scholarly journals Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict

2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 661-694 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff D. Colgan
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Data ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Conventional View ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Competition For Resources

AbstractOil-exporting states, or petrostates, engage in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) at a much higher rate on average than nonpetrostates. Why is this so? Further, what explains the variation among the petrostates in adopting aggressive foreign policies and engaging in MIDs on that basis? This article develops a theory that proposes that revolutionary petrostates have a higher propensity to launch MIDs than comparable nonpetrostates. This theory is tested with statistical analysis using a new quantitative data set that identifies revolutionary governments in the period 1945–2001. The results show that petro-revolutionary governments constitute a special threat to international peace and security. This evidence of resource-backed aggression challenges the conventional view of petrostates as the targets of international competition for resources.

Same Evidences, Different Interpretations – A Comparison of the Conflict Index between the Interstate Dyadic Events Data and Militarized Interstate Disputes Data in Peace-Conflict Models

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 347-372
Author(s):  
Scott Y. Lin ◽  
Carlos Seiglie
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Events Data ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

AbstractStudying the determinants of international conflict, researchers have found a series of influential variables, but few have addressed the robustness of the results to changes in the definition of the dependent variable, conflict. The two main sources for operationalizing conflict in empirical work are data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and events data. In this paper, we find that a χ2-test indicates a correlation between events data and MIDs data. However, detailed regression analysis indicates that there are some contradictory findings depending on whether we use events data as opposed to MIDs data to measure conflict.

Self-Monitoring, US Presidents, and International Crises

2018 ◽  
pp. 67-102
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
The Self ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Self Monitoring ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

This chapter looks at original surveys of sixty-eight presidential historians on the president each had studied in depth. The historians’ survey suggests that American presidents exhibit variation in their self-monitoring dispositions. The chapter then leverages this variation to test statistically whether US presidents’ behavior during international crises is consistent with the expectations of the theory presented in this book. The self-monitoring disposition of a US president is a significant predictor of his likelihood of employing and initiating military instruments to demonstrate resolve during international conflict. Low self-monitor presidents not only engage in less militarized interstate disputes, but they are also significantly less likely to initiate such disputes, compared to high self-monitor presidents. The chapter also presents findings indicating that high self-monitor presidents are more likely to prevail in militarized interstate disputes compared to their low self-monitor counterparts.

Partisanship, Militarized International Conflict, and Electoral Support for the Incumbent

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane P. Singh ◽  
Jaroslav Tir
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Level Data ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Comparative politics scholarship often neglects to consider how militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) shape political behavior. In this project, we advance an argument that considers voter responses to international conflict at the individual level. In particular, we consider how the well-known conditioning effects of partisanship manifest in relation to militarized international conflict. Examining individual- and macro-level data across ninety-seven elections in forty-two countries over the 1996–2011 period, we find consistent evidence of militarized conflict impacting vote choice. This relationship is, however, moderated by partisanship, conflict side (initiator or target), and conflict hostility level. Among non-copartisan voters, the incumbent benefits the most electorally from initiating low-hostility MIDs or when the country is a target of a high-hostility MID; the opposite scenarios (initiator of a high-hostility MID or target of a low-hostility MID) lead to punishment among this voter group. Copartisans, meanwhile, tend to either maintain or intensify their support in most scenarios we examine; when a country is targeted in a low-hostility MID, copartisan support erodes mildly.

Dictatorial Peace?

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK PECENY ◽  
CAROLINE C. BEER ◽  
SHANNON SANCHEZ-TERRY
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Interesting Variation ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Is there a dictatorial peace that resembles the democratic peace? This paper uses a new data set compiled by Barbara Geddes to examine the conflict behavior of three types of autocratic regimes—personalist, military, and single-party dictatorships—in the post-World War II era. We find some evidence that specific types of authoritarian regimes are peaceful toward one another. No two personalist dictators or two military regimes have gone to war with each other since 1945. These dyads were not less likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes than were mixed dyads, however. Although single-party regimes were the only homogeneous dyad in this study to have experienced war, multivariate analyses of participation in militarized interstate disputes suggest that single-party states are more peaceful toward one another than are mixed dyads. Thus, while we have found no unambiguous evidence of a dictatorial peace to match the robustness of the democratic peace, there is substantial interesting variation in the conflict behavior of specific types of authoritarian regimes. The analysis presented here demonstrates that studies of the impact of regime type on conflict behavior must work from a more sophisticated conception of authoritarianism.

Media Openness, Democracy and Militarized Interstate Disputes

2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEUNG-WHAN CHOI ◽  
PATRICK JAMES
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Time Series Dataset ◽  
Joint Membership ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Mass media play a central role in political life. Media not only transfer information; they also facilitate communication. These functions may ameliorate conflict, crisis and war in world politics. Accordingly, this study looks into the impact of media openness on international conflict. Based on a cross-sectional, time-series dataset for interstate dyads from 1950 to 1992, logistic regression analysis shows that an indicator of media openness has a strong dampening effect on Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) and fatal MIDs. Moreover, this connection is significant even in the presence of a composite indicator of democracy (that measures its institutional attributes using the Polity data), economic interdependence and joint membership in international organizations. The results suggest that the successful neo-Kantian triad is complemented effectively by the presence of media openness.

Status Deficits and War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Renshon
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
The United States ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Reference Groups ◽  
Unique Data ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Large N ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

This chapter explores the relationship between status deficits and international conflict using empirical evidence drawn from a large-N statistical analysis of the link between status dissatisfaction and war at several degrees of intensity (ranging from crises to interstate conflict). It first considers whether conflict serves as a status-altering event before discussing the connection of status deficits to initiation of war and militarized interstate disputes. It also presents unique data on which comparisons are most salient in motivating international conflict (for example, who powerful states compare themselves to, or whether South Africa and the United States are likely to compare themselves to similar groups of countries. The chapter shows that the types of comparisons that are made—who the “reference groups” are—have important implications for how status concerns are manifested in international politics.

Domestic uncertainty, third-party resolve, and international conflict

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew DiLorenzo ◽  
Bryan Rooney
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Uncertainty about resolve is a well-established rationalist explanation for war. In addition to estimating the resolve of immediate rivals, leaders choose their actions in a crisis based on expectations about how third parties will respond. We argue that leaders will become more likely to develop inconsistent estimates of rivals’ relative capabilities and resolve – and thus will become more likely to fight – when domestic political changes occur in states that are allied with an opponent. We also consider how the relationship between conflict in rivalries and third-party domestic change depends on domestic political institutions in the third party. We argue that this effect should only hold when a challenger does not also share an alliance with the third party, and that the effect should be strongest when the third party is a non-democratic state. We test our theory using a dataset of changes in leaders’ domestic supporting coalitions and data on militarized interstate disputes from 1920 to 2001. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the likelihood of conflict increases in rivalries only when domestic coalition changes occur in states that share an alliance with only one member of a rivalry, and that this effect is strongest and most consistent for non-democratic third parties.

Intervention in Conflicts from a Network Perspective

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato Corbetta ◽  
Keith A. Grant
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dyadic Relationships ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Events Data ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Structural Theories ◽  
Hostility Scale

Whether neutral or on the side of a combatant, third-party states’ intervention in ongoing interstate conflicts is a triadic phenomenon which involves ties between a joining state and the two originators of the dispute. Existing studies on this topic have failed to fully capture the triadic nature of intervention, preferring instead to focus either on the joiner’s motivations or on the distinct dyadic relationships between joiners and the two separate combatants. Building on classic structural theories of triadic balance and on prior work by Maoz et al. (2007), in this article we address the triadic aspect of both mediation and “joining behavior”. The nature of the triadic relations among disputants and third parties influences not just the likelihood of intervention, but also the type of intervention. When triadic relations are unbalanced, third parties are more likely to intervene as intermediaries. On the contrary, when triadic relations are balanced, third parties are more likely to intervene in a partisan manner. We explore our main hypotheses by constructing a triadic data set that combines Corbetta and Dixon’s (2005) data on partisan third-party interventions and Frazier and Dixon’s (2006) data on neutral (intermediary) interventions in militarized interstate disputes with a friendship–hostility scale extracted from international events data (IDEA and COPDAB).

Oil, Revolution, and International Conflict: A Toxic Mix

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (03) ◽  
pp. 613
Author(s):  
Jeff Colgan
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Global Markets ◽  
Contemporary World ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Empirical Fact ◽  
Oil Exports ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

What is the relationship between oil and international conflict? In an era of increased dependence on, and greater volatility within, global markets for oil and energy, this question is central to understanding contemporary world politics. It is an empirical fact that petrostates—defined as states that have at least 10% of GDP derived from oil exports—are more prone to international conflict than non-petrostates. Indeed, in the period 1965–2001, petrostates engaged in militarized interstate disputes at roughly twice the rate of non-petrostates, on average. What explains this propensity?

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