The theoretical foundations of liberalism

1987 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Mulhall

The publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice in 1972 inaugurated a new era in Anglo-American political theory by providing a sophisticated and complex paradigm of liberal political diagnosis of and prescription for contemporary society; it resulted in a flood of detailed analyses and discussions of Rawls' proposals in the large and in the small, and also brought forth (in the form of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia) a counterblast from the libertarian Right which was of commensurate scope and vigour. In the present decade, however, the challenge to Rawlsian liberalism has taken on a new guise—one which it is the purpose of this paper to explore.

Author(s):  
Elizabeth Rapaport

A certain view of Anglo-American liberal political theory has been commonplace for a couple of generations. It is said that the philosophical foundations of contractarian liberalism lie in the 17th century, chiefly in the formulations given to it by Hobbes and Locke. But for two distinct reasons these 17th century formulations fail to provide an adequate basis for contemporary political theory. First, the development of our political and economic institutions in the past two or three hundred years has made it impossible to accept a theory which assumes a minimal, laissez-faire state and a highly competitive economy. Second, the individualist psychological and moral assumptions of the theory are highly dubious if not clearly false.In A Theory of justice John Rawls attempts to provide the systematic revision which liberalism so clearly needs. The revisionist intent of Rawls’ work has not received the attention it deserves, except by critics of the right who deny that such revision is needed.


1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M. DeLue

John Rawls considers his Theory of Justice to be in the Kantian tradition. Generally there seems to be agreement among Rawls' critics that at least with respect to the procedural formulation of the principles of justice, it is difficult to call Rawls' position Kantian. In this article I will argue that Rawls' Kantianism is best understood as providing a motive source for acting upon known just standards of conduct. In this regard Rawls can be read as synthesizing aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Kant's moral reasoning to provide the rationale to explain why an individual who knows what is morally correct conduct in a given situation, makes such knowledge the source of his action. Demonstrating the Aristotelean roots of Rawls' Kantianism with respect to the problem of motivation for just conduct helps one understand how Kant's moral theory can be viewed in Rawls' words not as a “morality of austere command but … [as] … an ethic of mutual respect and self esteem” (1971, p. 251). Secondly, this view of Kant provides the basis for understanding the anti-corporatist aspect of Rawls' political theory that my reading of Rawls makes necessary.


2005 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Brown

On the face of it, this might seem a somewhat frivolous, not to say over-familiar, title for an essay on the influence of Charles Beitz's Political Theory and International Relations (hereafter, PTIR); Beitz, however, will recognise the implicit comparison between his work and John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, and will accordingly, I hope, forgive the familiarity. But, accepting that this is a title that conveys respect, it might still be argued to be inappropriate on the rather different grounds that it substantially overstates the influence of PTIR. Can it really be the case that this relatively short (under 200 pages) volume with an over-ambitious title ‘changed the subject’ in the way that A Theory of Justice certainly did a few years earlier? Obviously the subject in question – international political theory – is rather more limited than the whole world of at least Anglo-American political theory that was changed by Rawls's work, but such a claim can, I think, be defended.


Author(s):  
David Weinstein

Anglo-American political theory, especially contemporary analytical liberalism, has become too self-referential and consequently insufficiently attentive to its own variegated past. Some analytical liberals fret about whether the good or the right should have priority, while others agonize about whether liberalism is compatible with value pluralism and with multiculturalism. Too many contemporary analytical liberals see liberalism as beginning with Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, as next reformulated classically by John Stuart Mill, and then as receding into the wilderness of mere history of political thought thanks to the linguistic turn and the vogue of emotivism before being resurrected so magnificently by John Rawls. The Rawlsian liberal tradition severely marginalizes new liberals and idealists such as T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, L. T. Hobhouse, D. G. Ritchie, and J. A. Hobson. New liberals and idealists alike wrote highly original political philosophy, parts of which contemporary liberals have repeated inadvertently with false novelty. In Rawls's view, classical utilitarianism improved intuitionism by systematizing it but by sacrificing its liberal credentials.


1995 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 79-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón

Tesón critiques a recent article by John Rawls in which Rawls extends his acclaimed political theory to include international relations. Tesón first summarizes Rawls' theory and then presents a critique. With this essay, Rawls joins an already vigorous scholarly reaction against traditional state-centered models of international law and relations. When measured against such models, Rawls' theory of international law moves in the right direction in assigning a role, albeit a modest one, to human rights and political legitimacy. However, to the extent that Rawls' effort purports to be a rational reconstruction of international law for our new era (as he certainly intends it to be), it fails to capture central moral features of the international order. His proposal is still too forgiving of serious forms of oppression in the name of liberal tolerance. The theory thus falls short of matching the considered moral judgments prevailing in today's international community. Moreover, it fails Rawls' own test of epistemic adequacy.


Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson

This article examines the changes in the conception of justice after John Rawls. It explains that Rawls single-handedly revived Anglo-American political philosophy and his theory consists in an egalitarian vision of justice. It discusses criticisms on Rawls' theory of justice and identifies some alternative paths. It suggests that while Rawls' book The Law of Peoples adopted a conservative and somewhat anti-cosmopolitan stance, the doctrine of egalitarianism within national borders and minimal duties across borders may ultimately prove to be unstable under examination.


2002 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRIS BROWN

‘The limits of the possible in moral matters are less narrow than we think. It is our weaknesses, our vices, our prejudices that shrink them.’Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract Book II, Chapter 12.2 [cited from John Rawls The Law of Peoples, p. 7]After presenting a brief sketch of John Rawls's theory of justice, his international political theory is outlined and evaluated. Rawls develops a classification of ‘peoples’ based on whether or not they are ‘well-ordered’. The Law of Peoples covers ‘liberal’ and ‘decent’ peoples who adhere to minimum standards of human rights and are not aggressive in their international relations. This is in the realm of ‘ideal’ theory; ‘non-ideal’ theory must cope also with societies that are not well-ordered, such as outlaw states and burdened societies. The long-term aim is that all should be part of a confederation of decent peoples. Rawls's theory has been criticized by cosmopolitan liberals for its communitarian tendencies, but has much to offer scholars of international relations, including a systematic basis for classifying states, a helpful discussion of the distinction between reasonableness and rationality, and a powerful restatement of the importance of utopian thinking in international relations.


Author(s):  
Gunnar Almgren

This chapter provides readers with a concise explanation of the two works, that in synthesis with each other, provide the theoretical framework for the book’s central arguments pertaining to ends to be realized in radical health care reform: TH Marshall’s Theory of Citizenship and the Welfare State and John Rawls’ “Justice as Fairness” Theory of Justice. After acquainting the reader with the major concepts considered in this chapter (such as democratic society, citizenship, health, health care and universal health care), and then the more conventional justifications for a universal right to health care, the chapter turns to the justifications for particular social rights that are advanced by both Marshall and Rawls in accordance with the requirements of democratic citizenship –ending with the particular justifications for health care as a social right of citizenship.


1982 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-629 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Galston

The much-discussed contemporary revival of political theory in the Anglo-American intellectual community has for the most part been a revival of liberal theory. This should not have come as a great surprise. Most Anglo-Americans are, in one way or another, liberals; all are deeply influenced by the experience of life in liberal societies. Liberal polities have come under attack from within as well as from without, giving those who think them worthy of defense both the motive and the occasion to clarify the grounds of their partisanship.It is less often remarked that in one decisive respect, the revival of liberal theory remains rooted in the climate of moral skepticism that it has supplanted. Most contemporary liberal theorists are deeply mistrustful of what John Rawls has called “perfectionism”—the philosophic attempt to identify superior ways of life or traits of character and, once having identified them, to use them as the goals of political life. Contemporary liberal theory consists in the attempt to combine this skepticism about theories of the good life with the belief in philosophically defensible principles that regulate relations among individuals.It is my thesis that this defense of liberalism is fundamentally misguided. No form of political life can be justified without some view of what is good for individuals. In practice, liberal theorists covertly employ theories of the good. But their insistence that they do not reduces the rigor of their theories and leaves the liberal polity unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism.


Author(s):  
Celia E. Deane-Drummond

This chapter starts to move towards a political theory that, by taking multispecies context seriously, considers communitarianism as the most reasonable starting point over utilitarian or other alternative approaches. Drawing on Martha Nussbaum, the author develops and refines her political theory of justice through her communitarian approach in a way that attempts to take into account interaction and entanglements with other species. Nussbaum’s approach, which draws on capabilities in community, is more inclusive and holistic compared with procedural theories of justice such as that of John Rawls, but it still lacks a robust means to integrate love and compassion with justice. Classic theological approaches provide such an ontological basis, but remain vulnerable in the face of ethical naturalism. Yet an evolutionary naturalistic ethic also flounders given the ambiguity of human history with other animals. The work of Paul Riceour is discussed as his theories contribute to the overall thesis of this book, namely, that the goal of a multispecies ethics needs to include the idea of living well in and for others in just institutions, but broaden out his view so that it is inclusive of other animal kinds.


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