ANZUS Pacific Security Pact

1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-331

The Council of the ANZUS Pacific Security Pact met in Washington on October 2, 1958. It was reported that the major emphasis during the meeting was given to the situation existing in the Formosa Straits. Thus in a statement issued following the meeting, the three member governments, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, called on the Chinese communists to discontinue their attacks on Quemoy and Matsu as a first step to a peaceful settlement. According to the press, the statement also expressed the principle that armed force should not be used to achieve territorial ambitions, and indicated agreement among the participants that militant and subversive communist expansionism remained the greatest threat to the peaceful progress of the free world. The member governments of ANZUS were represented as follows: for the United States, Mr. Dulles (Secretary of State), for Australia, Mr. Casey (Minister for External Affairs), and for New Zealand, Mr. Nash (Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs).

1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-345

The Council of the ANZUS Pacific Security Pact met in Washington on October 26, 1959. New Zealand was represented by Prime Minister Walter Nash; Australia by Minister for External Affairs Richard G. Casey; and the United States by Secretary of State Christian Herter. The representatives of the three member nations voiced their concern that the destructive violence in Asia of the Chinese Communists and their threat of a “liberating” war in the Taiwan Strait should continue to pose a serious threat to the peace of the world; they reiterated their conviction in this context that any resort to force of arms by the Chinese Communists in the Taiwan area or elsewhere could only be regarded as an international problem affecting the stability of the region.


1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 1057-1058

The ANZUS Council held its fourteenth annual meeting in Washington on June 28, 1965. Keith J. Holyoake, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs of New Zealand; Paul M. C. Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs of Australia, and Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States, attended the meeting.


Significance The possibility of Japan joining the alliance is now seriously discussed in Tokyo and the capitals of the Five Eyes members -- the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Joining Five Eyes would signal Japan’s even deeper integration into US alliance structures, regionally and globally, and raise expectations for Japan to act as a fuller ally in all sorts of contingencies. Impacts Japan’s greatest potential contribution to allies is probably in signals and imagery intelligence, especially vis-a-vis China. The prime minister will avoid opening up a controversial foreign policy issue so close to a general election; his successor may be bolder. Japan’s partners still run a risk of leaks due to Japan’s lag in cybersecurity and institutional arrangements, but this is decreasing.


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-863

Tenth meeting: The tenth meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was held in London on May 3–5, 1965, under the chairmanship of Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. Other member governments were represented by Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs of Australia; D. J. Eyre, Minister of Defense of New Zealand; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan; Librado D. Cayco, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines; Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Aflairs of Thailand; and George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State of the United States. Achille Clarac, French Ambassador in Bangkok and Council representative for France, also attended the London session as an observer. (On April 20 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had announced that France would not send a delegation to the meeting although Ambassador Clarac would be present as an observer only.)


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 189
Author(s):  
Michael Sergel

Sergel, Michael. (2015). Pacific insights into the Rainbow Warrior legacy. Pacific Journalism Review, 21(2): 189-191. Review of Eyes of Fire: The Last Voyage of the Rainbow Warrior, by David Robie. [30th Anniversary Ed.] Auckland: Little Island Press, 2015, 194 pp. ISBN 978-1-877484-28-5The 1985 bombing of the Rainbow Warrior is often remembered as the deadly consequence of a small Pacific nation taking a defiant stance against nuclear testing by major powers. Thirty years on, the updated edition of David Robie’s Eyes of Fire moves beyond the David and Goliath narrative that puts New Zealand at the centre of the story. Prime Minister David Lange called the bombing a ‘sordid act of international statebacked terrorism’ and an ‘unprecedented affront to sovereignty’ (p. 128). Months earlier, he had defended New Zealand’s anti-nuclear position at the Oxford Union. Years later, he said the lack of international support had only strenthened the country’s resolve (Young, 2005). But Robie reminds us the bombing was far more than a key date on New Zealand’s political timeline. The former British fishing trawler had been part of missions to stop whalers, sealers and nuclear warships in Scotland, Ireland, France, Spain, the United States and Peru. It had even been at the centre of a diplomatic Cold War clash during a visit to Siberia.Eyes Of Fire: 30 Years On Little Island Press microsite about the book


1958 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 548-549 ◽  

The Council of the Baghdad Pact, meeting on the ministerial level, convened in London on July 28, 1958. It was reported that during its two-day meeting, Secretary of State Dulles committed the United States to partnership in the pact with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The United States' acceptance of obligations expressed in Article 1 of the pact was accompanied by an oral promise to increase military assistance to the three Asian members. According to the press, these two steps were considered “just as good” as signing a treaty. There were two considerations, according to one source, in the procedure adopted by the United States of agreeing to obligations to members of the pact instead of becoming a full member: 1) special military and economic agreements to be made could be made immediately under the joint resolution on the Middle East passed by both Houses of Congress in March 1957; if the United States had joined the pact as a full member, a new treaty would have been involved requiring the Senate's ratification; 2) the United States was not committed to make such special agreements with Iraq, since the latter did not sign the declaration issued by the Council following its meetings on July 28.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Peter Mauch

This essay reproduces in its entirety a translated version of a hitherto neglected document from 1941, entitled “Armed Services’ and Foreign Ministry’s Revised Draft, April 21.” The revisions pertain to the so-called “Draft Understanding between Japan and the United States,” a plan for peace in the Pacific which Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō submitted to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 14 April, and then to Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro on 17 April. The revisions – or, to be more exact, the scarcity of revisions – suggest that even the Imperial Japanese Army viewed the Draft Understanding with an equanimity that has escaped previous scholarship. In so doing, the reproduced document raises important questions about the gulf separating Japan’s armed services and hardline Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules Lobel ◽  
Michael Ratner

In January and February 1998, various United States officials, including the President, asserted that unless Iraq permitted unconditional access to international weapons inspections, it would face a military attack. The attack was not to be, in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s words, “a pinprick,” but a “significant” military campaign. U.S. officials, citing United Nations Security Council resolutions, insisted that the United States had the authority for the contemplated attack. Representatives of other permanent members of the Security Council believed otherwise; that no resolution of the Council authorized U.S. armed action without its approval. In late February, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan traveled to Baghdad and returned with a memorandum of understanding regarding inspections signed by himself and the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. On March 2, 1998, the Security Council, in Resolution 1154, unanimously endorsed this memorandum of understanding.


2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-182
Author(s):  
Allison Oosterman

New Zealand journalist Malcolm Ross was a witness to the international rivalries over Samoa between Germany, Britain and the United States, which came to a head in 1899. Civil war had broken out after the death of King Malietoa Laupepa in August 1898 over who would be his successor. The United States and Britain stepped in and supported Laupepa’s son while Germany supported a rival claimant, Mataafa. Malcolm Ross went to Samoa in late January to report on the ‘troubles’ for three New Zealand daily newspapers, the Otago Daily Times, The Press and the Evening Post. The Samoan trip was Ross’s first experience as a war correspondent, although not everybody saw the conflict as war. This article examines Ross’s coverage of four months of the conflict until the cessation of hostilities when a three-man commission was established to look into the troubles and offer a solution. The article will assess Ross’s work as a journalist in a ‘war zone’. The freedom with which he was able to operate in Samoa was not to be repeated, especially once he had become the country’s official war correspondent during World War I.


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