Education, Propaganda, and the People: Democratic paternalism in 1930s Siam

2015 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1122-1142 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARJUN SUBRAHMANYAN

AbstractOn the morning of 24 June 1932 the ‘People's Party’, a small group of civil and military bureaucrats, toppled the Thai absolute monarchy and introduced constitutional democracy. This article discusses the establishment of democracy as an endeavour in ‘democratic paternalism,’ by which is meant the Party's attempt to establish a new moral and intellectual leadership that had as its main goal the creation of a depoliticized democratic citizenry. To implement their programme for democracy, the Party embarked on an ambitious plan to modernize education and explain popular sovereignty through countrywide lectures and radio programmes. The democratic paternalist effort had mixed results. State weakness limited the reach of the educational and propaganda campaigns, and further the ‘people’ in whose name the revolution was staged, constituted two different groups: a largely illiterate peasantry and a small, incipient new intelligentsia. Because of its limited capacity, the People's Party tasked the second group with assisting in democratic mentorship of the masses, but many in this second category of people had a broader conception of democracy than the Party's ‘top-down’ model and criticized the Party for its paternalist constraints on popular sovereignty. Democratic paternalism and frustration with the limits imposed on popular democracy are two central aspects of this period of history that have endured in Thai society.

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Urbinati

Populism is the name of a global phenomenon whose definitional precariousness is proverbial. It resists generalizations and makes scholars of politics comparativist by necessity, as its language and content are imbued with the political culture of the society in which it arises. A rich body of socio-historical analyses allows us to situate populism within the global phenomenon called democracy, as its ideological core is nourished by the two main entities—the nation and the people—that have fleshed out popular sovereignty in the age of democratization. Populism consists in a transmutation of the democratic principles of the majority and the people in a way that is meant to celebrate one subset of the people as opposed to another, through a leader embodying it and an audience legitimizing it. This may make populism collide with constitutional democracy, even if its main tenets are embedded in the democratic universe of meanings and language. In this article, I illustrate the context-based character of populism and how its cyclical appearances reflect the forms of representative government. I review the main contemporary interpretations of the concept and argue that some basic agreement now exists on populism's rhetorical character and its strategy for achieving power in democratic societies. Finally, I sketch the main characteristics of populism in power and explain how it tends to transform the fundamentals of democracy: the people and the majority, elections, and representation.


Alegal ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 65-87
Author(s):  
Annmaria M. Shimabuku

This chapter charts the position of the sex industry amidst mass social protest known as the “all-island struggle” from 1952 to 1958. The U.S. military attempted to contain this resistance by issuing off-limits orders on base towns that paralyzed the Okinawan economy. As a result, base town workers were pitted against popular political protest. This chapter addresses the sex worker as a subject who could not be mobilized under a political platform before the state, i.e., the lumpenproletariat. Instead of dismissing the lumpenproletariat as non-political and therefore not useful, it repositions politics as the interplay between a radical heterogeneity (i.e., alegality) attuned to the immediate struggle for life and political representation oriented toward an idealistic goal by examining the activities of Kokuba Kōtarō in the underground communist party. It was under the cover of darkness that this chapter locates moments of solidarity between women involved with G.I.s and Okinawans resisting U.S. military repression. This solidarity, however, dissolved along with the introduction of ethno-nationalism of pro-reversion political forces such as the Okinawa People’s Party. Kokuba’s understanding of politics as the merely instrumental representation of the masses was replaced by the assumption of a spiritualistic communion between the people and Japanese state.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 681
Author(s):  
Sanidjar Pebrihariati R

<p>People’s Consultative Assemly (hereinafter reffered to <em>MPR</em>) membership consisting of members of the House of Representative (hereinafter reffered to <em>DPR</em><em>)</em> and Regional Representative Council (hereinafter reffered to <em>DPD</em><em>)</em> members indicates that the <em>MPR</em> is still viewed as a representative body of the people because of its membership elected in the general election. The change of position of the People's Consultative Assembly (<em>MPR</em>), then the understanding of the form of popular sovereignty is reflected in three branches of power, namely the representative institution, the President, and the holder of the judicial power. Problem formulation discussed are: 1) How is the position of the People's Consultative Assembly as the implementer of people's sovereignty in Indonesia before the amendment of the 1945 Constitution? 2) How the position of MPR members coming from the <em>DPD</em> after the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The research method used in this research is Normative Law research method, which uses secondary data. The discussion in this research: 1) the MPR as the executor of the sovereignty of the People in Indonesia, prior to the 1945 amendment, we see in the provisions On Article 1 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that: "Sovereignty is in the hands of the people, and carried out according to the law basic". In the above article it contains three meanings, namely: a). The sovereignty of the people is implemented by all state institutions established in the Constitution, b). The sovereignty of the people must be subject to the constitution, c) constitutional supremacy. People's sovereignty is limited by the rules of the Constitution and constitutional democracy. 2) Position of MPR members originating from DPD after the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. After the fourth amendment of the 1945 Constitution, (hereinafter referred to as the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia), there is a fairly fundamental change in both the state administration system and the state institutions in Indonesia .</p>


2021 ◽  
pp. e20210048
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

In recent times, the idea of popular sovereignty has figured prominently in the rhetoric of neo-populist thinkers and activists who argue that legal and political authority must be concentrated in one single body or individual elected by the people to act in its name. The thesis of this article is that, while the notion of popular sovereignty may seem to offer some support to the neo-populist image of democracy, it serves more persuasively to support the idea of a polycentric, constitutional democracy. The constitutional state can be polycentric and yet feature a sovereign. And if this constitutional state is democratic in the sense of distributing power relatively equally amongst individual citizens, thus empowering the people-several, then it will establish the people-corporate in the role of sovereign..


2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 435-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT WHITNEY

This article examines how Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar emerged as the ‘strong man’ of Cuba. Historians have pointed out that from 1934 to 1940 Batista's primary support came from the army and the police. We also know that, like many other Latin American leaders at the time, Batista went through a ‘populist phase’. Populists acknowledged the reality that ‘the masses’ were a new force in society and that ‘the people’ were at the centre of the nation and the state. Populist discourse functioned to construct a ‘people’ out of fragmented and scattered populations. Batista was very aware that in order to rule Cuba he had to appeal to ‘the people’ and to the revolutionary sentiments of 1933. But we need more information about exactly what Batista's political ideas were and how he put them into practice. This article shows how Batista became, in his own words, the ‘architect’ of the post-revolutionary state between 1937 and 1940. Batista supervised Cuba's transition from a military dictatorship in 1934 to a nominal constitutional democracy in 1940. The aim is to shed some light on how this remarkable transition took place.


Author(s):  
Ming-Sung Kuo

Abstract The recent upsurge of populism has prompted a wave of theoretical reflections on constitutional democracy. Echoing Max Weber’s sociology of legitimate authority, Bruce Ackerman’s Revolutionary Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law stands out from the crowd by providing an ambitious trichotomy of constitutional legitimacy—revolutionary, establishmentarian and elitist—with a focus on the revolutionary pathway. Engaging with Ackerman’s theoretical modelling of the relationship between constitutionalism and legitimate authority, I argue that the resurgence of popular sovereignty, as embodied in We the People in populist rhetoric indicates the centrality of authenticity in constitutional democracy as constitutional authenticity is underpinned by the ethics of being true to the people’s originality. Yet, with the ethics of authenticity assuming its pathological form, the focus has been shifting from making sense of the constitution to the people’s self-identification with individual politicians. The latest wave of populism crystallises the anti-ethics of authenticity in our quest for lasting constitutional legitimacy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 236-242
Author(s):  
Barnokhon Kushakova ◽  

This article discusses the conditions, reasons and factors of characterization of religious style as a functional style in the field of linguistics. In addition, religious style and its main peculiarities, its importance in the social life, and the functional features of religious style are highlighted in the article. As a result of our investigation, the following results were obtained: a) the increase in the need for the creation and significance of religious language, particularly religious texts has been scientifically proved; b) the possibility of religious texts to represent the thoughts of the people, culture and world outlook has been verified; c) the specificity of religious language, religious texts has been revealed; d) the development of religious style as a functional style has been grounded.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Klein

This is a pdf of the original typed manuscript of a lecture made in 2006. An annotated English translation will be published by the International Review of Social Psychology. I this text, Moscovici seeks to update his earlier work on the “conspiracy mentality” (1987) by considering the relationships between social representations and conspiracy mentality. Innovation in this field, Moscovici argues, will require a much thorough description and understanding of what conspiracy theories are, what rhetoric they use and what functions they fulfill. Specifically, Moscovici considers conspiracies as a form of counterfactual history implying a more desirable world (in which the conspiracy did not take place) and suggests that social representation theory should tackle this phenomenon. He explicitly links conspiracy theories to works of fiction and suggests that common principles might explain their popularity. Historically, he argues, conspiracism was born twice: First, in the middle ages, when their primary function was to exclude and destroy what was considered as heresy; and second, after the French revolution, to delegitimize the Enlightenment, which was attributed to a small coterie of reactionaries rather than to the will of the people. Moscovici then considers four aspects (“thematas”) of conspiracy mentality: 1/ the prohibition of knowledge; 2/ the duality between the majority (the masses, prohibited to know) and “enlightened” minorities; 3/ the search for a common origin, a “ur phenomenon” that connects historical events and provides a continuity to History (he notes that such a tendency is also present in social psychological theorizing); and 4/ the valorization of tradition as a bulwark against modernity. Some of Moscovici’s insights in this talk have since been borne out by contemporary research on the psychology of conspiracy theories, but many others still remain fascinating potential avenues for future research.


2009 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrek Jääts
Keyword(s):  

This article analyses the conceptual path to the creation of national territorial autonomies of the Komi (Zyrians) and Komi-Permiaks in the 1920s. It focuses on the history of the idea of Komi autonomy and on the formation of the borders of the Komi Autonomous Oblast. The creation of the Komi autonomy was, first of all, the project of the small group of nationalist Komi communists. They tried to unite all the Komi politically, and were successful as far as their aims were in accordance with contemporary Soviet nationalities policy. However, they were not able to include Permiak areas, mainly because of the opposition of neighbouring Russian provincial elites.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document