Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes

2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 949-980 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuhei Kurizaki ◽  
Taehee Whang
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Model ◽  
Selection Bias ◽  
Selection Effects ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Target State ◽  
Regime Types

AbstractSelection effects in crisis bargaining make it difficult to directly measure audience costs because state leaders have an incentive to avoid incurring audience costs. We overcome this inferential problem of selection bias by using a structural statistical model. This approach allows us to estimate the size of audience costs, both incurred and not incurred, in international crises. We show that although audience costs exist for state leaders of various regime types, democratic leaders face larger audience costs than nondemocratic leaders do. Audience costs can be so large that war might be preferable to concessions, especially for leaders of highly democratic states. Audience costs also increase a state's bargaining leverage in crises because the target state is more likely to acquiesce if the challenge carries larger audience costs. We also find evidence that audience costs generate selection effects.

The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound

2011 ◽  
Vol 105 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
JACK SNYDER ◽  
ERICA D. BORGHARD
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
The Cost

A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real—as opposed to simulated—crises. We look for such evidence in post-1945 crises and find hardly any. Audience cost mechanisms are rare because (1) leaders see unambiguously committing threats as imprudent, (2) domestic audiences care more about policy substance than about consistency between the leader's words and deeds, (3) domestic audiences care about their country's reputation for resolve and national honor independent of whether the leader has issued an explicit threat, and (4) authoritarian targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do. We found domestic audience costs as secondary mechanisms in a few cases where the public already had hawkish preferences before any threats were made.

Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 872-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua A. Schwartz ◽  
Christopher W. Blair
Keyword(s):  
Gender Equality ◽  
Gender Stereotypes ◽  
Female Leaders ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Efficient Mechanism ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Political Incentives ◽  
Survey Experiments

AbstractAs more women attain executive office, it is important to understand how gender dynamics affect international politics. Toward this end, we present the first evidence that gender stereotypes affect leaders’ abilities to generate audience costs. Using survey experiments, we show that female leaders have political incentives to combat gender stereotypes that women are weak by acting “tough” during international military crises. Most prominently, we find evidence that female leaders, and male leaders facing female opponents, pay greater inconsistency costs for backing down from threats than male leaders do against fellow men. These findings point to particular advantages and disadvantages women have in international crises. Namely, female leaders are better able to tie hands—an efficient mechanism for establishing credibility in crises. However, this bargaining advantage means female leaders will also have a harder time backing down from threats. Our findings have critical implications for debates over the effects of greater gender equality in executive offices worldwide.

Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions

2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Chaudoin
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Survey Experiment ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Actual Policy

AbstractA key assumption of audience costs theories of crisis bargaining and international cooperation is that audience members have strong preferences for consistency between their leader's commitments and actual policy choices. However, audiences also have strong preferences over the policy choices themselves, regardless of their consistency with past commitments. I conducted a randomized survey experiment to evaluate the magnitude of consistency and policy effects in the context of international agreements over trade policy. Respondents with expressed policy preferences, whether supporting or opposing free trade, have muted reactions to learning that their leader has broken an agreement. Only respondents with no opinion on trade policy are affected by learning that their leader's policy is inconsistent with prior commitments. This suggests that constituents' underlying preferences limit the degree to which audience costs influence policymakers' calculations.

Deterrence and Crisis Bargaining

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vesna Danilovic ◽  
Joe Clare
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Research Area ◽  
Great Promise ◽  
World War ◽  
Main Attention ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Common Thread ◽  
Data Collections ◽  
Major Data

Several strands of research on deterrence and crisis behavior were developed within different disciplinary, intellectual, and methodological traditions. Although sometimes coexisting as separate subfields, these studies share a common focus on coercive bargaining in international crises. To draw a common thread between two main subfields, strategic studies on deterrence on one hand and general literature on military crises on the other, both similarities and distinctions in their central concepts are delineated. Four general periods (“waves”) are also briefly outlined in the progression of this research area since World War II, each dominated by a distinct paradigmatic tradition. The main attention then turns to arguments about the causal conditions and mechanisms through which deterrence and crisis bargaining succeeds or fails. Since deterrence requires both capable and credible threats to work, divergent explanatory frameworks are discussed for each of these two requirements. Besides theoretical debates, there are also methodological controversies and measurement issues, which are introduced along with the major data collections that have been developed only recently in this area. In conclusion, several research paths are identified and discussed that have great promise for future advancements in the study of conflict and deterrence.

Backing up, not backing down: Mitigating audience costs through policy substitution

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 559-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Lin-Greenberg
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Survey Experiments ◽  
The Future ◽  
Original Survey

Can a leader reduce the audience costs imposed for backing down completely on a threat by opting instead to ‘back up’ to a less hawkish policy? Current research examines the political repercussions of making a threat and then taking no action at all. Real world leaders, however, often ‘back up’ and implement policies that involve some action – for instance, imposing sanctions after threatening military force, rather than backing down entirely. This article argues that audience costs can be mitigated through policy substitution: backing up to less hawkish policies – that reduce inconsistency between a leader’s words and deeds – may reduce audience costs. A series of original survey experiments finds support for the argument and demonstrates that the population treats inconsistency as a continuum. The findings have implications for domestic politics and crisis bargaining. Domestically, a leader who backs up faces lower audience costs and is seen as more competent than one who backs down. Yet those on the receiving end of threats are less likely to believe the future threats of a foreign leader who has previously backed up or backed down. Backing up therefore degrades the credibility of crisis signals by making it difficult for rivals to distinguish between credible threats and those that will be backed up.

Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy

2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Chiozza
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Theory Building ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Coercive Diplomacy ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Non Linear ◽  
Out Of Sample ◽  
Electoral Calendar

This study investigates an observable implication of audience cost theory. Building upon rational expectations theories of voters’ choice and foreign policy substitutability theory, it posits that audience costs vary over the electoral calendar. It then assesses whether US presidents’ major responses in international crises reflect the variability in audience costs in an analysis of 66 international crises between 1937 and 2006. Using out-of-sample tests, this study finds that tying-hand commitment strategies were more frequent closer to presidential elections, as expected from audience cost theory. It also finds that the fluctuation of audience costs over the electoral calendar is non-linear.

The Selection Effects (and Lack Thereof) in Patent Litigation: Evidence from Trials

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan C. Marco
Keyword(s):  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Selection Bias ◽  
Selection Effects ◽  
Patent Litigation ◽  
Selection Mechanism ◽  
Patent Data ◽  
First Time

Abstract Using a selection corrected probit, I estimate the probability that patents will be found valid and infringed at trial. I combine for the first time detailed adjudication data with detailed patent data. I find that the selection effects for validity adjudications and infringement adjudications differ systematically. Additionally, infringement estimates do not appear to suffer from a substantial selection bias. The results highlight the importance of correctly specifying the selection mechanism in policy analysis. In contrast with previous studies, I find that the win rate for patents that go to trial is biased towards 50%. The bias is much more substantial for validity decisions, where I find unconditional win rates of 75% for adjudicated patents and 85% for matched patents. Win rates conditional on adjudication are below 60%.

Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail

2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd S. Sechser ◽  
Matthew Fuhrmann
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Selection Effects ◽  
International Crisis ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
Compellent Threats ◽  
Significant Attention

AbstractDo nuclear weapons offer coercive advantages in international crisis bargaining? Almost seventy years into the nuclear age, we still lack a complete answer to this question. While scholars have devoted significant attention to questions about nuclear deterrence, we know comparatively little about whether nuclear weapons can help compel states to change their behavior. This study argues that, despite their extraordinary power, nuclear weapons are uniquely poor instruments of compellence. Compellent threats are more likely to be effective under two conditions: first, if a challenger can credibly threaten to seize the item in dispute; and second, if enacting the threat would entail few costs to the challenger. Nuclear weapons, however, meet neither of these conditions. They are neither useful tools of conquest nor low-cost tools of punishment. Using a new dataset of more than 200 militarized compellent threats from 1918 to 2001, we find strong support for our theory: compellent threats from nuclear states are no more likely to succeed, even after accounting for possible selection effects in the data. While nuclear weapons may carry coercive weight as instruments of deterrence, it appears that these effects do not extend to compellence.

Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher F. Gelpi ◽  
Michael Griesdorf
Keyword(s):  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
International Conflicts ◽  
International Crises ◽  
International Crisis ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
Political Structures ◽  
The Many ◽  
Spurious Result

We attempt to explain when and why democratic states will prevail in international crises. We review several of the prominent theories about democratic political structures and derive hypotheses from each framework about crisis outcomes. These hypotheses are tested against the population of 422 international crises between 1918 and 1994. Our findings provide further evidence that the democratic peace is not a spurious result of common interests. Moreover, we also begin the difficult task of differentiating among the many theories of the democratic peace. In particular, we find strong evidence that democratic political structures are important because of their ability to generate domestic audience costs. Our findings also support the argument that democratic political structures encourage leaders to select international conflicts that they will win.

Limited Audience Costs in International Crises

2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 1065-1089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmer Tarar ◽  
Bahar Leventoğlu
Keyword(s):  
International Crises ◽  
Audience Costs
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