On Macpherson's Developmental Liberalism

1982 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian H. Angus

The work of C. B. Macpherson is extremely significant for those seeking to understand the cul-de-sac which liberal political theory and institutions have entered. Considering the experience of socialist societies in this century, the necessity for a nonmarket political theory to retain a positive connection to Western liberal values should be beyond dispute. Any postmarket society requires, not pious reassurances, but institutional support for individual rights that are the most vehemently defended in the liberal tradition. But of course this is not enough. Contemporary society is already undermining liberal individualism through massive organizations and manipulated consumption. The inability of liberal theory to analyze effectively and propose alternatives to the contemporary decline of the individual suggests that the cul-de-sac is rooted in the conceptual foundations of liberalism itself. Macpherson's rigorous analysis of the market assumptions of liberal theory pinpoints this conceptual inadequacy and attempts to maintain a commitment to liberal values in a postmarket society.

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Phillip Cole ◽  

This paper examines toleration at two levels. At the first level, liberal individualism is concerned that the individual must be as free as possible to pursue their own goals and lifestyles. At the second level, liberal political theory is concerned with the value of liberal political culture and institutions and how to maintain and protect them. I argue that we can learn a great deal about the exercise of toleration and respect at the level of the liberal polity by examining them at the level of the liberal individual. Both tolerance and intolerance at the level of the polity must be principled. Principled tolerance and intolerance have the following features. First, the judgment whether to tolerate a particular belief or practice must be based on the value of toleration itself, not pragmatic political requirements. Second, it should be an issue of setting aside moral principles and convictions rather than dislikes, prejudices or fears. Third, it should respect the distinction between the public and the private, and should only recognise an issue as one of toleration if there is a public impact at stake.


2005 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Wilkinson

Because journalism ethics draw deeply, and perhaps unreflexively, on liberal political traditions, there is a lot of confusion about what public accountability entails. When interpreted from the standpoint of liberal theory, the perception of the need for public accountability is generally framed by a simplistic opposition between the public's right to know and the individual's right to privacy. Central to the liberal framing of the accountability is a weak notion of ‘publicity’ anchored in notions of representation and revelation. Furthermore, there is also a strong tradition within liberal theory to treat ethics as a matter of private concern, rather than something that can be publicly resolved. For these reasons, the balance of democratic consideration always seems to sit more comfortably with privacy rights than it does with considerations of accountability to the public. This paper explores some of these dilemmas surrounding journalism ethics and public accountability by examining their theoretical underpinnings in liberal political theory and comparing them with a model of public accountability grounded in publicity construed as public participation.


1988 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 207-223
Author(s):  
Keith Graham

My discussion in this lecture is structured as follows. In section 1 I consider the nature of philosophical enquiry and its affinity to liberalism. In section 2 I lay out some of the basic components of liberal theory and explore their interrelations. In section 3 I discuss two challenges to liberalism: one concerning the conception of liberty which it involves and one concerning the way in which it introduces the idea of legitimate political authority. In section 4 I suggest that these problems, to do with the values of liberalism, arise on the basis of a prior conception of individuals which is in need of modification. In a brief concluding section 5 I indicate the need for a post-liberal political theory.


Politik ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian F Rostbøll

Regarding issues of immigration, there is a sharp contrast between Danish public opinion and public policy on the one hand and liberal political theory on the other hand. This article analyzes whether it is a problem for liberal theory that argues for more open borders to be so far removed from public opinion and vice versa. Considering issues of realism, epistemology, and democracy it is discussed how directly policy-related political theory ought to be. 


Author(s):  
Quia  Mou

Liberal political theory is often accused of hindering the development of communities because it encourages people to be individualistic. As one of its founding fathers, critiques of liberalism date back to  the writings of John Locke in the seventeenth century. This research project looks at the writings of Locke within their historical context. In examining Locke’s views on religious toleration, social policy and  economics, this project proposes to show how Locke envisioned a particular form of community. This study also incorporates contemporary debates on liberalism. Specifically, it addresses communitarian  critiques put forth by Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, and invokes liberal defences, articulated by Will Kymlicka and Alan Buchannan. It proposes that many of today’s defences of liberal political theory can be applied to the writings of John Locke to support and sustain the development of communities within his own time. A second claim against liberal theory is that it favours particular communities instead of  granting fair procedural rights to all communities. To test this objection, this project will also look at the biases from Locke’s religious, political and social backgrounds and how they impacted his beliefs.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 625-636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas W. Smith

Contemporary debates over liberal political theory should encourage renewed investigation of the common good, and it is appropriate to begin by interrogating Aristotle's account. Aristotle argues that injustice stands in the way of the common good. Injustice is motivated by both overgrasping for scarce external goods, such as money, honor, and power, and by excessive desires. Aristotle argues that the common good requires a reorientation away from external goods to satisfying activities that do not diminish in the sharing. He sketches an analogical account of familial and political relationships that leads us to wonder what the political conditions are for the common good. Reflecting on these conditions not only points to the strict limits of the common good but also speaks to both sides in debates over liberal theory.


2016 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel E. Burns

AbstractWhen discussing the preconditions of liberal Islamic politics, liberal theorists often advocate the reinterpretation of traditional religious texts in light of liberal political theory. Such an interpretive project is worth comparing to a similar project conceived by the medieval Islamic philosopher Alfarabi, whose effort to introduce Greek political philosophy into his political-religious community parallels these efforts to introduce liberal theory into Islamic communities. Alfarabi argued that traditional texts should be reinterpreted in light of a new political science, one based on Greek sources but adapted to the unique needs of a community like his. This article shows how Alfarabi conceived of these adaptations, emphasizing the flexibility that he thought students of Greek political philosophy should adopt in accommodating even Islamic doctrines that they could not fully accept.


PMLA ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 127 (4) ◽  
pp. 918-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Rae Greeson

One of the central tenets of liberal individualism holds that property rights and citizenship rights are based in self-possession, which is often defined as an original ownership of one's own labor potential. In this short essay I propose that the concept of self-possession rests on a prior assumption that selves are possessable objects—an assumption that was generated, before and alongside liberal political theory, in the practice of Atlantic slave capitalism. I will first consider how John Locke formulates the theory of possessive individualism in one of the most-cited passages of his Second Treatise of Government (1690). To shed light on that theory's implications, I will turn to A Narrative of the Life and Adventures of venture, a Native of Africa (1798), which recounts how Venture Smith, an eighteenth-century man enslaved as a child, came to possess himself, quite literally, by purchasing himself. Smith's account illuminates the tacit precondition of Locke's self-possessing individual: to be owned, the self must first be alienated, entered into the market, “thingified.” Juxtaposing Locke and Smith provides a snapshot of a larger project, in which I argue that Enlightenment thought was founded on—not merely proximal to—the Atlantic imperial context out of which it arose.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-114
Author(s):  
George Klosko

Though questions of political obligation have long been central to liberal political theory, discussion has generally focused on voluntaristic aspects of the individual's relationship to the state, as opposed to other factors through which the state is able to ground compliance with its laws. The individual has been conceptualized as naturally without political ties, whether or not formally in a state of nature, and questions of political obligation have centered on accounting for political bonds.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Botwinick

This chapter endeavors to show that the relevant contrasting term to friend in liberal political theory is not enemy but self. Given the skepticism that suffuses liberal theory, the self remains an endlessly problematic construct that gives us ongoing opportunities for reimagining and reconstructing what the behavior of both friends and enemies is truly like. The chapter examines key terms in the liberal epistemological vocabulary such as skepticism, empiricism, nominalism, and conventionalism to clarify their import for the liberal conceptions of personal identity, friend, and enemy. Throughout, the chapter shows how the Levinasian deployment of the same–other distinction with its devolution upon the concept of infinity offers us a revealing guide to liberal political thought and practice and thereby also constitutes an important implicit critique of Schmitt.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document