Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority: Court-Ordered Surgery to Protect the Life of an Unborn Child

1983 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Eric P. Finamore

AbstractIn Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a lower court order requiring a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarian section and other medical procedures necessary to save her unborn child’s life. The court found that the state’s interest in protecting the viable fetus outweighed the pregnant mother’s right to religious practice, right to refuse medical treatment, and parental autonomy. Jefferson appears to stand for the proposition that fetuses have rights that attach at viability and that mothers have a corresponding duty to ensure live births. The decision foreshadows substantial conflict between fetal and maternal rights.

2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damen Ward

In early colonial politics, decisions about lower court jurisdiction often reflected competing ideas about the relationship between different parts and functions of government. In particular, court structure and jurisdiction could be seen as having important implications for the role and power of the governor. Appreciating the importance of jurisdiction as a way of defining, and arguing about, the distribution and exercise of political and legal authority in the colonial constitution allows connections to be drawn between different elements of settler politics in the 1840s and 1850s. The closing of the Court of Requests by Governor Grey in 1848, and the decisions of the Supreme Court judges in subsequent litigation, provide examples of this. Debate over the role of the governor in emerging systems of representative and responsible government after 1852 contributed to lower court jurisdiction remaining politically significant, particularly in relation to Māori.  This is shown by considering parliamentary debates about the Stafford ministry's 1858 proposals for resident magistrates' jurisdiction over "native districts". The politics of jurisdiction were part of wider contests about the establishment and consolidation of particular political and institutional relationships within the colonial constitution. This multi-faceted construction of government authority suggests a need to reconsider elements of Pākehā colonial politics and law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-745 ◽  

On June 26, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld President Trump's most recent iteration of restrictions on entry to the United States by nationals from certain foreign countries. Following several rewrites of this travel ban, ensuing legal challenges, and lower court injunctions, the Court, in a five-to-four decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, reversed the latest ruling of a lower court that had granted a partial preliminary injunction against the ban. Although acknowledging that there was considerable evidence tying the travel ban to bias against Muslims, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs were nonetheless unlikely to succeed either in their statutory claim that Trump lacked the authority to impose this ban or in their constitutional claim that the ban violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court accordingly reversed the lower court's injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The ruling, based on the Trump administration's asserted national security interest, leaves in place travel restrictions imposed on nationals of seven countries—Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—only two of which are not Muslim-majority countries.


Author(s):  
Dushyant Kishan Kaul

Abstract This article explores how the Supreme Court of India, in applying the judicial doctrine of ‘essential practices’, has embarked on a dangerous exercise of determining whether a particular religious practice is significant enough to warrant constitutional protection under Article 25(1) or not. In tracing a string of judgments, it shows how courts have been guilty of making ill-founded observations about the validity of religious practices, thereby detrimentally affecting religious groups and minorities. Due to this constitutional transgression, the question of ‘what is essentially religious’ turned into the question of ‘what is essential in religion’. The court has neither the right nor the expertise to decide if the religious practice indeed is ‘essential’. State intervention is warranted only based on constitutionally stipulated restrictions of ‘public order’, ‘morality’ and ‘health’. The cardinal rule ought to be of limited state intervention but maximum protection.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 563-590
Author(s):  
Sanjay Jain ◽  
Saranya Mishra

Abstract The Supreme Court of India (SC) pronounced a momentous judgment in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan in 1997, categorically recognizing the menace of sexual harassment (SH) at workplace and constitutionally rendering it as being in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India 1950. The Court also provided a mechanism for redressal against SH, which was ultimately reinforced by Parliament with the enactment of Sexual Harassment at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013 (POSH Act). However, when it comes to allegations of SH against judges in the SC and High Courts by its employees, interns, or lower court judges, the response of the SC has been abysmal to say the least. There is a systematic pattern to suggest foul play and conspiracy in each such allegation, and judges, including even the Chief Justice of India (CJI), have not hesitated to openly indulge in victim-shaming and-blaming. In other words, the court has not been able to uphold its own jurisprudence on sexual harassment, which it expects to be scrupulously adhered to by other organs of the state. It is submitted that in not supporting the cause of victims alleging SH against judges, the other organs of the state are also party to this constitutional decay and serious infraction of fundamental rights. It leads us to ask the question, how can we guard against the guardians?


2020 ◽  
pp. 174387212095030
Author(s):  
Howard Schweber ◽  
Eric Segall

Students and faculty at public colleges and universities frequently find themselves in conflict with administrators over questions of free speech. Unfortunately, the courts have provided precious little guidance. Lower courts are struggling with a diverse set of issues: the appropriate rules for student protests; which campus spaces constitute open forums for speech and which can be closed off or regulated; how much control administrators can wield over student-invited speakers; and whether or when student online speech can be punished, among many other problems. The Supreme Court has provided virtually no helpful guidance to lower court judges or public college administrators as to how or when the First Amendment limits their discretion. This article provides a helpful forum-based approach to the analysis of many of these questions and proposes specific solutions in the hope of bringing more predictability and stability to this confusing area of constitutional law.


1985 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-98
Author(s):  
Alon Rosenthal

Because of the diminutive size and relatively intense urbanization of the country, noise has always constituted one of the more serious environmental problems with which the Israeli legislature and courts must contend. Indeed, in a recent survey conducted by the Israeli Environmental Protection Service, (E.P.S.) 52.5% of Israelis questioned indicated that the major deficiency of their environment was the prevalence of noise, as opposed to only 3.7% who complained of unpleasant air or odours. Regulations have been enacted specifying the manner in which noise is to be measured and providing standards for the existence of nuisances. Recently, the court has been faced on several occasions with the question of whether violation of such regulations is necessary for an action seeking to establish a given noise as a nuisance. Although no definitive rule has been established, the Supreme Court, in confirming a lower court decision in Israel Electric Co. Ltd. v. Farsht, began what we hope will be a continuing process in determining a clear and optimal judicial policy regarding the measuring of noise and the use of these calculations in nuisance cases.


1975 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-4

It has been twenty years since the Supreme Court concluded in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka that separate educational systems for different races were inherently unequal and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The early result of this decision was the gradual elimination of overtly dual school systems in the South. More recently, the principle of educational equality has been interpreted to forbid any school segregation by race unless it can be shown to a court's satisfaction that such segregation has no discriminatory purpose. This has led to the movement to desegregate schools even in the face of segregated residential patterns. The most recent episode in the desegregation movement was initiated in 1974 with a federal court order to desegregate the Boston Public School System. The controversy and conflict following this decision have convulsed our community. Through this editorial statement we hope to encourage serious examination of some of the issues surrounding this controversy.


Author(s):  
Claire van Overdijk ◽  
Terence Seah

Singapore is a common law country. Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court (High Court and Court of Appeal) and the State Courts (District Courts and Magistrates’ Courts). Pursuant to the Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Mental Capacity Proceedings to District Court) Order 2010, proceedings under the Mental Capacity Act (cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) (‘MCA’) are now first heard by the District Court.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Dana Lloyd

Abstract In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), the Supreme Court declared constitutional the Forest Service's development plan in an area of the Six Rivers National Forest (known as the High Country) that is central to the religious practice of the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa Nations. The Court admitted that “[i]t is undisputed that the Indian respondents’ beliefs are sincere and that the Government's proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion” (447). Nevertheless, because the disputed area was on public land, the Court thought that the government should be allowed to manage its property in any way it saw fit, regardless of the severe adverse effects on the religious practice of the local Indigenous nations. In this article, I read materials from the trial that led to the Lyng decision, focusing on the Indigenous witnesses and their testimony that has been largely ignored in the Lyng decision. The U.S. legal framework of free exercise does not allow the courts to fully consider the stories told by the Indigenous witnesses in trial. A law-and-literature approach allows me, though, to tell a different story about the High Country, one that centers Indigenous knowledge and sovereignty.


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