Farrugia
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information Overload ◽  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Report ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Questionnaire Research

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the use and non-use of the Government Financial Report by Maltese Members of Parliament (MPs). It refers to information overload theory to analyse the gap between financial reports and their relevance for decision making. Design/methodology/approach A mix of qualitative (interviews) and quantitative (questionnaire) research tools are applied, with the Maltese MPs being the research participants. This method is acclaimed to be comprehensive, but this study highlights certain disadvantages when applied in the political arena. Findings The characteristics of the information itself could be the main cause of information overload, resulting in the non-use of the financial report for decision making. Politicians refer to financial data for their decision making, but not to the data presented in the financial report. Irrespective of the politician’s professional background, the data in the financial report is perceived as incomplete and outdated. Practical implications The cause of information overload and its effects are important considerations for preparers of financial information and accounting standard setters, if they wish that their production is relevant for decision makers. Originality/value There is an increase in research concerning politicians’ use of budgetary and performance information, at local and regional levels of government. This study investigates exclusively the use of the financial report by politicians at central level, in a politically stable environment.

scholarly journals Elections and local government performance in Brazil

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (83) ◽  
pp. 580-599
Author(s):  
Pedro Luiz Costa Cavalcante
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Citizen Participation ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Government Performance ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
National Analysis

Abstract The 1988 federal Constitution introduced a complex and innovative institutional arrangement that not only reestablished political rights and democratic procedures, but also reinforced decentralization as a fundamental guideline for policy implementation in Brazil. As a result, municipalities have become pivotal actors in the policymaking process. Scholars of Latin American politics have given much emphasis to the causes and determinants of decentralization, but not much has been done toward a more general understanding of how this increased decentralization has affected policymaker behavior and policy outcomes. This paper aims to do exactly that. Specifically, it investigates how institutional arrangements and electoral competition affect local government performance. The theoretical basis is the electoral democratic theory that broadly highlights elections as instruments of citizen control in retrospective and prospective voting approaches. The research employs a large-N cross sub-national analysis based on a dataset of electoral, partisan, socioeconomic and public financial information collected from over 5500 municipalities. Local governments’ performance, our dependent variables, are synthetic indicators formulated from 2009 nationwide surveys on public education, health, housing and welfare services. The OLS regression results confirm the hypothesis that politics variables do matter in how politicians make decisions and implement policy under the new Brazilian democratic Era. The empirical evidences suggest that electoral competition does not present a direct effect on government performance, however, ideology and citizen participation do. Therefore, this paper helps to expand our understanding of a political system’s impact on public policy outputs, which is extremely important not only for academic purpose but also to support policymakers’ decisions.

scholarly journals Bureaucratic Corruption, Democracy and Judicial Independence

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Gang Wang
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Instrumental Variable ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Bureaucratic Corruption ◽  
Institutional Constraint ◽  
Determinants Of Corruption ◽  
The Government ◽  
Different Levels

<p>The theoretical literature in economics and political science has made numerous efforts in understanding the determinants of corruption and stressed the importance of political institutions in shaping the patterns of government corruption. Nevertheless, very few researches focus on the role of judicial system. Employing a formal model with empirical analyses, I incorporate economic factors with political constraints to investigate the different roles of democracy and judicial independence in determining the level of bureaucrats’ corruption across countries. Empirically, the instrumental variable (IV) approach is applied to resolve the endogeneity problems. The evidence indicates that different levels of corruption across countries are significantly influenced by the degrees of judicial independence. To fight corruption successfully, I contend that the judiciary, as a hard institutional constraint to resist bureaucratic corruption, has to be independent from the government. </p>

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