Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 993-993 ◽  

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Council held its eighth meeting in Paris from April 8 to 10, 1963, under the chairmanship of Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France. According to the communiqué released at the close of the meeting, the Council discussed the situation in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Ministers noted that considerable progress had been achieved in the fight against subversion in Vietnam and that one might expect a new improvement in the situation thanks to the efforts made by the Vietnamese government. It was hoped that South Vietnam, with the support given to it, would be in a position to maintain its advance toward internal stability and international security. The Council reiterated its support for a neutral and independent Laos and took note of the deployment of troops from some member countries in Thailand in May 1962.

1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-863

Tenth meeting: The tenth meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was held in London on May 3–5, 1965, under the chairmanship of Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. Other member governments were represented by Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs of Australia; D. J. Eyre, Minister of Defense of New Zealand; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan; Librado D. Cayco, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines; Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Aflairs of Thailand; and George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State of the United States. Achille Clarac, French Ambassador in Bangkok and Council representative for France, also attended the London session as an observer. (On April 20 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had announced that France would not send a delegation to the meeting although Ambassador Clarac would be present as an observer only.)


1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 657-659 ◽  

The Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) held its ninth annual meeting in Manila on April 13–15, 1964, under the chairmanship of Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. The communiqué issued at the close of the meeting expressed the Ministers' contention that SEATO had had, and continued to have, a most important stabilizing influence in Southeast Asia. Despite the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Council agreed that world domination remained the aim of communism and that vigilance could not therefore be relaxed. In addition to measures to deter overt aggression and active insurgency, the Ministers agreed that emphasis on the development of economic and social conditions should be continued in order to strengthen national resistance to subversion. Reaffirming that the determination of national policy rested with individual governments, the Council declared that material support and encouragement should be given to those nations which, in defending themselves, needed and requested such support.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-79
Author(s):  
Nargiza Sodikova ◽  
◽  
◽  

Important aspects of French foreign policy and national interests in the modern time,France's position in international security and the specifics of foreign affairs with the United States and the European Union are revealed in this article


2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-334
Author(s):  
Edmund F. Wehrle

America's Miracle Man in Vietnam presents a prime example of the controversial new cultural trend in U.S. diplomatic history. On the surface, the author's depiction of the process whereby Ngo Dinh Diem became America's candidate to head the new country of South Vietnam is familiar (see, for instance, George Herring, America's Longest War, Temple University Press, 1986, 50–69). Echoing others, Jacobs argues that the U.S. promotion of Diem ultimately led to severe setbacks in Southeast Asia. So blatant were Diem's flaws, Jacobs insists, virtually any prescient observer could have predicted his unsuitability to lead nascent South Vietnam. Diem had no political base, was “undeniably an autocrat,” and appeared to be an eccentric loner by virtually all accounts (38). Once in office, Diem predictably launched his “reign of terror and error,” alienating legions of his countrymen and strengthening his opposition, which emerged officially as the National Liberation Front in 1960 (17).


Author(s):  
See Seng Tan

This chapter examines extant understandings of sovereignty as responsibility, beginning with the idea of sovereign responsibility as conceptualised by Francis Deng and his collaborators, who contend that sovereignty can no longer be seen as a protection against interference, but as a charge of responsibility where the state is accountable to both domestic and external constituencies. The understanding is foundational to the thinking behind the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, which introduced the responsibility to protect (R2P) with the aim to popularise the concept of humanitarian intervention and democracy-restoring intervention. Since its endorsement by the United Nations, the R2P has evolved through efforts by the UN and others to enhance, operationalise as well as to implement it in actual crisis situations – with varying degrees of success and in some instances not without controversy. The chapter discusses the relevance of the sovereignty as responsibility idea to Southeast Asia. It also examines the existing academic and policy debate over the R2P and its relevance to international security and sovereign responsibility, as well as its ambivalent reception in Southeast Asia.


Author(s):  
Gregory A. Daddis

For nearly a decade, American combat soldiers fought in South Vietnam to help sustain an independent, noncommunist nation in Southeast Asia. After U.S. troops departed in 1973, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 prompted a lasting search to explain the United States’ first lost war. Historians of the conflict and participants alike have since critiqued the ways in which civilian policymakers and uniformed leaders applied—some argued misapplied—military power that led to such an undesirable political outcome. While some claimed U.S. politicians failed to commit their nation’s full military might to a limited war, others contended that most officers fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the war they were fighting. Still others argued “winning” was essentially impossible given the true nature of a struggle over Vietnamese national identity in the postcolonial era. On their own, none of these arguments fully satisfy. Contemporary policymakers clearly understood the difficulties of waging a war in Southeast Asia against an enemy committed to national liberation. Yet the faith of these Americans in their power to resolve deep-seated local and regional sociopolitical problems eclipsed the possibility there might be limits to that power. By asking military strategists to simultaneously fight a war and build a nation, senior U.S. policymakers had asked too much of those crafting military strategy to deliver on overly ambitious political objectives. In the end, the Vietnam War exposed the limits of what American military power could achieve in the Cold War era.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document