Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security: bringing together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of security studies

2007 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
RITA FLOYD

ABSTRACTThis article constitutes an attempted bridge-building between the so-called ‘Copenhagen School’ and the so-called ‘Welsh School’ of security studies. The thesis of communality rests upon an evaluative bifurcation of the concept of securitisation into positive and negative securitisation. In tandem with this lies a bifurcation of the concept of desecuritisation into positive and negative desecuritisation. The two positive concepts are believed to be of equal value, with both trumping over the two negative concepts.This evaluative strategy of securitisation/desecuritisation, it is hoped will combine the optimistic perception of security by ‘Welsh School’ critical security theorists, with the more pessimistic perception of security associated with the Copenhagen School – particularly with that of Ole Wæver, the originator of securitisation theory. Such a strategy is seen as advantageous for three reasons. First, it is believed that the more unified these critical theories are, the stronger a challenge they can offer to the mainstream of security studies; second, the more united the academy the more adoptable are its theories for policymakers (EU or otherwise) and third the strategy proposed here paves the way for a more evaluative engagement with security on the part of the analyst, allowing for normative – but denying infinite – conceptualisations of security.In order to show that there are differences between the utility of securitisation and desecuritisation, this article demonstrates the distinctions by way of illustrative examples, all of which are taken from the environmental security sector. By means of this practical application, the article will show that neither securitisation nor desecuritisation are, in and of themselves positive or negative. It is rather the case that the outcome of a securitisation/desecuritisation is always issue dependent – something reflected here in the suggested two-tier structure of securitisation.

Author(s):  
David Mutimer

This chapter provides a partial history of the label ‘Critical Security Studies’ and the way it has developed and fragmented since the early 1990s. It considers the primary claims of the major divisions that have emerged within the literatures to which the label has been applied: constructivism, critical theory, and poststructuralism. It looks at the 1994 conference held at York University in Toronto entitled Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approaches to Security Studies, which spawned a book called Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (1997b), and Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), which was published to serve as a relatively comprehensive statement of ‘securitization studies’, or the Copenhagen School. The chapter argues that Critical Security Studies needs to foster an ‘ethos of critique’ in either the study or refusal of security. Finally, it examines Ken Booth’s views on poststructuralism as part of a broad Critical Security Studies.


Author(s):  
Ralf Emmers

This chapter examines the Copenhagen School and its securitization model. The Copenhagen School broadens the definition of security by encompassing five different sectors: military, political, societal, economic, and environmental security. It first provides an overview of the Copenhagen School’s securitization model before discussing its application to empirical research as well as the limitations of the securitization model. It then considers the role of the securitizing actor and the importance of the ‘speech act’ in convincing a specific audience of a threat’s existential nature. It argues that the Copenhagen School allows for non-military matters to be included in Security Studies while still offering a coherent understanding of the concept of security. It also describes the dangers and the negative connotations of securitizing an issue and concludes with some cases of securitization, including the securitization of undocumented migration, securitization of drug trafficking, and the failure of securitization in the Iraq War.


Author(s):  
Ralf Emmers

This chapter examines the Copenhagen School and its securitization model. The Copenhagen School broadens the definition of security by encompassing five different sectors: military, political, societal, economic, and environmental security. It first provides an overview of the Copenhagen School’s securitization model before discussing its application to empirical research as well as the limitations of the securitization model. It then considers the role of the securitizing actor and the importance of the ‘speech act’ in convincing a specific audience of a threat’s existential nature. It argues that the Copenhagen School allows for non-military matters to be included in Security Studies while still offering a coherent understanding of the concept of security. It also describes the dangers and the negative connotations of securitizing an issue and concludes with some cases of securitization, including the securitization of undocumented migration, securitization of drug trafficking, and the failure of securitization in the Iraq War.


Author(s):  
David Mutimer

This chapter provides a partial history of the label ‘Critical Security Studies’ and the way it has developed and fragmented since the early 1990s. It considers the primary claims of the major divisions that have emerged within the literatures to which the label has been applied: constructivism, critical theory, and poststructuralism. It looks at the 1994 conference held at York University in Toronto entitled Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approaches to Security Studies, which spawned a book called Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (1997b), and Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), which was published to serve as a relatively comprehensive statement of ‘securitization studies’, or the Copenhagen School. The chapter argues that Critical Security Studies needs to foster an ‘ethos of critique’ in either the study or refusal of security. Finally, it examines Ken Booth’s views on poststructuralism as part of a broad Critical Security Studies.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Albert Saban ◽  
Stephen Rau ◽  
Charles A. Wood

Purpose Information security has increasingly been in the headlines as data breaches continue to occur at alarming rates. This paper aims to propose an Information Security Preparedness Model that was developed to examine how SME executives’ perceptions of security importance, implementation challenges and external influences impact their awareness and commitment to security preparedness. Design/methodology/approach Funded by the Department of Justice, a national survey of SME executives’ perceptions of information security preparedness was conducted. Using PLS-SEM, the survey responses were used to test the proposed Information Security Preparedness Model. Findings The results indicate that as perceptions of security importance and external influences increase, SME executives’ awareness and commitment to information security also increases. In addition, as implementation challenges increase, awareness and commitment to information security decreases. Finally, as security importance and awareness and commitment to information security increases, executives’ perception of security preparedness also increases. Research limitations/implications Executive perceptions of information security were measured and not the actual level of security. Further research that examines the agreement between executive perceptions and the true state of information security within the organization is warranted. Originality/value Prior information security studies using Roger’s (1975, 1983) Protection Motivation Theory have produced mixed results. This paper develops and tests the Information Security Preparedness Model to more fully explain SME executive’s perceptions of information security.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-176
Author(s):  
Joanna Stryjek

Nowadays, air pollution constitutes one of the most serious threats to human health and life. Poland belongs to the group of countries with the highest level of air pollution in the EU and OECD. The scale of the threat posed by air pollution shows its importance when it comes to the health security of the Polish citizens. However, the ongoing (political and scientific) debate on health security in Poland often ignores the problem of air pollution. The aim of the article is to 1) assess the threat currently posed by air pollution to health security in Poland, 2) locate the threat in the area of health security, and 3) analyse the process of transferring the problem of air pollution from the sphere of politics to the area of security, in accordance with the theory of securitization, developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Qualitative analysis of documents together with the application of the theory of securitization show that, in Poland, the state has started to play the role of an actor securitizing air pollution as an existential threat. Nevertheless, this process is at an early stage, and its further success depends, inter alia, on decisions and possibilities related to taking extraordinary measures to eliminate the threat posed by air pollution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-257
Author(s):  
Daniel Edler Duarte ◽  
Marcelo M. Valença

Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic has sparked controversies over health security strategies adopted in different countries. The urge to curb the spread of the virus has supported policies to restrict mobility and to build up state surveillance, which might induce authoritarian forms of government. In this context, the Copenhagen School has offered an analytical repertoire that informs many analyses in the fields of critical security studies and global health. Accordingly, the securitisation of COVID-19 might be necessary to deal with the crisis, but it risks unfolding discriminatory practices and undemocratic regimes, with potentially enduring effects. In this article, we look into controversies over pandemic-control strategies to discuss the political and analytical limitations of securitisation theory. On the one hand, we demonstrate that the focus on moments of rupture and exception conceals security practices that unfold in ongoing institutional disputes and over the construction of legitimate knowledge about public health. On the other hand, we point out that securitisation theory hinders a genealogy of modern apparatuses of control and neglects violent forms of government which are manifested not in major disruptive acts, but in the everyday dynamics of unequal societies. We conclude by suggesting that an analysis of the bureaucratic disputes and scientific controversies that constitute health security knowledges and practices enables critical approaches to engage with the multiple – and, at times, mundane – processes in which (in)security is produced, circulated, and contested.


Author(s):  
Anna Deekeling ◽  
Dahlia Simangan

AbstractThe concept of hybridity sheds light on the complexity of conflict settings. It helps to analyse the participation of all parties and actors involved and entangled in a social network of normative and political power, while avoiding theoretical binaries that over-simplify the process of post-conflict peacebuilding. What lacks, however, is a practical application of hybridity in peacebuilding that actively engages with bottom/local or grassroots, top/national and international actors through mediation in the mid-space to create sustainable peace. Given this practical shortcoming of hybridity, this chapter examines mid-space actors as gatekeepers and their capacities to enable dialogue among opposing parties. The aim is to offer insights for the international community, as outside intervenors, in promoting the bridge-building potentialities of gatekeepers. Specifically, externally led efforts to engage with the specific skill sets of mid-space local actors are explored. It is argued in this chapter that such engagement provides a favourable environment for sustaining peace by overcoming power struggles in and around the mid-space.


Author(s):  
Wouter Werner ◽  
Lianne Boer

One of the core insights of Musil’s The Man Without Qualities is that there must be ‘a sense of possibility’. This chapter analyzes debates on the law applicable to cyberwar, as debates emanating from a sense of possibility, which translates into imageries of the way cyberwar might, could, or ought to happen, i.e. how possible future realities are construed. The analysis is limited to the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. The basic point of much legal analysis is to make sense of new phenomena in terms of pre-existing legal rules, or, to make the unfamiliar, familiar. The creation of these legal imageries is contrasted with non-legal imageries of cyberwar, as found in military and security studies. The purpose of this exercise is to carve out more clearly what is particular about the way in which international lawyers have imagined the future in this domain.


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