Divided We Fall: Opposition Fragmentation and the Electoral Fortunes of Governing Parties

2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ko Maeda

This article introduces the concept of opposition fragmentation into the study of the determinants of election results. Empirical studies have demonstrated that anti-government economic voting is likely to take place where the clarity of responsibility (the degree to which voters can attribute policy responsibility to the government) is high. This argument is extended by focusing on the effects of the degree of opposition fragmentation in influencing the extent to which poor economic performance decreases the government’s vote share. With data from seventeen parliamentary democracies, it is shown that when there are fewer opposition parties, the relationship between economic performance and governing parties’ electoral fortune is stronger. Opposition fragmentation appears to be as strong a factor as the clarity of responsibility.

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (11) ◽  
pp. 1474-1499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams

If no-confidence motions are primarily motivated by bringing down governments, why do only approximately 5% of no-confidence motions in advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 result in the termination of government? In this project the author addresses this puzzle by developing a formal model of the electoral benefits of no-confidence motions and tests these hypotheses with the use of an original data set. No-confidence motions represent highly visible opportunities for opposition parties to highlight their strength or ability compared to the government in the hopes of improving their vote shares. The author finds support for the signal-based theory on a sample of 20 advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 to 2008. Although no-confidence motions result in decreases for the government parties, the opposition parties that propose the motion experience boosts in vote share. This relationship is even stronger when the proposing party is an alternative governing possibility—illustrated by the conditioning impacts of the number of parliamentary parties and the opposition party’s ideological extremism. This provides an explanation as to why opposition parties would continue to challenge the government even though the motions are likely to fail.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams

The power to remove the government via no-confidence motion is a powerful tool afforded to the opposition. By triggering the government’s downfall, opposition parties can substantially influence policy direction in parliamentary democracies. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how government and opposition parties interact to determine the occurrence of no-confidence motions and their chance of success. In this project, I develop a simple formal model that identifies the factors influencing when opposition parties propose no-confidence motions and their outcomes. I find support for these expectations by estimating an empirical model that is explicitly derived from the underlying theoretical model. Unlike previous empirical studies of government stability, this project honors the strategic interactions that occur between government and opposition parties. In addition to the possibility of the motion passing, opposition parties are motivated by electoral considerations, which induce different behaviors at various stages of the electoral cycle. This project offers a number of implications for the study of parliamentary politics, including theories of opposition behavior, democratic accountability, and government duration and termination.


Author(s):  
Michael Marsh

This chapter seeks to explain a significant puzzle of the 2016 election. There is now a very extensive literature linking economic performance with the electoral performance of government parties, with the relationship being a positive one. The 2016 election was an unusual illustration of a government being punished despite being able to point to a record of very significant economic growth and rapidly falling unemployment as Ireland’s recovery from the economic crash and bailout made it such a good example of the success of ‘austerity’ policies. Drawing on many studies that argue for certain contingencies in the relationship, this chapter explores a number of ways in which the good economy-government returned to office relationship went wrong. A key finding, contrary to general tendencies in the literature on economic voting, is that ‘pocketbook’ considerations were very significant in determining how voters felt about the government parties. The chapter offers some reasons why the Irish case is unusual and also questions the theoretical bases on which ‘pocketbook’ voting is downplayed in the economic voting literature.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 864
Author(s):  
Samsidine Aidara ◽  
Abdullah Al Mamun ◽  
Noorul Azwin Md Nasir ◽  
Muhammad Mohiuddin ◽  
Noorshella Che Nawi ◽  
...  

This study investigated the mediating and moderating effects of competitive advantage and access to working capital, respectively, on the relationship between entrepreneurial competencies and informal microenterprise economic performance in Senegal from the lens of resource-based view theory (RBV). Data were randomly gathered using the cross-sectional research design from 356 informal micro-entrepreneurs operating in the informal sector. The study outcomes revealed that entrepreneurial competencies and competitive advantage emerged as significant predictors of economic performance for informal microenterprises in Senegal. On the contrary, access to working capital displayed an adverse moderating effect, while competitive advantage exhibited a partial and positive mediating effect on the relationship between entrepreneurial competencies and economic performance of informal microenterprises. The Important and Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA) results signify that the most significant considerations for the economic performance of informal microenterprises in Senegal were competitive advantage, access to working capital, commitment competency, and relationship competency. Simultaneously, this study expanded the reach of RBV by enhancing our understanding pertaining to the mediating and moderating roles in the relationships among entrepreneurial competencies, competitive advantage, and access to working capital towards improving the economic performance of informal microenterprises across developing countries. Since many have lost their jobs due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the Government of Senegal and its policymakers should place more emphasis on the importance of informal entrepreneurship, such as provision of low-interest credit facilities for their working capital, as well as thorough training in the strategic advantage and competencies domains. This is because informal entrepreneurs have the ability, via jobs creation and income generating activities, to contribute to the economic growth of the country.


2013 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 630-657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Régis Dandoy

This article analyses the impact of government prospects and government participation on party policy preferences. Comparing the content of manifestos of governing and opposition parties in Belgium during three decades, I observed that the relationship of a party to the act of governing influences the content of its manifesto. In that sense, party preferences are not only driven by ideology and vote-seeking arguments but are part of a larger party strategy: parties adapt their electoral platform when they are in government or are willing to enter into it. The conclusion of the article also discusses the literature on government formation. Such literature hypothesizes that parties that are ideologically similar would form a coalition. However, results for the Belgian case demonstrate that parties strategically adapt their electoral platform when wanting to enter the government. Coalitions are made up of parties with similar policy preferences, not because they ‘are’ alike but because parties strategically ‘make’ them alike.


1989 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 372-384
Author(s):  
Ignace Ng ◽  
John McCallum

Even though identifying the causes of economic growth has been the subject of numerous empirical studies, little is known about the impact of inter-country variations in unionization on differences in economic growth between countries. To fill this apparent gap in the literature, the primary objective of this paper is to examine the influence of trade unions on economic growth in seventeen oECD countries from 1960 to 1979. The results show that the nature of the relationship between trade unions and economic growth depends upon the ideology of the government in power. Under 'non-socialist' governments, increased union density reduces economic growth, whereas under `socialist' governments, a higher level of unionization increases economic growth. This, in turn, implies that governments can have an influence on whether trade unions are growth-inhibiting or growth-promoting. However, because of the limitations in the sample used, additional studies are needed before a consensus can be reached on this issue.


1995 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON

This article investigates the relationship between economic conditions and party support for coalition parties in Denmark and the Netherlands. The article argues that the simple reward-punishment model cannot fully account for changes in citizens' support for parties, given variable economic performance. Using aggregate public support data for political parties, the article shows that citizens differentiate between coalition partners depending on the parties' issue priorities. Instead of blaming or rewarding all coalition parties in a uniform fashion, citizens shift support from one coalition party to another, depending on the perceived competence of a party to deal with particular economic problems. The article finds that the structure of responsibility in parliamentary democracies ruled by coalition governments is more complex than is often assumed. Therefore, it is argued that students of economics and public opinion should pay particular attention to the institutional context in which citizens make choices.


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 589-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanna Linn ◽  
Jonathan Nagler

Most economic models of election outcomes make two assumptions: voters look at the aggregate economy, and they compare the state of the economy with some fixed reference. We argue that the increase in economic inequality and slowing of overall growth suggest these assumptions should no longer hold. We propose a theory that allows voters to take into account the distribution of economic growth, and we reconsider different decision rules voters could use to evaluate the incumbent. Analyzing presidential elections from 1952 through 2012, we show that models using the economic performance of individual income quintiles are indistinguishable in overall fit from models using aggregate income to predict election results, but can produce different predictions given different distributions of growth. And we show that voters do not appear to explicitly compare economic performance of the incumbent with the out-party, suggesting they have reneged on their role as rational gods of vengeance.


1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Taylor ◽  
V. M. Herman

Arguments are presented for and against a series of hypotheses about the influence of the parliamentary party system on the stability of governments, and the hypotheses are tested against data on 196 governments in parliamentary democracies since 1945. A strong relation is found between the duration of governments and the fragmentation of the parliamentary party system and of the government parties, but the fragmentation of the opposition parties seems not to affect stability. One-party governments are more stable than coalition governments, and majority governments more than minority governments. The ideological dispersion of the parties—in the whole parliament, in the government, or in the opposition—does not explain stability any better than fragmentation, which is based upon only the number and sizes of parties; but the proportion of seats held by ‘anti-system’ parties (communists and neo-fascists, mainly) is a good indicator of stability. The best explanation of government stability found here is the combined linear influence of the size of the anti-system parties and the fragmentation of the pro-system parties.


2020 ◽  
pp. 99-120
Author(s):  
Josiah Aduda ◽  
Stephen Obondy

The objective of this paper was to conduct literature review on how credit risk management impacts efficiency and to identify the knowledge gaps in the relationship between the two variables. This study will help the government in policy direction as far as growing the financial sector as a precursor to credit risk management and its contribution to growth in terms of improved savings, improved per capita income, improved credit to private sector and increased employment levels both directly and indirectly. From the empirical studies reviewed, credit risk management was found to influence financial performance but there is no concrete evidence on the relation that credit risk management has with efficiency of SACCOs. The previous studies have mostly focused on financial performance instead of efficiency and they also differ on the direction of the relationship between the two variables. The difference in findings among the scholars might arise from methodological differences and operationalization of the study variables. Contextual differences might also explain the inconsistent findings as most of the studies have focused on commercial banks and in different economies. Future studies should investigate underlying variables that can explain the relationship between credit risk management and efficiency of SACCOs. Keywords: Credit risk management, efficiency, SACCOs.


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