Physical science and archaeology

Antiquity ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 46 (182) ◽  
pp. 134-139
Author(s):  
J. A. Charles

In recent years the important role that scientific research techniques can play in archaeological investigations has become increasingly recognized. An early major review on the whole subject of both physical and biological science in archaeology by D. Brothwell and E. S. Higgs was revised in 1967 and represents the major work in this field. More recently, much of the effort in physical sciences has also been admirably reviewed by Tite (1970). This present paper also seeks to outline the ways in which physical science has contributed to archaeological discovery, with particular emphasis on recent developments known to the author.

Author(s):  
Lloyd Cawthorne

AbstractComputer programming is a key component of any physical science or engineering degree and is a skill sought by employers. Coding can be very appealing to these students as it is logical and another setting where they can solve problems. However, many students can often be reluctant to engage with the material as it might not interest them or they might not see how it applies to their wider study. Here, I present lessons I have learned and recommendations to increase participation in programming courses for students majoring in the physical sciences or engineering. The discussion and examples are taken from my second-year core undergraduate physics module, Introduction to Programming for Physicists, taught at The University of Manchester, UK. Teaching this course, I have developed successful solutions that can be applied to undergraduate STEM courses.


1974 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-188
Author(s):  
Willard J. Poppy ◽  
Leland L. Wilson ◽  
Edmund C. Bray

1899 ◽  
Vol 45 (189) ◽  
pp. 257-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Lloyd Andriezen

Since the middle of the nineteenth century psychology has gradually come to be recognised as a branch of biological science. This is due to the influence of the works of Darwin and Herbert Spencer, of the Clinical and Neurological School of Meynert, Golgi, Cajal, Flechsig, and others, and recent developments in the Psychometric School of Fechner and Wundt on the other. The Alienistic School can render powerful aid to this movement; and though there are indications of the current in the proper direction, as shown more particularly in the work of Mercier (1) and Bevan Lewis (2), the end, however, cannot as yet be said to have been achieved, nor the movement to have become general. Psychology still lingers on the borderland of metaphysics; it has not yet been established on the firm rock of natural science. And while it thus lingers progress in knowledge is slow and restricted.


1994 ◽  
Vol 267 (6) ◽  
pp. S113 ◽  
Author(s):  
R Jevning ◽  
R Anand ◽  
M Biedebach

Most physiological scientists have restricted understanding of probability as relative frequency in a large collection (for example, of atoms). Most appropriate for the relatively circumscribed problems of the physical sciences, this understanding of probability as a physical property has conveyed the widespread impression that the "proper" statistical "method" can eliminate uncertainty by determining the "correct" frequency or frequency distribution. However, many relatively recent developments in the theory of probability and decision making deny such exalted statistical ability. Proponents of Bayes's subjectivist theory, for example, assert that probability is "degree of belief," a more tentative idea than relative frequency or physical probability, even though degree of belief assessment may utilize frequency information. In the subjectivist view, probability and statistics are means of expressing a consistent opinion (a probability) to handle uncertainty but never means to eliminate it. In the physiological sciences the contrast between the two views is critical, because problems dealt with are generally more complex than those of physics, requiring judgments and decisions. We illustrate this in testing the efficacy of penicillin by showing how the physical probability method of "hypothesis testing" may contribute to the erroneous idea that science consists of "verified truths" or "conclusive evidence" and how this impression is avoided in subjectivist probability analysis.


2008 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Euan R. Kay ◽  
David A. Leigh

Nature uses molecular motors and machines in virtually every significant biological process, but learning how to design and assemble simpler artificial structures that function through controlled molecular-level motion is a major challenge for contemporary physical science. The established engineering principles of the macroscopic world can offer little more than inspiration to the molecular engineer who creates devices for an environment where everything is constantly moving and being buffeted by other atoms and molecules. Rather, experimental designs for working molecular machines must follow principles derived from chemical kinetics, thermodynamics, and nonequilibrium statistical physics. The remarkable characteristics of interlocked molecules make them particularly useful for investigating the control of motion at the molecular level. Yet, the vast majority of synthetic molecular machines studied to date are simple two-state switches. Here we outline recent developments from our laboratory that demonstrate more complex molecular machine functions. This new generation of synthetic molecular machines can move continuously and progressively away from equilibrium, and they may be considered true prototypical molecular motors. The examples discussed exemplify two, fundamentally different, "Brownian ratchet" mechanisms previously developed in theoretical statistical physics and realized experimentally in molecular-level devices for the first time in these systems.


2017 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-98
Author(s):  
Christopher Fear

AbstractIn recent years, William E. Connolly has argued that the phenomenon of complexity in the physical sciences carries radical implications for political theory: namely, that political theorists should now be revising their concepts of agency, responsibility, and freedom. This very recent project of Connolly's has not (yet) attracted much opposition. Here I offer a critique of Connolly's argument which focuses on three key areas: (1) how he interprets and deploys “evidence” from physical science; (2) his theory of “creative freedom”; and (3) the impact that his recent philosophy has on the idea of the intellect. I argue that Connolly's scientific evidence is not what he claims it is; that the theory of “creative freedom” he offers fails; and that his critique of the intellect fails in theory, and would be highly damaging in practice.


Philosophy ◽  
1927 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
pp. 28-38
Author(s):  
L. S. Stebbing

The man in the street to-day is aware that recent developments in the physical sciences have necessitated a fundamental revision of the concepts of physics; he finds that Einstein is no less upsetting to his ideas than was Copernicus to those of his own time or than Darwin was to Bishop Wilberforce. The plain man who has “ philosophical leanings ” is aware that questions previously regarded as metaphysical—and about which philosophers have written much that is unintelligible—are now recognized as falling within the scope of physics. Every reader of this Journal is aware that the criticism to which the main concepts of physics—space, time, matter—have been subjected is so fundamental that it is no longer possible to say that there are material bodies in space, which have events happening to them at a given time. We must substitute the conception of a fourfold continuum within which space, time and matter are inextricably involved. Finally, we are told that this new way of regarding the classical trinity suggests the consequence that we know nothing about the “ inner nature ” of the terms with which we deal, we can make no assertions as to the ultimate nature of that to which they may refer. In this respect the prevailing temper of the present-day scientist is to be contrasted with the cocksureness of most nineteenth-century physicists l who, even if they did not go so far as to say “ we know what matter is,” at least suggested that only the metaphysician had, or could have, any doubts as to its nature and reality^


2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 797-814 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIM OGG ◽  
CATHERINE GORGEON

Social gerontology, as a distinct discipline, has been slower to develop in France than in Anglo-Saxon countries. Gerontological discourses have been dominated by the medical and physical sciences. At the same time, France has a long tradition of research on ageing that incorporates important social dimensions, particularly in demographic and economic fields. Current developments include research on pensions and related issues such as early-retirement or older people in the labour force; inter-generational relations or family solidarity; disabled elderly people and caring; and ageing among ethnic minority populations. These developments point in the direction of co-ordinated, multi-disciplinary approaches to the life course and ageing in the future.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 116
Author(s):  
Cedric Bheki Mpungose

Post-apartheid South African curriculum reforms, from outcomes-based education (OBE) to the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS), resulted in different challenges. Teachers, in particular those teaching Physical Sciences in the Further Education and Training (FET) phase from Grades 10-12, were expected to cope with changes and master Physical Sciences curriculum for the attainment of good results, but were unable to do so because they were missing an understanding of curriculum concepts. The success of any curriculum depends on ten fundamental and broad curriculum concepts: rationale, goals, activities, assessment, accessibility, resources, content, roles, environment, and time. However, empirical findings show that Grade 12 Physical Science teachers in South African schools still struggle to understand and contextualise curriculum concepts in order to redefine specific CAPS Physical Science concepts. Consequently, this conceptual study uses Van den Akker (2004) curriculum spider web concept framework in reconceptualising Grade 12 CAPS Physical Science concepts. This study argues that teaching without knowing specific subject curriculum concepts can lead to poor teacher performance and poor subject results, this study concludes by proposing a formal, non-formal and informal framework for CAPS Physical Science to resolve this.


Author(s):  
Simon Bates ◽  
Ross Galloway

We present a review of diagnostic testing in the physical sciences. We cover the motivation for using such instruments and their historical development via a case study of probably the most cited and influential test instrument and application: the Force Concept Inventory, developed in the early 1990s by Hestenes and co-workers, and its use to quantify learning gains from different instructional methodologies by Richard Hake. We then present an overview of the process of creation and validation of such instruments, and highlight the results from studies that have made use of some of the many instruments available in the literature. We conclude with a short summary of our own recent work to develop a diagnostic test of data handling skills of physical science undergraduates.


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