The Rights of the Individual in Court

1974 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gideon Hausner
Keyword(s):  
Total Population ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Jewish State ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Mother Country ◽  
English Oak ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Individual

Close to one billion people, a third of the total population of the world, live under systems of government broadly defined as liberal-democratic, of which it can be said that authority rests on public opinion and is accountable to it. Out of the said number, only sixty million, i.e., 6%, live in states which have no formal written constitution. Great Britain is a notable example. New Zealand is another. Israel is a third in this exclusive company. In these countries it falls to the Courts, fortified as they are by the traditions of the Common law, to be the mainstay of the liberties of the individual. The English Common law, however, is “just like an English oak. You cannot transplant it to (another) continent and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England. It will flourish indeed but it needs careful tending”. (per Lord Justice Denning).The application of western principles of the rule of law to the reborn Jewish State was more in the nature of a grafting than of a transplantation. It was a combination which offered an interesting legal experiment. While drawing upon ancient legal traditions and heritage, the Israel courts were vitalized through their access to the legal experience of English-speaking countries, especially so since the Common law in its mother country exemplified the adaptations of old principles to new needs long before it was exported abroad.

Mi casa es tu casa? The Limits of Inter-systemic Dispute Resolution

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Camarena ◽  
Bradly J. Condon
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
The Common ◽  
Domestic Law

Abstract The ‘new NAFTA’ agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States maintained the system for binational panel judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations of domestic government agencies. In US–Mexico disputes, this hybrid system brings together Spanish and English-speaking lawyers from the civil and the common law to solve legal disputes applying domestic law. These panels raise issues regarding potential bicultural, bilingual, and bijural (mis)understandings in legal reasoning. Do differences in language, legal traditions, and legal cultures limit the effectiveness of inter-systemic dispute resolution? We analyze all of the decisions of NAFTA panels in US–Mexico disputes regarding Mexican antidumping and countervailing duty determinations and the profiles of the corresponding panelists. This case study tests whether one can actually comprehend the ‘other’. To what extent can a common law, English-speaking lawyer understand and apply Mexican law, expressed in Spanish and rooted in a distinct legal culture?

scholarly journals From Norms to Facts: The Realization of Rights in Common and Civil Private Law

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helge Dedek
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Deep Structure ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Common ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
The Ideal

Every legal system that ties judicial decision making to a body of preconceived norms has to face the tension between the normative formulation of the ideal and its approximation in social reality. In the parlance of the common law, it is, more concretely, the remedy that bridges the gap between the ideal and the real, or, rather, between norms and facts. In the common law world—particularly in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth—a lively discourse has developed around the question of how rights relate to remedies. To the civilian legal scholar—used to thinking within a framework that strictly categorizes terms like substance and procedure, subjective right, action, and execution—the concept of remedy remains a mystery. The lack of “remedy” in the vocabulary of the civil law is more than just a matter of attaching different labels to functional equivalents, it is the expression of a different way of thinking about law. Only if a legal system is capable of satisfactorily transposing the abstract discourse of the law into social reality does the legal machinery fulfill its purpose: due to the pivotal importance of this translational process, the way it is cast in legal concepts thus allows for an insight into the deep structure of a legal culture, and, convergence notwithstanding, the remaining epistemological differences between the legal traditions of the West. A mixed jurisdiction must reflect upon these differences in order to understand its own condition and to define its future course.

9. Mental conditions, intoxication and mistake

2021 ◽  
pp. 292-358
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
External Factor ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Mental Condition ◽  
Individual Actor ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter considers the most commonly occurring ‘mental condition defences’, focusing on the pleas of insanity, intoxication and mistake. The common law historically made a distinction between justification and excuse, at least in relation to homicide. It is said that justification relates to the rightness of the act but to excuse as to the circumstances of the individual actor. The chapter examines the relationship between mental condition defences, insanity and unfitness to be tried, and explains the Law Commission’s most recent recommendations for reforming unfitness and other mental condition defences. It explores the test of insanity, disease of the mind (insanity) versus external factor (sane automatism), insane delusions and insanity, burden of proof, function of the jury, self-induced automatism, intoxication as a denial of criminal responsibility, voluntary and involuntary intoxication, dangerous or non-dangerous drugs in basic intent crime and intoxication induced with the intention of committing crime.

Law

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Kuehn
Keyword(s):  
Middle Ages ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
European Continent ◽  
14Th Century ◽  
Charles I ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
The Common ◽  
Local Courts ◽  
Medieval Universities

The period between the mid-14th and the mid-17th centuries saw the consolidation of both major European legal traditions. One was based on Roman and canon law and held sway as a common law (ius commune) on much of the European Continent. The other was rooted in royal writs and judgments that constituted the “common law” of England. The Romano-canonical law was based on venerable texts, chiefly those of the Corpus iuris civilis, compiled at the behest of the Emperor Justinian in the early 6th century, and the Corpus iuris canonici, assembled in the course of the Middle Ages by legal teachers and popes, with the process of assembly ending in the early 14th century. These texts served as the basis for a highly sophisticated and technical education in law in the medieval universities of Italy and southern France, whose graduates spread throughout Europe. The establishment of new universities from the 14th century—in Italy but also spreading to Germany, Spain, and elsewhere—only served to foster the geographical reach of the Romano-canonical law. This was also the point at which the teaching methods in the universities changed from the logical elaboration of authoritative texts (the so-called school of the glossators) in the direction of contemporary issues and practices (the era of the post-glossators and commentators). The greatest exponent of this trend was Bartolus of Sassoferrato (b. 1313–d. 1357), whose influence was such that it was said that to be a jurist was to be a “bartolist” (nemo iurista nisi bartolista) (see Jurisprudence and Legal Methodologies). The English law consisted of royal writs, Parliamentary statutes, customs, and precedents set in courts. These became in some regards increasingly rigid by the 14th and 15th centuries, but flexibility was introduced by means of the Royal Court of Chancery, which drew to some degree on Roman law notions. This was the so-called law of equity. The influence of royal courts and their remedies led to the waning of manorial and other local courts. The trend toward legal centralization in England was further fueled by the Crown’s break with Catholicism. By the 17th century the common law tradition, including much of the intervening developments in equity, served as the bastion of those who would resist the pretensions of the Stuart monarchs, especially Charles I (b. 1600–d. 1649). Developments in the commercial economy of Europe, intellectual and cultural trends, and religious turmoil would all pose problems in areas such as property law, contracts, marital relations and family prerogatives, and judicial procedures, and would call forth adjustments to resolve them.

Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions

2019 ◽  
pp. 422-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Patrick Glenn
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
First Century ◽  
Static State ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
System A ◽  
Early Twenty ◽  
The World ◽  
Late Twentieth ◽  
The Common ◽  
Legal Normativity

For much of the twentieth century, comparatists have divided the world into ‘legal families’ (such as the civil law, the common law, socialist law, etc.) and assigned each (national) legal system a place in one of them. The chapter argues that this taxonomic enterprise has largely remained at the descriptive state, entailed a misleading division into fixed categories, and that is has failed to produce real comparison between laws. It is also too static, state-centred, and Euro-centric to be workable under conditions of late twentieth and early twenty-first century globalism. It should be replaced by the paradigm of ‘legal traditions’ which not only emphasizes the evolving nature of law, but also avoids dividing the world into clearly separated groupings. Instead, a ‘legal traditions’ approach focuses on the fluidity, interaction, and resulting hybridity of laws, thus facilitating their comparison. As it is not tied to Western-style national legal systems, it can easily capture the laws of the whole world, including the increasingly important non-state forms of legal normativity. Since the chapter was written by the late H. Patrick Glenn over a decade ago, the editors added a postscript bringing the reader up to date on the scholarship on, and the debate about, legal families and traditions.

Kant and the Common Law: Intersubjectivity in Aesthetic and Legal Judgment

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-460
Author(s):  
Douglas E. Edlin
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Aesthetic Judgment ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Aesthetic Theory ◽  
Objective Truth ◽  
Core Concepts ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This article develops some conceptual correlations between Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment and the common law tradition of legal judgment. The article argues that legal judgment, like aesthetic judgment, is best conceived in terms of intersubjective validity rather than objective truth. Understanding the parallel between aesthetic and legal judgment allows us to appreciate better the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the individual and the community, in the formulation and communication of judgments, which combine a personal response and a reasoned determination intended for a discrete audience. The article frames and pursues these themes in relation to four core concepts in Kant’s aesthetic theory: judgment, communication, community, and disinterestedness. Through sustained comparison and application of these concepts in aesthetic judgment and legal judgment, the article provides a conception of judging that more accurately captures the common law role and relationship of the individual judge and the institutional judiciary as integral parts of the broader legal and political community.

International and Comparative Legal Perspectives on Victim Participation in Criminal Justice

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie Manikis
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Process ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
Criminal Justice Systems ◽  
Justice Process ◽  
Criminal Justice Process ◽  
The Common ◽  
Victim Participation ◽  
Historical Developments

Victim participation in common law has evolved across history and jurisdictions. Historical developments within conceptions of crime, harms, and victims in common law as well as the different victims’ movements provide an understanding of the ways that victim participation has been shaped in more-recent common law criminal justice systems. Victim participation in the criminal legal process has also given rise to various debates, which suggests that providing active forms of engagement to victims remains controversial. The forms of victim participation are also diverse, and the literature has provided typologies of victim participation. Forms of participation also vary across jurisdictions and the different stages of the criminal justice process, including prosecutorial decisions, pretrial and trial proceedings, sentencing, parole, and clemency. Finally, research that focuses on victim participation in legal traditions beyond the common law would provide an additional and important contribution to the field.

7. Employment I: employment status, equal pay, and equality

2019 ◽  
pp. 97-113
Author(s):  
James Marson ◽  
Katy Ferris
Keyword(s):  
Employment Status ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Independent Contractor ◽  
Equal Pay ◽  
Employment Contracts ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Employment Contract ◽  
The Common ◽  
Contract Employment ◽  
The Individual

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter reviews the law on the employment contract, employment status, equal pay, and equality. Individuals may be engaged as workers, but their employment status will most commonly be as an employee or independent contractor. Employment status is significant in relation to the rights and obligations each type of contract has for the individual and employer. Given the lack of an adequate statutory definition, the common law has developed tests to identify employment status. Employment contracts contain express and implied terms. Employees and people employed personally to perform work under a contract are protected against various forms of discrimination and enjoy enforceable rights to equality at work.

Liberty and the Common Law

1945 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lord Wright
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Case System ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

In preparing the few and elementary observations which I am about to make to you tonight I have wondered if the title I chose was apt or suitable. The Common Law is generally described as the law of liberty, of freedom and of free peoples. It was a home-made product. In the eighteenth century, foreign lawyers called it an insular and barbarous system; they compared it to their own system of law, developed on the basis of Roman and Civil Law. Many centuries before, and long after Bracton's day, when other civilised European nations ‘received’ the Roman Law, England held back and stood aloof from the Reception. It must have been a near thing. It seems there could have been a Reception here if the Judges had been ecclesiastics, steeped in the Civil Law. But as it turned out they were laymen, and were content as they travelled the country, and in London as well, to adopt what we now know as the Case System, instead of the rules and categories of the Civil Law. Hence the method of threshing out problems by debate in Court, and later on the basis of written pleadings which we find in the Year Books. For present purposes, all I need observe is that the Civil Lawyer had a different idea of the relation of the state or the monarch to the individual from that of the Common Lawyer. To the Civil or Roman Lawyer, the dominant maxim was ‘quod placuit principi legis habet vigorem’; law was the will of the princeps. With this may be compared the rule expressed in Magna Carta in 1215: No freeman, it was there said, was to be taken or imprisoned or exiled or in any way destroyed save by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. Whatever the exact application of that phrase in 1215, it became a text for fixing the relations between the subject and the State. Holdsworth quotes from the Year Book of 1441; the law is the highest English inheritance the King hath, for by the law he and all his subjects are ruled. That was the old medieval doctrine that all things are governed by law, either human or divine. That is the old doctrine of the supremacy of the law, which runs through the whole of English history, and which in the seventeenth century won the day against the un-English doctrine of the divine right of Kings and of their autocratic power over the persons and property of their subjects. The more detailed definition of what all that involved took time to work out. I need scarcely refer to the great cases in the eighteenth century in which the Judges asserted the right of subjects to freedom from arbitrary arrest as against the ministers of state and against the validity of a warrant to seize the papers of a person accused of publishing a seditious libel; in particular Leach v. Money (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1001; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029; Wilkes v. Halifax (1769) 19 St. Tr. 1406. In this connexion may be noted Fox's Libel Act, 1792, which dealt with procedure, but fixed a substantive right to a trial by jury of the main issue in the cases it referred to.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document