Does the brain “initiate” freely willed processes? A philosophy of science critique of Libet-type experiments and their interpretation

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Radder ◽  
Gerben Meynen
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Analysis And Evaluation ◽  
Central Notion ◽  
Regular Succession ◽  
The Brain

In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. It is often claimed that these experiments demonstrate the illusory nature of freely willed actions. In this article, we provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of Libet’s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective. Our analysis focuses on Libet’s central notion of the “initiation” of freely willed processes by the brain. We examine four interpretations of the notion of initiation: in terms of a cause, a necessary condition, a correlation, and a regular succession. We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet’s experiments. In addition, we analyze two recent Libet-type experiments. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet’s original experiments nor later Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that allegedly freely willed processes are in fact initiated by the brain.

The brain minds whether we believ in free will

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Rigoni ◽  
M. Brass ◽  
B. Burle
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The Brain

Consciousness, law of nature, and nomological determinism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Important Thing ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
The World ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Brain

Nomological determinism does not mean everything is predictable. It just means everything follows the law of nature. And the most important thing Is that the brain and consciousness follow the law of nature. In other words, there is no free will. Without life, brain and consciousness, the world follows law of nature, that is clear. The life and brain are also part of nature, and they follow the law of nature. This is due to scientific findings. There are not enough scientific findings for consciousness yet. But I think that the consciousness is a nature phenomenon, and it also follows the law of nature.

The ”true me”—one or many?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Berent ◽  
Melanie Platt
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Optimality Theory ◽  
The Self ◽  
True Self ◽  
Behavioral Test ◽  
Brain Scan ◽  
Moral Behaviors ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Constraint Ranking

Recent results suggest that people hold a notion of the true self, distinct from the self. Here, we seek to further elucidate the “true me”—whether it is good or bad, material or immaterial. Critically, we ask whether the true self is unitary. To address these questions, we invited participants to reason about John—a character who simultaneously exhibits both positive and negative moral behaviors. John’s character was gauged via two tests--a brain scan and a behavioral test, whose results invariably diverged (i.e., one test indicated that John’s moral core is positive and another negative). Participants assessed John’s true self along two questions: (a) Did John commit his acts (positive and negative) freely? and (b) What is John’s essence really? Responses to the two questions diverged. When asked to evaluate John’s moral core explicitly (by reasoning about his free will), people invariably descried John’s true self as good. But when John’s moral core was assessed implicitly (by considering his essence), people sided with the outcomes of the brain test. These results demonstrate that people hold conflicting notions of the true self. We formally support this proposal by presenting a grammar of the true self, couched within Optimality Theory. We show that the constraint ranking necessary to capture explicit and implicit view of the true self are distinct. Our intuitive belief in a true unitary “me” is thus illusory.

scholarly journals Consciousness, decision making, and volition: freedom beyond chance and necessity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Liljenström
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Brain Structures ◽  
Complex Process ◽  
Neural Information ◽  
Neural Information Processing ◽  
Stochastic Population Model ◽  
The Brain

AbstractWhat is the role of consciousness in volition and decision-making? Are our actions fully determined by brain activity preceding our decisions to act, or can consciousness instead affect the brain activity leading to action? This has been much debated in philosophy, but also in science since the famous experiments by Libet in the 1980s, where the current most common interpretation is that conscious free will is an illusion. It seems that the brain knows, up to several seconds in advance what “you” decide to do. These studies have, however, been criticized, and alternative interpretations of the experiments can be given, some of which are discussed in this paper. In an attempt to elucidate the processes involved in decision-making (DM), as an essential part of volition, we have developed a computational model of relevant brain structures and their neurodynamics. While DM is a complex process, we have particularly focused on the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for its emotional, and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) for its cognitive aspects. In this paper, we present a stochastic population model representing the neural information processing of DM. Simulation results seem to confirm the notion that if decisions have to be made fast, emotional processes and aspects dominate, while rational processes are more time consuming and may result in a delayed decision. Finally, some limitations of current science and computational modeling will be discussed, hinting at a future development of science, where consciousness and free will may add to chance and necessity as explanation for what happens in the world.

Who's in charge? Free will and the science of the brain

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E. J. Linden
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The Brain

scholarly journals Brain as agent and conscious mind as action guide: from Libet-style experiments to necessary conditions for free will

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-83
Author(s):  
Jonas Gonçalves Coelho
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
The Body ◽  
General View ◽  
Conscious Mind ◽  
Sociocultural Environment ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Conscious Intention ◽  
The Brain

Many neuroscientific experiments, based on monitoring brain activity, suggest that it is possible to predict the conscious intention/choice/decision of an agent before he himself knows that. Some neuroscientists and philosophers interpret the results of these experiments as showing that free will is an illusion, since it is the brain and not the conscious mind that intends/chooses/decides. Assuming that the methods and results of these experiments are reliable the question is if they really show that free will is an illusion. To address this problem, I argue that first it is needed to answer three questions related to the relationship between conscious mind and brain: 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do conscious events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that is, who consciously intends/chooses/ decides, the conscious mind, the brain, or both? I answer these questions by arguing that the conscious mind is a property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal capacity to interact adaptively with its body, and trough the body, with the physical and sociocultural environment. In other words, the brain is the agent and the conscious mind, in its various forms - cognitive, volitional and emotional - and contents, is its guide of action. Based on this general view I argue that the experiments aforementioned do not show that free will is an illusion, and as a starting point for examining this problem I point out, from some exemplary situations, what I believe to be some of the necessary conditions for free will.Key-words: Agent brain, conscious mind, free will, Libet-style experiments.

Internationalism versus Statism and Globalism

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Risse
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Global Order ◽  
Context Of Discovery ◽  
Plausible Theory

This chapter examines contemporary debates about statism and globalism. Statists need a necessary condition for justice to apply. They must tell us what it is about states that renders such principles applicable, and does so only in states. The quest for such a condition ends inconclusively. This result leads to a pluralist view of the grounds of justice. To use a distinction from the philosophy of science, the debate among versions of statism turns out to be a context of discovery for internationalism as a contender for a plausible theory of global justice. The chapter proceeds by discussing the most prominent version of globalism, the view defended by Charles Beitz, who argues that John Rawls' principles hold globally. To engage with Beitz, the chapter considers the merits of relationism and then suggests that Rawls' principles do not apply to the global order.

Spatiotemporal Model of Consciousness II: Spatiotemporal Alignment—Neuro-ecological Continuum and World–Brain Relation

2018 ◽  
pp. 195-236
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Spontaneous Activity ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Spatiotemporal Structure ◽  
Spatiotemporal Model ◽  
Time Consciousness ◽  
Spatiotemporal Scales ◽  
World Brain ◽  
The Brain

Consciousness is neuronal as it is based on the brain and its neural activity. This is what neuroscience tell us citing strong empirical evidence. At the same time, consciousness is ecological in that it extends beyond the brain to body and world – this is what philosophers tell us when they invoke concepts like embodiment, embeddedness, extendedness, and enactment. Is consciousness neuronal or ecological? This amounts to what I describe as “argument of inclusion”: do we need to include body and world in our account of the brain and how is that very same inclusion important for consciousness? I argue that the “spatiotemporal model” of consciousness can well address the “argument of inclusion” by linking and integrating both neuronal and ecological characterizations of consciousness. I demonstrate various data showing how the brain’s spontaneous activity couples and aligns itself to the spatiotemporal structure in the ongoing activities of both body and world. That amounts to a specific spatiotemporal mechanism of the brain that I describe as ‘spatiotemporal alignment’. Conceptually, such ‘spatiotemporal alignment’ corresponds to “body-brain relation” and “world-brain relation”, as I say. World-brain relation and body-brain relation allow for spatiotemporal relation and integration between the different spatiotemporal scales or ranges of world, body, and brain with all three being spatiotemporally aligned and nested within each other. Based on various empirical findings, I argue that such spatiotemporal nestedness between world, body, and brain establishes a “neuro-ecological continuum” and world-brain relation. Both neuro-ecological continuum and world-brain relation are here understood in an empirical sense and can be regarded as necessary condition of possible consciousness, i.e., neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC) (as distinguished from the neural correlates of consciousness/NCC). In sum, the spatiotemporal model determines consciousness by “neuro-ecological continuum” and world-brain relation (with body-brain relation being a subset). Taken in such sense, the spatiotemporal model can well address the “argument of inclusion”. We need to include body and world in our account of the brain in terms of “neuro-ecological continuum” and world-brain relation since otherwise, due to their role as NPC, consciousness remains impossible.

Interaction Model of Brain and Consciousness

2018 ◽  
pp. 105-126
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Vegetative State ◽  
Interaction Model ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Additive Interaction ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Nancy Cartwright ◽  
Level Of Consciousness ◽  
The Brain

In addition to the spectrum model, I also introduced an interaction model to characterize the brain’s neural activity (chapter 2). Is the interaction model of brain also relevant for consciousness? That is the focus in the present chapter. I here present various lines of empirical evidence focusing on disorders of consciousness like vegetative state, anesthesia, and sleep. Based on empirical evidence, I show that the degree of non-additive interaction between spontaneous and stimulus-induced activity indexes the level of consciousness in a seemingly rather fine-grained way; for that reason, it may be considered a neural correlate of the level of consciousness, i.e., NCC. In contrast, the spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure is rather a necessary condition of possible consciousness, that is, a neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC). The concept of NPC is further enriched by the concept of capacities for which I recruit Nancy Cartwright. I suggest that the brain’s non-additive interaction including the subsequent association of stimulus-induced activity with consciousness is based on the spontaneous activity’s capacity. Since that very same capacity, operating as NPC, can be traced to the spontaneous activity’s spatiotemporal features, I speak of “spatiotemporal capacity”. I conclude that the empirical data suggest a capacity-based approach (rather than law-based approach) to the brain and how it is related to consciousness.

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