Burundi: Assessing Military Institutional Reforms Post-Arusha

Author(s):  
Astrid Jamar ◽  
Gerard Birantamije

Military politics have been entangled with the trajectory of Burundian public institutions, experiences of violence, and the army formation. From 1994 to 2009, the peace process brought together different political parties, security forces, and rebel groups to negotiate ceasefires and major institutional reforms. Adopted in 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement contained some of the most ambitious and sophisticated security reforms. While most literature emphasizes mostly on the Arusha Peace Agreement, 22 agreements were signed by different sets of parties, including political parties and rebel groups during these 15 years of peace meditation. The Arusha Peace Agreement provides for complex security arrangements: (a) a strictly defined role, structure, and mandate of the army and other security forces; (b) sophisticated power-sharing arrangements for both leadership and composition of the army and other security forces; (c) demobilization, disarmament, integration, and training of armed forces; (d) transformation of armed groups into political parties; and (e) ceasefires. The peace talks integrated various armed political groups into Burundian institutions. Responding to four decades of violence and military dictatorship, these reforms of the military and other security forces aimed to disentangle the military from politics. Initially contested, the agreements shaped the reading of the historical contexts that justified these institutional military reforms. Indeed, provisions of these agreements also framed a narrative about violence and imposed fixed interpretations of political mobilization of violence. These imposed interpretations neglected key elements that enabled and, continue to enable, the political use of violence as well as the emergence of new forms of military politics. The main institutional approaches adopted to tackle issue of inclusion and correct imbalances in armed forces was the introduction of power-sharing arrangements based on ethnic dimensions. The formulation and further implementation of ethnic quotas reinforced the binary elements of ethnic identities, rather than promote a more fluid understanding that would appreciate intersecting elements, such as gender, political affiliation, and class and regional dimensions in the undertaking of power, alliance, and relations between executive and military institutions. Security reforms continue to affect the functioning of public institutions, with limited effects for disentangling politics and military.

Author(s):  
Marco Bünte

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 496-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Dean

In Myanmar, one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world (1962—2011) exerting unrestrained coercion and relying on a pervasive security apparatus, has accepted a constitution and competitive elections. The military directed concatenation of developments but especially the Constitution that legalizes a unique power-sharing arrangement between the military and the elected government, contribute to the exceptionalism but also continuing coercion of Myanmar’s military, even under the democratically elected popular government of former democracy icons Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Holding that a key step in a democratic transition must involve the scaling down of state coercive apparatus, the article demonstrates how this has not been the case in Myanmar. The size, expenditure and revenues of the armed forces have been maintained, the surveillance for political and social control continues, while the spread of mobile communication devices, and particularly social media, has opened up more extensive and easier opportunities for monitoring. Subjugating the practices of surveillance to laws is not prioritized in the complex political context of multiple pressing issues.


Subject Elections and security. Significance The interior minister has ordered security personnel to assure “equal security to all political parties” contesting the June 4 commune council elections. Yet this follows remarks by other officials that “war” will occur if the governing Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) loses these or the 2018 general election, and promising a crackdown if the opposition does not respect either election’s result and undertakes violent street protests. Cambodia’s security forces will be central to election security, to any crackdown and to the post-election period. However, concerns have been raised about their relationship with the state. Impacts Using the security forces to perpetuate CPP rule could undermine Cambodia’s democratisation. However, renewed CPP government would assure internal security, aiding economic growth and investment. If the CNRP wins in 2018, the CPP would likely demand a power-sharing agreement rather than leave office.


Author(s):  
Zoltan Barany

This chapter looks at two pivotal states of South Asia: India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan gained their independence in 1947. India succeeded in placing its armed forces under firm and virtually unchallenged state control right from the beginning of independence. However, civil–military relations in Pakistan have been far more “eventful.” The chapter makes three arguments. First and most important, by the end of the first postcolonial decade, the patterns for the drastically different military politics of India and Pakistan were already set. Second, of the numerous reasons for the evolution of different civil–military relations in the two countries, several lie in the circumstances of the 1947 Partition and in the immediate post-Partition period. Third, the British colonial period left behind profound legacies, most of which have positively influenced military affairs in the Subcontinent. The chapter also addresses Bangladesh—from its independence in 1971 to the military take-over in 2007—and what sets its military politics apart from Pakistan's.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanislav Mikhailovich Ivanov

The article analyzes the military operation of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan, which lasted for 20 years, and the prospects for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from this country. The author states that the new US President D. Biden does not abandon the foreign policy course pursued by his predecessors earlier to reduce the US military presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the new president reaffirmed his commitment to the peace agreement between the United States and the opposition Taliban, reached in the Qatari capital of Doha in February 2020, which provides for the withdrawal of US troops and their NATO allies from the country. However, the author comes to the conclusion that due to a number of objective and subjective factors, the timing of the final withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may be postponed indefinitely, and even the deadline recently declared by the White House on September 11, 2021, may be far from final and may be repeatedly subjected to revisions. The main obstacle to the implementation of this important clause of the bilateral agreement is the lack of progress in negotiations between the Taliban representatives and the central government, as well as the lack of security guarantees for the withdrawn contingent of the US Armed Forces, NATO and the remaining staff of Western foreign missions in Afghanistan. Not only the radical Taliban wing, but also a number of current ministers in Kabul are trying to sabotage the conclusion of a second peace agreement and the subsequent integration of the Taliban into power. Without a lasting agreement between the Taliban and the central authorities in Kabul and the formation of a new coalition government, the likelihood of a resumption of civil war in the country will remain. New terrorist attacks and outbursts of violence on the part of the radical wing of the Taliban movement against the central government and foreign troops are not excluded. The penetration of Islamic State gangs into Afghanistan, which can undermine the stability of the military-political situation from within and provoke new armed conflicts, also carries certain risks. Much will also depend on the position of one of the main external players in Afghan affairs — Islamabad. Time will show whether Pakistan will be ready to take on part of the functions of a peaceful settlement within the Afghan conflict. The US administration would like more participation in stabilizing the further situation in Afghanistan from other regional forces (China, Russia, India, Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan).


Author(s):  
Bishnu Raj Upreti

Historically, the military in Nepal was closely associated with and loyal to the institution of the monarchy and was intended to operate in the interests of the palace. However, the military was forced to confront political change in 1990 as the power of the king beyond that of the constitution was scrapped and Nepal was limited to a constitutional monarchy. Consequently, the military theoretically came under civilian control with the advent of the end of a partyless political system and the establishment of a multiparty democracy. The palace reluctantly accepted this change but covertly continued consolidating power by using the military. Hence, the already cemented mistrust between political parties and the military mounted. Political parties viewed the military as a royal army and the military perceived political parties as unpatriotic and aligned with foreign powers. This hidden tension remained and was reflected in many instances until the abolition of the institution of the monarchy in May 2008 by the Nepali parliament. From 1990 to 2010, the military endured very difficult periods such as continuous combat (February 1996–November 2006) with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN(M)], the royal massacre (the entire family of King Birendra was assassinated), sharp criticisms of its armed conflict related to human rights violations, a cessation of military support from the international community, the abolition of the monarchy, which had existed in Nepal for 240 years, confinement along with CPN(M) ex-combatants per the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), tensions with the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), attempts by the CPN(M) government to politicize the military, and the removal of the military chief. In all these events, the military was indirectly and directly dragged in political maneuvering. In some cases, it fully dragged while in others only partially so, and in some cases, it failed entirely. Further, in the past three decades, from 1990 to 2020, the military has been sharply criticized for engagements in business beyond its traditional military role and for not respecting civilian supremacy. However, the military has also been highly praised for its acceptance of the republican system. All Nepali citizens have praised the military’s natural disaster relief work during floods, earthquakes, avalanches, fires, landslides, air and other transportation disasters, its search and rescue operations, medical assistance and evacuation efforts, air rescues and mass evacuations, flood control, reconstruction of damaged vital infrastructures, and construction of temporary shelters for homeless citizens. It is clear that the Ministry of Defense and the military require further security sector reforms and better civil–military relations as well as ensuring parliamentary oversight in the spirit of the National Security Policy and Nepal’s constitution.


Author(s):  
Federica Caso

Abstract After decades of refusal, neglect, and tacit admittance, the service of Indigenous people in the national armed forces of settler colonial states such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States is finally gaining acknowledgment. Indigenous people are now integrated in the regular forces and represented in national war commemoration. This article maintains that while inclusion and recognition of Indigenous military service is a positive transformation in the direction of post-colonial reconciliation, it still operates within the logics of settler colonialism intended to eradicate Indigenous stories of connection to land and assimilate Indigenous people in settler society. Using the case study of Indigenous militarization in Australia, this article argues that, under conditions of settler colonialism, the inclusion and recognition of Indigenous people in national militaries advances the settler colonial project intended to dispossess Indigenous people from their land and assimilate them in the new settler society. It highlights that historically, military organization has supported settler colonialism, and positions the present inclusion and recognition of Indigenous people in the military as a continuation of this history.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 931-942
Author(s):  
Muhammad Riaz Raza ◽  
Muhammad Usman Saeed ◽  
Zafar Ali

Purpose of the study: This study aims to analyze and compare the media images and coverage of three countries regarding their security forces. For this purpose, researchers have examined the media image of the American Army in the New York Times, the Indian Army in Indian Express, and the Pakistani Army in The Dawn. Methodology: The researchers selected news stories of three sampled newspapers; New York Times, Indian Express, and The Dawn for one year from 1st January 2018 to 31st December 2018 purposively for the content analysis. Spearman correlations, central tendency, frames of the stories in terms of positive, negative, and neutral have been examined. The researchers have examined coverage patterns of security forces at the object, attribute, and network levels in the light of agenda-setting theory. Main Findings: There are significant differences in the image of the armed forces. Indian Express covered the Indian army positively with the special emphasis on the success of the armed in internal military operations and the glorification of the military leadership. Similarly, New York Times covered the American Army favourably with a particular focus on external military operations for peace and security purposes. Whereas, The Dawn covered Pakistan Army differently. Applications of this study: The study will be helpful and of great importance for media owners, media regulatory bodies, military establishments, foreign and international relations. The study will also be a significant contribution towards civil-military relationships in geostrategic locations of the sub-continent. Since these countries have been involved in war-on-terror in this region as far as peace and stability are concerned, the study will be a roadmap for the peacekeeping forces. Novelty/Originality of this study: Few research studies have been witnessed so far on the media image of these countries. This study is new and different in nature as the military image of three different countries in terms of civil-military relationship has been measured on their mainstream media.


Significance The Constitutional Declaration -- a power-sharing agreement between the military leaders who ousted former President Omar al-Bashir and the protest leaders who led the popular revolution -- makes a peace agreement with Sudan’s various armed factions a priority for the first six months of the transition. Impacts For now, de facto ceasefires should mostly hold, though sporadic skirmishes, including among non-formal armed actors, may continue. Progress in peace talks would enhance wider prospects for stability, creating an enabling environment for economic and political reforms. Progress could also accelerate plans for the withdrawal of the joint UN-African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur.


1984 ◽  
Vol 40 (04) ◽  
pp. 479-489
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Masterson

Abraham Lowenthal in characterizing the Peruvian military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado cautioned that the regime was not a “typical caudillo” venture but rather an essentially “institutional” effort. His caveat is certainly justified when one considers that Peru was dominated until recent decades by such modern era military chieftains as Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, Oscar R. Benavides, and Manuel A. Odría. Yet when General Odría seized control of Peru on October 27, 1948, the Peruvian army was striving desperately for increased professionalism. In order to retain the army's support, the caudillo was thus compelled to enact institutional reforms that made the officer class more conscious of its modernizing mission and, ironically, far less tolerant of Odría's personalism. This study will analyze the military policies of the Odría regime in order to explain the changing outlook of the Peruvian armed forces during the caudillo's eight year rule.


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