COHABITANTS IN PRIVATE LAW: TRUST, FRUSTRATION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN ENGLAND, GERMANY AND CANADA

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 629-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Sanders

AbstractNeither in England, nor in Germany, nor in all Canadian provinces, does the law provide specific rules for the redistribution of property for unmarried cohabitants after the breakdown of their relationship. Instead, courts apply the law of trusts, contract and unjust enrichment with an eye to the characteristics of intimate relationships, as, for example, in decisions like the EnglishJones v Kernott([2011] UKSC 53) and the CanadianKerr v Baranow(2011 SCC 10). This article compares English, Canadian, and German case law and evaluates it both from a doctrinal perspective and as a part of a general approach towards cohabitation. The article concludes with an appeal for legislative action that strikes the right balance between party autonomy and protection of the weaker party.

Author(s):  
Ben McFarlane ◽  
Andreas Televantos

This chapter identifies and explores a core task of private law: to determine “third party effects” of transactions. We ask to what extent an A–B transaction may affect C, a party who enters into a subsequent transaction with A, or otherwise interferes with the right claimed by B. We show first that such third party effects are controlled not only by rules relating to legal property rights and equitable interests, but also by parts of the law of agency, of partnerships, and of tort. Secondly, whilst a range of doctrines thus share this function of controlling third party effects, it is important to distinguish between the precise legal form used by each doctrine. Thirdly, we argue that even when considering one particular form, such as that of a legal property right, third party effect is determined by the interaction of different types of rules, with the practical operation of one type of rule modified by the application of a different type. For this reason, attention must be paid to the interaction between the different forms used to govern third party effect. There is a question as to whether the law in this area is unduly complex, but we suggest that, so long as the range of forms tracks the diversity of ordinary transactions, private law usefully enhances party autonomy by offering parties these different means of casting their legal relations.


1969 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 221 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Stevens ◽  
Jason W. Neyers

The law of restitution has developed out of the law of quasi-contract and the law of constructive trust. Inadequate attention to the logic and coherence of doctrines in the law of restitution, however, renders this new law as opaque and confused as its predecessor. This is largely due to the remedial mentality of the common law. The remedy to the remedial mentality is to concentrate future efforts in stating doctrine on defining rights, not remedies. The precedent for this type of change in method is the transformation that occurred in contract and tort over the past 100 years, inspired, in part, by civilian theories of private law. The right that generates the remedy restitution is the cause of action in unjust enrichment. It arises where there has been a non-consensual receipt and retention of value, that is, a receipt and retention of value that occurs without "juristic reason." "Nonconsensual" means by mistake, by theft or by finding. There are a number of problems in the method of the common law tradition which stand in the way of recognizing this simple formulation: (a) The inherent expansiveness of "restitution " and "unjust enrichment" if these terms are not rigorously defined; (b) The lack of serious competition for the expansive versions of the subject, on a number of fronts; (c) The lack of a clear direction in the efforts to reform the law of quasi-contract and constructive trust; (d) The deeply embedded nature of the quasi-contract thinking; (e) Poor analysis in some areas of the law of contract and (f) Tort; and (g) The lack of an explicit agency of reform in the tradition.


Author(s):  
Inesa Shumilo ◽  
◽  
Mykyta Kostin ◽  
Artem Shapoval ◽  
◽  
...  

The article is devoted to a comprehensive study of the problems of application of the law of unrecognized states in private international law. The study describes the main conceptual approaches to the possibility of national courts to apply the law of unrecognized states in the regulation of private law relations. Emphasis is placed on the arguments "for" the right of courts to take into account the rules of domestic law of unrecognized states, the case law on the issue selected for study is studied. According to the results of the research, it is concluded that the international legal recognition of the newly formed countries and the determination of the status of its national legislation and, as a consequence, the possibility of its application by national courts remain controversial today. Under the outlined conditions in the process of settling private law relations, the competent jurisdictions of the countries face the problem of applying the law of foreign states that have not gained worldwide recognition, which objectively causes controversy on the issue of mandatory rules of conduct, law in force in its territory. . Given the fact that today a significant number of unrecognized countries have "proven their viability" and are integrated into the international market, we still consider it appropriate to gradually adopt the effect of private law, even an unrecognized state. National courts, taking into account the specific case and the expediency of applying the private law of an unrecognized state, should apply them if these rules effectively regulate specific private law relations.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Katharina Pistor

Abstract In this brief introduction, I summarize the core themes of my book “The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality”. Capital, I argue, is coded in law – predominantly in a handful of private law institutions. By relying on legal coding techniques, asset holders invoke the right to enforce claims against others, if necessary with the help of the state’s coercive power.


2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 527-543
Author(s):  
Jadranko Jug

This paper deals with the problems related to the legal position of honest and dishonest possessors in relation to the owner of things, that is, it analyses the rights belonging to the possessors of things and the demands that possessors may require from the owners of things to whom the possessors must submit those things. Also, in contrast, the rights and requirements are analysed of the owners of things in relation to honest and dishonest possessors. In practice, a dilemma arises in defi ning the essential and benefi cial expenditure incurred by honest possessors, what the presumptions are for and until when the right of retention may be exercised for the sake of remuneration of that expenditure, when the statute of limitations expires on that claim, and the signifi cance of the provisions of the Civil Obligations Act in relation to unjust enrichment, management without mandate and the right of retention, and which provisions regulate these or similar issues. The answers to some of these dilemmas have been provided in case law, and therefore the basic method used in the paper was analysis and research of case law, especially decisions by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. The introduction to the paper provides the basic characteristics of the concept of possession and possession of things, and the type and quality of possession, to provide a basis for the subsequent analysis of the legal position of the possessor of a thing in relation to the owner of that thing.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 159-194
Author(s):  
Nadia de Araujo ◽  
Caio Gomes de Freitas

When negotiating a contract, parties usually establish that future and eventual disputes arising out and related to the performance of their obligations shall be resolved by arbitration. Such a choice, a clear expression of the principle of party autonomy, is embedded in a contractual clause, commonly referred to as arbitration agreement. The way by which the agreement is written and, to some extent, how it is construed can, and most commonly will, result in extensive and costly disputes. In the UK, the Supreme Court has recently decided a case related to the construction of an arbitration agreement, specifically to the law applicable to its validity, scope and effectiveness. According to the Court, in the absence of an express choice made by the parties, the system of law chosen to govern the substance of the contract will apply to the validity and scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Where no such choice is expressly or implied made by the parties, it will be the law of the seat of arbitration since it represents the system of law most closely connected to the agreement. This article reviews the case-law and provides some relevant excerpts of the case.


Author(s):  
Göran Rollnert Liern

La tramitación parlamentaria de la Ley de Transparencia ha reabierto el debate doctrinal sobre el acceso a la información pública como derecho fundamental. El trabajo hace una valoración de los argumentos utilizados en la discusión, en particular de la jurisprudencia nacional sobre este derecho y de su posible integración en la libertad de información del art. 20.1 d) CE interpretándolo conforme a los tratados internacionales y atendiendo a las recientes sentencias del TEDH dictadas en 2009 y 2013.The parliamentary procedure of the Law of Transparency has reopened the doctrinal debate on access to public information as a fundamental right. The paper gives a valuation of the arguments used in the discussion, in particular the national case-law on this right and the possible integration thereof in the freedom of information set in article 20.1 d) of the Spanish Constitution interpreting it according to international treaties and taking into account the recent judgments of the ECHR established in 2009 and 2013.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-57
Author(s):  
Tatiana Cutts

Mistaken payment is the ‘core case’ of unjust enrichment, and it has had a powerful effect on the development of this area of private law. For Peter Birks, unjust enrichment was simply ‘the law of all events materially identical to mistaken payment’—to be shaped through a process of abstraction from that core case. But this begs the question: how do we work out what counts as ‘materially identical’ to mistaken payment? The most obvious starting point, and that which Birks chose, is the central characteristic of money: money is valuable. Thus, ‘the law of all events materially identical to mistaken payments’ is ‘the law of all events that unjustly enrich one party at another’s expense’.In this article, I argue that this starting point is incorrect. Rather than looking for some factual similarity between mistaken payment and other events, we should identify the role that money plays in justifying restitution. And what justifies restitution in the core case is not the ‘value’ or ‘benefit’ that money confers; rather, it is a defect in the legal transaction that links payor with payee. The payee is not liable because she has been ‘enriched’, but because she is the counterparty to a legal transaction which exhibits traits that there are institutional reasons to disavow. Just like contract and torts, the role of value is secondary: where correcting the injustice in specie is impossible or undesirable, the defendant must pay whichever sum will most nearly achieve that goal.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Case law shows that private prosecutions have been part of Mauritian law at least since 1873. In Mauritius there are two types of private prosecutions: private prosecutions by individuals; and private prosecutions by statutory bodies. Neither the Mauritian constitution nor legislation provides for the right to institute a private prosecution. Because of the fact that Mauritian legislation is not detailed on the issue of locus standi to institute private prosecutions and does not address the issue of whether or not the Director of Public Prosecutions has to give reasons when he takes over and discontinues a private prosecution, the Supreme Court has had to address these issues. The Mauritian Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that a private prosecution may only be instituted by an aggrieved party (even in lower courts where this is not a statutory requirement) and that the Director of Public Prosecutions may take over and discontinue a private prosecution without giving reasons for his decision. However, the Supreme Court does not define “an aggrieved party.” In this article the author takes issue with the Court’s findings in these cases and, relying on legislation from other African countries, recommends how the law could be amended to strengthen the private prosecutor’s position.


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