Respect for the Moral Law: the Emotional Side of Reason

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janelle DeWitt

AbstractRespect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one in which emotions take the form of evaluative judgments that determine the will. I then show that, as a purely rational emotion, respect is perfectly suited to be a moral motive.

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Denis

The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804) exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent history of philosophy and continues to be a dominant approach to ethics, rivaling consequentialism and virtue ethics. Kant’s ethical thought continues to be studied in itself, as a part of his critical system of philosophy, in its historical context, and in relation to particular practical questions. Kant’s writings and lectures display the influence of the Stoics, Rousseau, Crusius, Wolff, Hutcheson, Hume, and others; Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bradley, Greene, Habermas, and Rawls are among the many philosophers whose moral philosophies can be read (in part) as responses to Kant. Salient foundational features of Kant’s ethics include: its a priori method, its conception of the will as autonomous, its categorical imperative, its theory of freedom, and its account of moral motivation. Kant maintained that foundational moral principles must be a priori, not based on observation or experience. Kant takes the moral law to be legislated by the will to itself. Unlike holy beings, human beings experience morality as a constraint upon our wills. For us, the moral law is a categorical imperative. All ethical duties are ultimately grounded in this supreme moral principle. If we are bound to obey the moral law, we must be capable of doing so; Kant holds that, even assuming causal determinism in the phenomenal world, morality reveals our (noumenal) freedom to us. Kant attributes moral worth only to action done from duty (i.e., from respect for the law), not from inclination. Significant aspects of Kant’s fully developed ethical theory include its rich theory of virtue and the virtues, its taxonomy of duties (which include duties to oneself as well as to others), its distinctive conceptions of the highest good and human evil, and its connections with Kant’s philosophies of history, religion, and human nature. Many of Kant’s own discussions of particular duties, virtues, and vices are controversial. For example, Kant appears to condemn all lies as violations of a duty to oneself. This entry focuses on Kant’s ethics rather than Kantian ethics more broadly. Despite that, it includes a number of pieces that apply, extend, or revise Kant’s ethics in some ways, as well as interpretations of Kant’s ethics that some commentators may object stray too far from Kant’s own stated views. Kant’s political philosophy is discussed only peripherally here, save for the section on the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals.


1978 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 239-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Pecheur

The fundamental proposition to which this article is addressed is that the process, posited by cognitive theorists, to underlie change and growth is identical to the scriptural process of sanctification. The essential tenets of cognitive theory are presented after a brief introduction. The veracity of these principles is then substantiated by an examination of relevant empirical research studies. Next, the methodology of cognitive therapy a la Meichenbaum is set forth. This particular conceptualization of the therapeutic process is subsequently described as forming a model of the sanctification process in which the processes in these two spheres (the psychological and theological) are seen as the same, but the contents are seen as different. The role of the will is evaluated in the context of the change process followed, finally, by a Christian rationale of cognitive therapy.


Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum

The problem of disagreement is a well-known tool in the arsenal of various anti-realist and skeptical views. Persistent disagreement is supposed to be evidence that our moral judgments do not track a realm of objective values. This chapter is concerned with a different form of skepticism that one might try to ground on the fact of value disagreement: namely, “commitment skepticism.” According to the commitment skeptic, the fact of value disagreement should, at least under certain circumstances, lower our confidence in our evaluative judgments. But such lowering of confidence, if taken seriously, leaves us with no way to move from our judgments to actions. According to this skeptic, we have justification neither for our usual moral commitments, nor for any particular course of action based on these evaluative judgments. This chapter argues that Kant’s view about our awareness of the moral law provides an important way of resisting commitment skepticism.


Conceptus ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (93) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmar Fenner

SummaryThis article pursues the question of the significance of moral emotions by exhibiting the similarities and differences of ethical approaches as diverse as Kant’s and Hume’s. What will be shown through this contrast are aspects often overlooked in these approaches. So, one must agree that on the one hand Kant’s idea of the force of moral law as being (necessarily) intertwined with the feeling of respect for others suffers from a lacking support by experience, whereas his ideas about the formation and cultivation of a ” moral sense“ undoubtedly have such a support. Hume’s theory on the other hand appeals to emotions in order to make explainable our having moral evaluations but falls short when it comes to account for the content of emotions said to be responsible for evaluative judgments. Both accounts therefore can be said to suffer from an unsatisfying explanation of the motivational aspect of moral norms that is due to an unsatisfying conceptualization of the difference between reason and emotions.


Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

This chapter addresses the following topics pertaining to Section II of the general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals: 1. Kant’s conception of the faculty of desire and its relation to the faculties of feeling and cognition; 2. The significance of Kant’s distinction between will and choice in relation to human freedom of the will; 3. The distinction between maxims and imperatives as two fundamental types of practical principle; and 4. Kant’s conception of both nonmoral and moral motivation—the latter fundamental for understanding Kant’s theory of virtue. The chapter establishes Kant’s background ideas on these ideas and faculties and also addresses aspects of his theory of action.


Author(s):  
O. V. Ohirko

Christian views on the education of man are considered. Christian pedagogy is the science of the formation of the spiritual and bodily life of man on the basis of absolute values, which is filled with Christian culture. It is based on universal moral law of humankind that is Ten Commandments of God and Two Fundamental Commandments of Christian Love and on Seven Corporal and Spiritual Works of Mercy, Evangelical Counsels and Beatitudes. Christian pedagogy helps a person to realize his dignity and value as a person created on the image and likeness of God. A special feature of Christian pedagogy is the close connection between spiritual and moral education. By means of Christian pedagogy moral and theological virtues are formed. The most important virtue in upbringing is love, as a struggle for the good of your neighbors, regardless of yourself. Love to God and to others is the basic law of Christian pedagogy. In the Christian upbringing of youth, the most important tasks are the formation of: the mind in which faith will reign; the will in which love will dominate; feelings in which hope will work. Principles of Christian pedagogy are nonviolence, timeliness, unity of pedagogical influences, the principle of personality, anthropological principle (respect for human dignity). Christian education is an alternative to a society that surrounds our youth. It creates a sensible conscience, calls for the avoidance of sins, and to live according to the commandments of God.


1936 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-170
Author(s):  
James Bissett Pratt

The subject for our annual conference this year — Ethics and Theology — forces us to face one of the most difficult problems of religious thought, — the relation between God and morality. To this problem several solutions — all quite familiar — have been proposed and it will not be the purpose of my paper to suggest a new one of my own. In fact, as the sequel will show, I am very uncertain whether any completely satisfactory solution to the problem be possible. My aim is the much less ambitious one of placing the matter, with some of its difficulties, before the Society for discussion, in the hope that your collective wisdom may be able to throw more light upon this dark theme than the Society's benighted president for this year — who is no theologian — is able to contribute.One of the simplest and most popular modes of conceiving the relation between God and the laws of morality is to equate righteousness with obedience to the divine will. God is good, we are told, and our goodness is to be defined as conformity to the will of God. One relatively superficial and pragmatic difficulty in accepting this view consists in the obvious fact that it is by no means easy to know with certainty what the will of God may be. Different philosophers, different prophets, different religions give us different and sometimes quite contradictory answers to this question.


Author(s):  
Horst Seidl

The controversies in our time between teleological and deontological ethics which come down to the problem "from being to ought," referring to human being or nature, can be resolved only by an adequate conception of human nature. Taking up the ancient tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Stoa) again, we can re-examine the teleological conception of human nature as primarily instinctive and selfish, and say that human nature is constituted also by reason and that the instinctive nature is predisposed to be guided by reason or intellect. The constitutive order of the human soul, with the subordination of the instinct under the intellect, involves already some natural goodness, of which the intellect is aware (in the natural moral conscience) and for which the will strives (in a natural inclination). This is the basis for the "moral law" and for normative ethics. Thus, human nature is not selfish in itself. Although moral goodness as humankind’s perfection is an ideal, it has in us already imperfect natural beginnings, a "natural morality." In a certain sense, the moral ought of actions comes from one’s being, from the natural moral goodness of which the intellect is aware in itself, and from its good intentions.


Dialogue ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marceline Morais

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to discuss the transcendental status of Kant's moral philosophy. Despite what is usually thought among scholars, we intend to demonstrate that morality for Kant is not part of transcendental philosophy. We shall at first recall the reasons that have driven Kant to separate morality from the transcendental philosophy. Kant's position seems both firm and clear: morality, although involving a priori concepts such as the moral law, is not a transcendantal knowledge because its major concept, the will, is not pure enough; it refers somehow to experience. On the other hand, after considering the positions of renowned scholars such as Gueroult, Delbos, and Höffe, who claim that Kant's morality became partially or totally transcendantal since the writing of the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, we suggest that Kant had then found the right way to establish on a critical basis a future metaphysics of morals.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document