Interpretation in Criminal Law

1986 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 358-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mordechai Kremnitzer

In recent years a new trend has appeared in decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of criminal prohibitions. According to this trend – which will be analysed in the course of this article – a penal statute must be interpreted in the same way as every other statute, there being no rule of restrictive interpretation particular to criminal law. The interpreter must choose that interpretative option which best realizes the objective of the legislation, even when that option is based on the irregular and secondary meaning of the words. The legislative objective is often identified by the Court as the broadest possible defence of the social interest protected by the norm. It is this trend that we wish to discuss, or rather, to criticize.

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 66-79
Author(s):  
S. L. Morozov ◽  

The advent of the electronic currency and the effecting of electronic payments has caused new forms of thefts and types of acquisitive crimes. The judicial investigative practice of criminal cases of embezzlement committed using bank cards and other types of electronic payments has encountered problems with the qualification of such acts. The author identifies the most common enforcement problemsand their causesby a retrospective study of judicial practice, the changing norms of the criminal law. At the same time, a ten-year period of work of the judicial investigating authorities was studied. On the basis of traditional general scientific methods of cognition, as a result of a system-legal analysis of the considered set of specific situations, the author gives an author's view of the complex of causes that cause a lack of uniformity in judicial investigative practice. Using the hermeneutic approach, the author paid special attention to the application by the courts of the interpretation of the criminal law by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in different years. In conclusion, ways of resolving contentious issues of qualification of thefts and fraud in the field of electronic means of payment are proposed. It has been ascertained that high-quality and uniform law enforcement can provide additional clarification on the delimitation of related and competing theft from the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. It is concluded that in general, the current concept of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation does not contain contradictions with the novels of the criminal law, but can be improved. The rationale and edition of possible additions to the relevant decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation are given.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McGaughey

Abstract What explains the election of the 45th President of the United States? Many commentators have said that Trump is a fascist. This builds on grave concerns, since Citizens United, that democracy is being corrupted. This article suggests the long term cause, and the shape of ideology is more complex. In 1971, an extraordinary memorandum of Lewis Powell for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged that ‘[b]usiness interests’ should ‘press vigorously in all political arenas for support’. Richard Nixon appointed Powell to the Supreme Court, and a few years later, despite powerful dissent, a majority in Buckley v. Valeo held that candidates may spend unlimited funds on their own political campaigns, a decision of which Donald Trump, and others, have taken full advantage. Citizens United compounded the problems, but Buckley v. Valeo was the ‘Trump for President’ case. This provided a platform from which Trump could propel himself into extensive media coverage. The 2016 election was inseparable from the social ideal pursued by a majority of the Supreme Court since 1976. No modern judiciary had engaged in a more sustained assault on democracy and human rights. Properly understood, ‘fascism’ is a contrasting, hybrid political ideology. It mixes liberalism’s dislike of state intervention, social conservatism’s embrace of welfare provision for insiders (not ‘outsiders’), and collectivism’s view that associations are key actors in a class conflict. Although out of control, Trump is closely linked to neo-conservative politics. It is too hostile to insider welfare to be called ‘fascist’. Its political ideology is weaker. If we had to give it a name, the social ideal of Donald Trump is ‘fascism-lite’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-118
Author(s):  
Simeneh Kiros Assefa

The criminal law is adopted as a means of achieving the common good; it is interpreted and applied by the court. The judge chooses the type of legal theory and method to employ in the interpretation and application of the criminal law. Such theories may be acquired from higher norms or from the decision of the Supreme Court. Because such choice of theory and method determines the outcome of the case, the judge is also expected to be guided by the doctrines in criminal law inspired by the values of rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, enshrined in the Constitution. This article examines how courts harmonise the application of the positive criminal law with the non-positivist theories of higher norms. After reviewing various criminal rules and their judicial application, it finds that the court applies the criminal law as it is written in disregard of the non-positivist theories of higher norms, at times in contradiction to the basic doctrines of the criminal law itself.


2021 ◽  
pp. 240-243
Author(s):  
Michael J. Rosenfeld

Chapter 18 describes social science research of the 1940s and 1950s that showed how segregation harmed both minority and majority populations and thereby played a role in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision of 1954. Between 1896, when the Supreme Court endorsed segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson to 1954, when the Supreme Court rejected segregation, social science had built a consensus about the many harms and costs that racial segregation imposed on Black and on White children. Like school desegregation, marriage equality’s victories in the courts were built on a social science consensus, specifically the social science consensus that children raised by same-sex couples have good outcomes.


Author(s):  
Yseult Marique

Analysing the administrative case law of the Belgian Supreme Court between 1890 and 1910, this chapter shows that the Supreme Court applied the main features of a positivist legal thought (based on the assumption of clarity, coherence, and completeness of the formal law) to administrative action and its legality. It equipped the central and local institutions of the State with functioning powers, allowing an operational state to develop despite social unrest. As the social and technological context changed at the end of the nineteenth century, the statute book became more confused, however. This gave the Supreme Court ample room to interpret the law creatively and pragmatically. The ‘administrative miracle’ in Belgium is that the Supreme Court did not shackle social forces and unbridle the administration so much that the very course it wanted to avert actually happened. This may be down to the creative judicial genius that the Belgian judiciary developed a formal approach whilst deciding pragmatically on the substance of cases.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter examines the law governing theft. It considers the extent to which the criminal law of theft conflicts with civil law concepts of property; whether it is possible to steal property that belongs to oneself; the types of property that may be stolen; and the extent to which it is possible to provide a definition of ‘dishonesty’. The test for dishonesty has been fundamentally altered by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, developments which are analysed in this chapter.


Author(s):  
Dickson Brice

This chapter begins by considering the arms trial in the early 1970s and outlines the gist of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973 before considering the challenge to that Agreement dealt with by the Supreme Court in the Boland case. There follows an examination of the Court’s views on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland in McGimpsey v Ireland, decided in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and on the constitutionality of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in the Riordan case. There is an analysis of Law Enforcement Commission’s report and of the Court’s views on resulting Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill 1975. The focus next moves to the shifting views of the Supreme Court on when it is appropriate to extradite suspected terrorists to Northern Ireland. Cases concerning Dominic McGlinchey, Séamus Shannon, Robert Russell, Dermot Finucane and Owen Carron are examined, as is the state of extradition law today.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document