Philo on Free Will: And the Historical Influence of His View

1942 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Austryn Wolfson
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
General Term ◽  
Physical Universe ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Universe

In Philo, as in any other philosopher, the problem of the freedom of the will in man is but a special phase of the more general problems of the existence of immutable laws in nature and the relation of mind to body. Now with regard to laws of nature Philo's view is clear. There are, according to him, certain unalterable laws by which the universe is governed, but these laws were established in the universe by God at the time of its creation. This view is expressed by him in a variety of ways in such statements as that there are “ordinances and laws which God laid down in the universe as unalterable” and that “this world is the Megalopolis and it has a single polity and a single law.” These laws of nature are sometimes designated by him in their totality by the general term Logos, by which he means an immanent Logos in the created physical universe, conceiving of it as part of that incorporeal Logos which existed prior to the creation of the universe. It is this immanent Logos which is described by him as “the bond of all existence,” which “holds and knits together all the parts” and which also “administers all things.”

scholarly journals Edwards on the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will

Sententiae ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Oleh Bondar ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Jonathan Edwards ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
The Past ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Theological Fatalism ◽  
Nelson Pike ◽  
Necessity Of The Past

In the book “Freedom of the Will”, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong ar-gument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike. The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that ~A is possible (Infallibility of God`s knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose ~A. The article argues that (i) the Edwards` inference Kgp → □p rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of ~p; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary. Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if Kgp is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose ~p. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.

Creation, the Fall, and the Regime of the Passions

2020 ◽  
pp. 164-188
Author(s):  
Gerard O'Daly
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Desire ◽  
The Body ◽  
Two Cities ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Love Of God ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
The Universe

The chapter discusses Augustine’s presentation in Books 11–14 of the origins of the two cities, heavenly and earthly. The focus is on the creation of the universe, the angels and the rebellion of some of them, and Adam, Eve, and the Fall. Specific themes include: Genesis exegesis; the elaboration of the history theme, with good and bad angels as ‘prologues’ to the two historical human cities; good and evil in the universe; angelic rebels and the nature of the will; death and resurrection; Platonist and Christian views on the body; Pauline flesh and spirit; emotions and passions; sexual desire in paradise and since the Fall; love of self and love of God, and the application of this contrast to the two cities.

Causality, Determinism And Freedom Of The Will

Philosophy ◽  
1964 ◽  
Vol 39 (149) ◽  
pp. 233-248
Author(s):  
Lionel Kenner
Keyword(s):  
Human Activity ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
The State ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
Sufficient And Necessary Conditions ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Universe

The classical determinist argument is that every event has a cause, that every event in the universe is an effect whose sufficient and necessary conditions are the state of the universe immediately preceding it. For this reason we could not have done otherwise than we did. We do not have free-wills and hence we are not morally responsible for our thoughts and actions. The classical deterministmay, however, modify his position and agree that not every event inthe world has a cause, but only that every human activity—our thoughts and our actions—are causally determined. Butit would still follow that we could not have done otherwise than wedid. As the first formulation entails the second formulation, and is more usual, we shall adopt that one.

scholarly journals Wittgenstein on Freedom of the Will: Not Determinism, Yet Not Indeterminism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

Since the publication of Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Freedom of the Will in 1989, his remarks about free will and determinism have received very little attention. Insofar as these lectures give us an opportunity to see him at work on a traditional—and seemingly intractable—philosophical problem and given the voluminous secondary literature written about nearly every other facet of Wittgenstein’s life and philosophy, this neglect is both surprising and unfortunate. Perhaps these lectures have not attracted much attention because they are available to us only in the form of a single student’s notes (Yorick Smythies). Or perhaps it is because, as one Wittgenstein scholar put it, the lectures represent only “cursory reflections” that “are themselves uncompelling." Either way, my goal is to show that Wittgenstein’s views about freedom of the will merit closer attention.

Free Will, Responsibility, and Blame in Psychotherapy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Zürcher
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Everyday Life ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Patient’S Autonomy ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Therapeutic Context ◽  
The Relationship

Freedom of the will is not only an issue in the attribution of moral and legal responsibility—it also fundamentally shapes how we look at ourselves and how we interact with others. This is essential in everyday life but even more so in psychotherapy. In the debate on freedom of will, the main controversy is concerned with the relationship between determinism and free will. In this chapter, different positions are presented and discussed. The compatibilist viewpoint, which claims determinism and freedom of will to be compatible, is defended against competing theories and applied to psychotherapeutic work. Mental disorders affect free will in many ways, as is demonstrated by the examples. Nevertheless, a compatibilist approach to free will can be used as a resource to increase the patient’s autonomy. As a result, it is justified and sometimes appropriate within the therapeutic context to ascribe responsibility and, within certain limits, to express blame.

8. Freedom of the will

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-113
Author(s):  
Edward Craig
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Causal Chains

Do we have free will? ‘Freedom of the will’ starts by looking at Descartes, whose theology encouraged him to believe that he had free will. His thoughts may have been given by God, but he had the power to assent to them. Hegel’s metaphysics can teach us about his account of freedom. His predecessor Kant was possessed by the idea of moral obligations. Hegel argued that we are free, but that the decisions we make are the result of an idea, reason, or spirit. Finally, there is determinism—the idea that things happen because of causal chains—and compatibilism, the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible.

Introduction

1992 ◽  
pp. 1-51
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Behaviour ◽  
Natural Connection ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Physical Causation ◽  
Philosophical Writings ◽  
Freedom Of Action

This chapter focuses on Cicero's treatise titled On Fate (De fato), which is part of the second group of his philosophical writings that dates from the period of Julius Caesar's ascendancy at the end of the Civil War and the period immediately after his assassination. It explains how De fato considers the relation of the gods to human affairs and problems that arise therefrom. It also discusses the natural connection between different occurrences that the Stoics spoke of as “sympathy” that may have some influence on human behaviour but not remove the freedom of action altogether. The chapter describes how Cicero is characteristically scornful of the arguments by Stoics and favors the view of Carneades that free will could be defended against the Stoics. It talks about the freedom of the will in antiquity that can be divided into areas concerned with physical causation and questions of logic.

The Struggle against Fate

2019 ◽  
pp. 17-67
Author(s):  
Benedetta Zavatta
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

This chapter examines the influence that reading Emerson had on Nietzsche’s treatment of the theme of fate and free will, which is closely tied to two other central themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy: the theme of moral responsibility for one’s own actions, and that of the construction of one’s character, or self-creation. Though rejecting Emerson’s metaphysical assumptions regarding the freedom of the will and of thought, Nietzsche used certain suggestions provided to him by Emerson to work out an account of freedom as agency whereby to be free is not to act in a completely unconditioned way but rather to act as master of one’s own drives and guided by one’s own values. This chapter also examines the feeling of freedom which Nietzsche describes as the feeling of the preponderance of one’s own force vis-à-vis the force of external circumstances. Thanks to his reading of Emerson, Nietzsche comes to consider this feeling as compatible with the perception of necessity or the presence of immutable facts in one’s own life.

Moral Bioenhancement and Free Will: Continuing the Debate

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 384-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
VOJIN RAKIĆ
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Threshold Concept ◽  
Moral Bioenhancement ◽  
Political Concept ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

Abstract:This article continues and expands differences I have with Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu concerning issues of moral bioenhancement and free will. They have criticized my conception of voluntary moral bioenhancement, claiming that it ignores the extent to which freedom is a matter of degree. Here, I argue that freedom as a political concept (or as one that is analogous to a political concept) is indeed scalar in nature, but that freedom of the will is to be understood as a threshold concept and therefore not as subject to degree. Consequently, I contend, by asserting that freedom is a matter of degree, that Persson and Savulescu have not undermined my arguments favoring voluntary moral enhancement. In addition, I add three further arguments against compulsory moral bioenhancement.

Augustine's Metaphysics and Free Will

1967 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-306
Author(s):  
Frederick Sontag
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The World ◽  
Crucial Problem ◽  
The Will

“Free Will” is not a problem which can simply be answered. The long history surrounding this issue would seem to indicate that. It is not that an answer is impossible; on the contrary, the problem is that many answers may be given and no single one can be established to the exclusion of all others. Which answer is adopted depends upon one's metaphysics, upon one's basic assumptions about the first principles which govern and structure the world. Does all this leave us lost in a helpless pluralism where freedom of the will is concerned, an issue which might well be the crucial problem of our own era and which certainly has been important in every philosophical age? No, not unless we adopt an attitude of scepticism where metaphysics is concerned. Thus, our success in dealing with free will depends upon our metaphysical competence. If we can analyze previous metaphysical views and then construct and defend our own, we can still structure an answer to the issue of freedom of the will.

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