ANZUS Pacific Security Pact

1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 1057-1058

The ANZUS Council held its fourteenth annual meeting in Washington on June 28, 1965. Keith J. Holyoake, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs of New Zealand; Paul M. C. Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs of Australia, and Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States, attended the meeting.

1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-331

The Council of the ANZUS Pacific Security Pact met in Washington on October 2, 1958. It was reported that the major emphasis during the meeting was given to the situation existing in the Formosa Straits. Thus in a statement issued following the meeting, the three member governments, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, called on the Chinese communists to discontinue their attacks on Quemoy and Matsu as a first step to a peaceful settlement. According to the press, the statement also expressed the principle that armed force should not be used to achieve territorial ambitions, and indicated agreement among the participants that militant and subversive communist expansionism remained the greatest threat to the peaceful progress of the free world. The member governments of ANZUS were represented as follows: for the United States, Mr. Dulles (Secretary of State), for Australia, Mr. Casey (Minister for External Affairs), and for New Zealand, Mr. Nash (Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs).


1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-345

The Council of the ANZUS Pacific Security Pact met in Washington on October 26, 1959. New Zealand was represented by Prime Minister Walter Nash; Australia by Minister for External Affairs Richard G. Casey; and the United States by Secretary of State Christian Herter. The representatives of the three member nations voiced their concern that the destructive violence in Asia of the Chinese Communists and their threat of a “liberating” war in the Taiwan Strait should continue to pose a serious threat to the peace of the world; they reiterated their conviction in this context that any resort to force of arms by the Chinese Communists in the Taiwan area or elsewhere could only be regarded as an international problem affecting the stability of the region.


1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 546-547 ◽  

The Council of the Baghdad Pact held its annual meeting in Karachi from June 3 through 6, 1957. Representatives were present from the five member countries—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom—and the United States was represented by an observer delegation. The Council had been scheduled to meet months earlier, but Iraq originally refused to meet with the United Kingdom. At the opening session, presided over by Mr. Suhrawardy, Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri es Said, was reported to have spoken forcefully about the dangers implicit in the problems of Israel, Algeria, Kashmir and Cyprus. Mr. Lloyd, Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, was reported to have followed Mr. Nuri es Said's remarks with a speech in which he announced his government's offer of a contribution of £500,000 a year in cash and in kind for building up the minimum military infra-structure in member countries. The speeches of other delegates were reported to be noteworthy for their frank recognition of past weaknesses in the Baghdad Pact organization and the need to give it new effectiveness. In the course of the first session the United States formally accepted an invitation to join the Pact's Military Committee; and a United States military delegation headed by General Nathan F. Twining started participating in a separate concurrent meeting of the Military Committee. The United States thus became a member of the Pact's three main committees, but had still not become a formal member of the Pact.


Significance The possibility of Japan joining the alliance is now seriously discussed in Tokyo and the capitals of the Five Eyes members -- the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Joining Five Eyes would signal Japan’s even deeper integration into US alliance structures, regionally and globally, and raise expectations for Japan to act as a fuller ally in all sorts of contingencies. Impacts Japan’s greatest potential contribution to allies is probably in signals and imagery intelligence, especially vis-a-vis China. The prime minister will avoid opening up a controversial foreign policy issue so close to a general election; his successor may be bolder. Japan’s partners still run a risk of leaks due to Japan’s lag in cybersecurity and institutional arrangements, but this is decreasing.


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-863

Tenth meeting: The tenth meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was held in London on May 3–5, 1965, under the chairmanship of Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. Other member governments were represented by Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs of Australia; D. J. Eyre, Minister of Defense of New Zealand; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan; Librado D. Cayco, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines; Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Aflairs of Thailand; and George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State of the United States. Achille Clarac, French Ambassador in Bangkok and Council representative for France, also attended the London session as an observer. (On April 20 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had announced that France would not send a delegation to the meeting although Ambassador Clarac would be present as an observer only.)


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 189
Author(s):  
Michael Sergel

Sergel, Michael. (2015). Pacific insights into the Rainbow Warrior legacy. Pacific Journalism Review, 21(2): 189-191. Review of Eyes of Fire: The Last Voyage of the Rainbow Warrior, by David Robie. [30th Anniversary Ed.] Auckland: Little Island Press, 2015, 194 pp. ISBN 978-1-877484-28-5The 1985 bombing of the Rainbow Warrior is often remembered as the deadly consequence of a small Pacific nation taking a defiant stance against nuclear testing by major powers. Thirty years on, the updated edition of David Robie’s Eyes of Fire moves beyond the David and Goliath narrative that puts New Zealand at the centre of the story. Prime Minister David Lange called the bombing a ‘sordid act of international statebacked terrorism’ and an ‘unprecedented affront to sovereignty’ (p. 128). Months earlier, he had defended New Zealand’s anti-nuclear position at the Oxford Union. Years later, he said the lack of international support had only strenthened the country’s resolve (Young, 2005). But Robie reminds us the bombing was far more than a key date on New Zealand’s political timeline. The former British fishing trawler had been part of missions to stop whalers, sealers and nuclear warships in Scotland, Ireland, France, Spain, the United States and Peru. It had even been at the centre of a diplomatic Cold War clash during a visit to Siberia.Eyes Of Fire: 30 Years On Little Island Press microsite about the book


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Peter Mauch

This essay reproduces in its entirety a translated version of a hitherto neglected document from 1941, entitled “Armed Services’ and Foreign Ministry’s Revised Draft, April 21.” The revisions pertain to the so-called “Draft Understanding between Japan and the United States,” a plan for peace in the Pacific which Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō submitted to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 14 April, and then to Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro on 17 April. The revisions – or, to be more exact, the scarcity of revisions – suggest that even the Imperial Japanese Army viewed the Draft Understanding with an equanimity that has escaped previous scholarship. In so doing, the reproduced document raises important questions about the gulf separating Japan’s armed services and hardline Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules Lobel ◽  
Michael Ratner

In January and February 1998, various United States officials, including the President, asserted that unless Iraq permitted unconditional access to international weapons inspections, it would face a military attack. The attack was not to be, in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s words, “a pinprick,” but a “significant” military campaign. U.S. officials, citing United Nations Security Council resolutions, insisted that the United States had the authority for the contemplated attack. Representatives of other permanent members of the Security Council believed otherwise; that no resolution of the Council authorized U.S. armed action without its approval. In late February, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan traveled to Baghdad and returned with a memorandum of understanding regarding inspections signed by himself and the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. On March 2, 1998, the Security Council, in Resolution 1154, unanimously endorsed this memorandum of understanding.


1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 543-543

The Council of the ANZUS Pacific Security Pact met in Washington on November 17, 1956. The three member governments were represented by their foreign ministers: Mr. Hoover (Acting Secretary of State) for the United States, Mr. Casey for Australia, and Mr. Macdonald for New Zealand. The ministers reviewed the work done under the aegis of ANZUS since the Council had last met, in September 1955, and noted that, in addition to meetings of the ANZUS Military Representatives and Staff Planners, agreements with the United States had been signed by both Australia and New Zealand for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The ministers expressed the conviction that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization had contributed substantially over the preceding year to the welfare and security of Southeast Asia.


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