Caudillismo and Institutional Change: Manuel Odría and the Peruvian Armed Forces, 1948-1956

1984 ◽  
Vol 40 (04) ◽  
pp. 479-489
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Masterson

Abraham Lowenthal in characterizing the Peruvian military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado cautioned that the regime was not a “typical caudillo” venture but rather an essentially “institutional” effort. His caveat is certainly justified when one considers that Peru was dominated until recent decades by such modern era military chieftains as Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, Oscar R. Benavides, and Manuel A. Odría. Yet when General Odría seized control of Peru on October 27, 1948, the Peruvian army was striving desperately for increased professionalism. In order to retain the army's support, the caudillo was thus compelled to enact institutional reforms that made the officer class more conscious of its modernizing mission and, ironically, far less tolerant of Odría's personalism. This study will analyze the military policies of the Odría regime in order to explain the changing outlook of the Peruvian armed forces during the caudillo's eight year rule.

1984 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-489
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Masterson

Abraham Lowenthal in characterizing the Peruvian military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado cautioned that the regime was not a “typical caudillo” venture but rather an essentially “institutional” effort. His caveat is certainly justified when one considers that Peru was dominated until recent decades by such modern era military chieftains as Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, Oscar R. Benavides, and Manuel A. Odría. Yet when General Odría seized control of Peru on October 27, 1948, the Peruvian army was striving desperately for increased professionalism. In order to retain the army's support, the caudillo was thus compelled to enact institutional reforms that made the officer class more conscious of its modernizing mission and, ironically, far less tolerant of Odría's personalism. This study will analyze the military policies of the Odría regime in order to explain the changing outlook of the Peruvian armed forces during the caudillo's eight year rule.


Author(s):  
Astrid Jamar ◽  
Gerard Birantamije

Military politics have been entangled with the trajectory of Burundian public institutions, experiences of violence, and the army formation. From 1994 to 2009, the peace process brought together different political parties, security forces, and rebel groups to negotiate ceasefires and major institutional reforms. Adopted in 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement contained some of the most ambitious and sophisticated security reforms. While most literature emphasizes mostly on the Arusha Peace Agreement, 22 agreements were signed by different sets of parties, including political parties and rebel groups during these 15 years of peace meditation. The Arusha Peace Agreement provides for complex security arrangements: (a) a strictly defined role, structure, and mandate of the army and other security forces; (b) sophisticated power-sharing arrangements for both leadership and composition of the army and other security forces; (c) demobilization, disarmament, integration, and training of armed forces; (d) transformation of armed groups into political parties; and (e) ceasefires. The peace talks integrated various armed political groups into Burundian institutions. Responding to four decades of violence and military dictatorship, these reforms of the military and other security forces aimed to disentangle the military from politics. Initially contested, the agreements shaped the reading of the historical contexts that justified these institutional military reforms. Indeed, provisions of these agreements also framed a narrative about violence and imposed fixed interpretations of political mobilization of violence. These imposed interpretations neglected key elements that enabled and, continue to enable, the political use of violence as well as the emergence of new forms of military politics. The main institutional approaches adopted to tackle issue of inclusion and correct imbalances in armed forces was the introduction of power-sharing arrangements based on ethnic dimensions. The formulation and further implementation of ethnic quotas reinforced the binary elements of ethnic identities, rather than promote a more fluid understanding that would appreciate intersecting elements, such as gender, political affiliation, and class and regional dimensions in the undertaking of power, alliance, and relations between executive and military institutions. Security reforms continue to affect the functioning of public institutions, with limited effects for disentangling politics and military.


Author(s):  
Brian E. Loveman

Latin America’s armed forces have played a central role in the region’s political history. This selective annotated bibliography focuses on key sources, with varying theoretical, empirical, and normative treatments of the military governments in the region, from the Cuban Revolution (1959) until the end of the Cold War (1989–1990). The article is limited to those cases in which military governments or “civil-military” governments were in power. This excludes personalist dictatorships, party dictatorships, and civilian governments in which the armed forces exercised considerable influence but did not rule directly. No pretense is made of comprehensiveness or of treating the “causes” of military coups (a vast literature) and of civil-military relations under civilian governments. Likewise, the closely related topics of guerrilla movements during this period, human rights violations under the military governments, US policy and support for many of the military governments, and the transitions back to civilian government (including “transitional justice”) are not covered in depth, but some of the selections do treat these topics and direct the reader to a more extensive literature on these subjects. Long-term military governments, with changing leadership in most cases, controlled eleven Latin American nations for significant periods from 1964 to 1990: Ecuador, 1963–1966 and 1972–1978; Guatemala, 1963–1985 (with an interlude from 1966–1969); Brazil, 1964–1985; Bolivia, 1964–1970 and 1971–1982; Argentina, 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; Peru, 1968–1980; Panama, 1968–1989; Honduras, 1963–1966 and 1972–1982; Chile, 1973–1990; and Uruguay, 1973–1984. In El Salvador the military dominated the government from 1948 until 1984, but the last “episode” was from 1979 to 1984. Military governments, though inevitably authoritarian, implemented varying economic, social, and foreign policies. They had staunch supporters and intense opponents, and they were usually subject to internal factionalism and ideological as well as policy disagreements. The sources discussed in this article reflect that diversity.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Dhenin ◽  
Paulo Gustavo Pellegrino Correa

This paper aims to offer a critical perspective regarding Brazil's border policies and its military presence. For decades, the Brazilian Armed Forces emphasized the 'Security and Development' doctrine as the solution to solve the many issues of the remote areas of the Amazon. In the late 1980's, even with the end of the Military Regime, such practices continued to dominate the agenda of policymakers. Nowadays, Brazil's young democracy faces new challenges regarding its 'brown areas', as O'Donnell theorized them. Our main goal here is to stress the lack of a critical thinking in the process of transformation of the regional reality. We evaluated the situation according to recent data gathered during several field trips in the Amazon region. The absence of a government presence, often pointed out as a strategic weakness by the military authorities, neglect the presence of various actors (population, NGOs, for example) committed to security. We argue that it is essential for the military to cooperate more with civilians, instead of militarizing the borders, to guarantee a safe presence for the population, and not only the security of a territory.


Author(s):  
Brian Loveman

Despite the common identification of Chile as “exceptional” among Latin American nations, the military played a key role in 20th-century Chilean politics and continues to do so in the first decades of the 21st century. Both 20th-century constitutions were adopted under military tutelage, after military coups: two coups—1924–1925 (the 1925 Constitution) and the military coup in 1973 (the 1980 constitution). A successful coup in 1932 established the short-lived “Chilean Socialist Republic.” Infrequent but sometimes serious failed military coups decisively influenced the course of Chilean politics: 1912, 1919, 1931–1932 (several), 1933, 1935, 1936, 1938, 1939, 1948, 1954, 1969, June 1973, 1986 (“coup within the coup” against Augusto Pinochet by air force officers), and others. Monographic and article-length histories of each of these events exist detailing their rationale and eventual failure. Severe political polarization in the context of the post-Cuban Revolution Cold War wave of military coups (1961–1976) in Latin America resulted in the breakdown of the Chilean political system in 1973. U.S. support for a military coup to oust the elected socialist president exacerbated the internal political strife. When a military junta ousted socialist president Salvador Allende in 1973, the military leaders claimed that they had ousted the Allende government to rescue Chilean democracy from the threat of international communism and civil war, and to restore the 1925 Constitution and the rule of law In 1973, the armed forces established a dictatorship that lasted almost 17 years and imposed a new constitution that is still in place in 2020 (with amendments). During this period (1973–1990), military officers occupied ministerial posts in the presidential cabinet, a military junta (Junta de Gobierno) acted as the legislature, and much of the public administration was militarized. Massive human rights violations took place involving all three branches of the armed forces and the national police (carabineros). After a plebiscite that rejected continued rule by General Augusto Pinochet and elections in 1989, the country returned to civilian government in March 1990. From 1990 until 2020 the country experienced gradual “normalization” of civil–military relations under elected civilian governments. After 1998, the threat of another military coup and reestablishment of military government largely disappeared. Constitutional reforms in 2005 reestablished much (but not all) of civilian control over defense and security policy and oversight of the armed forces. Nevertheless, reorganization of defense and security policymaking remained salient political issues and the armed forces continued to play an important role in national politics, policymaking, and internal administration.


1973 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aristide R. Zolberg

After a decade of play, the score in the match pitting men in uniform against politicians is nearly even. About half of the new states of Black Africa have remained uninterruptedly under civilian rule while in the other half each has experienced at least one coup in which armed forces—military and police—have played a prominent role. Most of the coups were followed by the establishment of some form of military government. Sometimes the original coup leaders were overthrown by others; sometimes they returned to their barracks, hovering about the seats of power; sometimes they or others abruptly interrupted “civilianization.”


1992 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Conca

Brazil Entered the 1990s with its transition from authoritarian rule incomplete. The gradual withdrawal of the armed forces from power brought an end to over two decades of direct military rule in 1985, paving the way for a new constitution and the first presidential election in nearly 30 years. These formal democratizing changes were erected, however, on a foundation of socio-economic structures and political institutions with some decidedly non-democratic features. As a result, Brazilian politics retains some important vestiges of authoritarianism. Pre-existing centers of power in society remain extraordinarily influential within the emerging system, frequently operating beyond the reach of even nominal democratic control or oversight.If events of the 1980s did not completely transform Brazilian politics, they did redefine the main challenge of the political transition. The initial problem of replacing the military government with a civilian regime has given way to a second, less tangible, task of consolidating democratic institutions and procedures (O'Donnell, 1988).


1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Gilbert

In the early morning hours of July 27, 1974, the military government of Peru employed riot police to seize control of the country's principal daily newspapers. The government announced that the newspapers were being transferred to independent organizations representative of broad sectors of Peruvian society. Peru's “Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces,” which came to power in 1968, had already surprised students of the Latin American military with a series of radical measures which included an extensive land reform, the expropriation of a number of foreign companies, reorganization of the financial sector, and the creation of a system of worker control for industry. Now President Juan Velasco Alvarado presented the press takeover as an integral part of a fundamental reordering of the existing society along progressive nationalist lines.


2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-332
Author(s):  
Dierk Walter

Abstract More than many other armed conflicts of the modern era, the colonial wars/wars of empire fought by Western powers at the periphery of the world system over the past five centuries were defined by spatial categories. The problems of transoceanic or transcontinental power projection and the economic logic of the imperial system limited the military means employed on the periphery, making them often insufficient for the effective control of extended, inaccessible, and inhospitable spaces. Faced with an adversary capable of using these wide spaces to avoid decisive battle, the imperial military resorted to warfare against entire societies. Cognitively and mentally, Western armed forces experienced the periphery as an alien space, a space in which physical geography and human enemy seemed to be organically connected in opposing the invader. This perception of the peripheral space was not only partially responsible for atrocities, but could also result in warfare against nature itself.


Author(s):  
Curtis R. Ryan

The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), unlike their counterparts in many other parts of the Middle East, have never taken power in a coup. The military has no direct role in governance, but its shadow looms large in Jordanian politics, especially as the kingdom has been challenged by regional wars, internal conflicts, and (after 2010) by the domestic and regional effects of the Arab Spring (Arab uprisings). The only time Jordan came close to a military coup was in 1957, in an era marked by heightened pan-Arab nationalism and politicization of armed forces across the Arab world. But that coup was foiled almost as soon as it began, leaving the armed forces thereafter to cast themselves as the protectors not only of the country but also of the Hashemite monarchy. Jordan’s armed forces fought in multiple wars with Israel, including in 1948 and 1967, with a more limited role in the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. The military was also involved intensely in internal conflict, especially in 1970–1971, when King Hussein’s armed forces clashed with the guerilla forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Although they never overthrew the state nor established a military government in Jordan, the Jordanian Armed Forces nonetheless played a large role in Jordanian politics, society, and even in the economy. The military was also part of a broader array of security institutions, including the intelligence services, the police, and the gendarmerie. An aid-dependent country with limited resources, Jordan faced countless fiscal crises over the years, but its military and security budgets continued to grow. Hashemite kings have tended to dote on the armed forces, ensuring large budgets and the latest in arms and equipment. Even the regime’s attempt to cultivate a strong Jordanian national identity was deeply rooted in the images of the military, the monarchy itself, and the other key security institutions. But while the military’s influence loomed large in public life, it did not necessarily reflect a broad range of Jordanian society, being drawn heavily from Jordan’s tribal, rural, and East Jordanian communities, rather than from more urban, largely Palestinian-Jordanian communities. But in the era of the Arab uprisings across the Middle East (especially after 2010), military veterans—especially those with tribal and East Jordanian roots—played ever more vocal roles in Jordanian politics, remaining loyal to the monarchy, but also feeling empowered to lecture the monarchy about perceived flaws in social and economic policies. The personnel in Jordan’s military and security institutions, in short, were drawn from the same tribes, regions, and communities that were most fervently challenging the regime and its policies in the Arab Spring era, changing the nature of Jordanian politics itself.


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