scholarly journals Uncovering interest group participation in Germany: web collection of written statements in ministries and the parliament

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Rasch ◽  
Florian Spohr ◽  
Rainer Eising ◽  
Simon Ress

Abstract This article discusses web collection of interest group statements on bills as a data source. Written statements allow the identification of actors active in policy-making as well as those actors’ positions, lobbying coalitions and issue saliency. These data also can contribute to the measurement of interest groups’ influence on legislation. Taking web collection from the German parliament’s and ministries’ web pages as an example, we demonstrate the collection process and the merits and limitations of employing written statements as identificatory data. Our analysis of statements submitted by interest groups, private firms and policy experts to four federal ministries and the respective parliamentary committees in the years 2015 and 2016 reveals differences between parliamentary and ministerial consultations. Although ministries have invited written statements for fewer draft laws than parliamentary committees, they received far more statements from interest groups. The reason is that German ministries often issue open calls, in which all actors are given the opportunity to comment on legislation, whereas the German parliament invites selected interest group representatives and other experts. As a further result, ministries are mostly contacted by business groups, whereas parliamentary committees use their gatekeeper function to balance interests.

Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter focuses on the so-called organized interests, whose interaction with the formal European Union (EU) institutions is a central component of the EU’s decision-making process. The term ‘interest group’ refers to a range of organizations outside of the formal institutions that seek to influence decision making. They provide a link between state actors and the rest of society, also known as ‘civil society’. The chapter first considers the general growth of interest group activity at the European level before discussing the types of group that try to influence EU policy making and the forms of representation open to interests. It then explores the strategies and tactics that interest groups use to try to influence the different institutions. Finally, it analyses the issue of regulating interest group access to the EU institutions.


2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. de Figueiredo ◽  
Rui J.P. de Figueiredo

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions—legislative, administrative, and legal—is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.


1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Maloney ◽  
Grant Jordan ◽  
Andrew M. McLaughlin

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the place of groups in the consultative process in British policymaking. It stresses the importance of consultation even under the Thatcher government and distinguishes between consultation, bargaining and negotiation. The paper identifies the important divide between the relatively few groups with privileged status and the greater number of groups who find themselves consigned to less influential positions. The discussion revisits the insider/outsider typology often used to differentiate interest group strategies and status in policy development. It suggests that the insider group term is associated with a particular style of policy making, and offers amendments to the existing use of the terms to avoid the difficulties which occur from the conflation of group strategy and group status.


2001 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang-Soo Choe

Several theories have been introduced to explain American politics along the historical development of American society. It has been told that any one theory tends to prevail in explaining American politics at any given period. Is it possible then to describe the structure of American politics by any one theory? Which theory or theoretical perspective is valid to understand the U.S. policy making system in 1980s? The purpose of this paper is to show that American politics in any given period cannot be explained by any one prevalent theoretical framework. Despite the arguments between interest group stasis and “countervailing forces,” (McFarland 1992) some policy area can still be explained only by the traditional group theory framework. The Imigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 is a case in point. In the following, theoretical frameworks concerning policy formation will be presented first. Second, the process of IRCA formation will be briefly reviewed with special reference to the role of interest groups. Finally, by summarizing the gain and loss of each interest group, the characteristics of IRCA formation will be suggested.


1994 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine DeGregorio ◽  
Jack E. Rossotti

With evidence from fifty-nine organizations that worked to support or oppose the confirmation of Judge Robert H. Bork to the Supreme Court, we investigate how interest groups utilize their resources to influence politics. We assess the frequency with which advocacy groups adopt (1) an "inside the beltway" strategy, which involves their own members making direct appeals to officeholders; (2) an "outside the beltway" strategy, which involves enlisting the support of an unpredictable public through media campaigns; or (3) some combination of the two. We further develop and test a predictive model of the choice, allowing us to see the impact that the groups’ resource and attitudes have on adopting one strategy or another. Among other things the findings help clarify the important role played by the mass public in Washington politics.


Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker

This chapter focuses on the so-called organized interests, whose interaction with the formal European Union institutions is a central component of the EU’s decision-making process. The term ‘interest group’ refers to a range of organizations outside of the formal institutions that seek to influence decision making. They provide a link between state actors and the rest of society, also known as ‘civil society’. The chapter first considers the general growth of interest-group activity at the European level before discussing the types of group that try to influence EU policy making and the forms of representation open to interests. It then explores the strategies and tactics that interest groups use to try to influence the different institutions. Finally, it analyses the issue of regulating interest-group access to the EU institutions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 259-278
Author(s):  
Richard A. Almeida

Many interest groups are known to be ideological actors. Some interest groups self-identify as liberal, progressive, or conservative, while others arguably possess ideologies which can be inferred from their policy platforms, rhetoric, or allies. To date, few attempts have been made to identify and quantify interest group ideology. This paper attempts to demonstrate interest group ideology by recovering one- and two-dimensional ideological mappings from group participation as amici curiae in cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court from 1999-2003. The results demonstrate that groups’ patterns of cooperation and disagreement across cases and years generate a valid and reliable ideological mapping and provides some initial evidence of ideological structuring of lobbying coalitions in amicus briefs.


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