The nature and sources of liberal international order

1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL DEUDNEY ◽  
G. JOHN IKENBERRY
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Civic Identity ◽  
Economic Openness ◽  
Industrial Countries ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
American Hegemony ◽  
The Cold War

Debates about the future of relations among the advanced industrial countries after the Cold War hinge on theories about the sources of international political order. Realism advances the most defined—and pessimistic—answers drawing on theories of anarchy, balance, and hegemony. But these theories are not able to explain the origins and continuing stability of relations among the United States and its European and Asian partners. This article develops a theory of liberal international order that captures its major structures, institutions, and practices. Distinctive features mark postwar liberal order—co-binding security institutions, penetrated American hegemony, semi-sovereign great powers, economic openness, and civic identity. It is these multifaceted and interlocking features of Western liberal order that give it a durability and significance.

Cinema and the Cultural Cold War

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangjoon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Motion Picture ◽  
Film History ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
American Hegemony ◽  
East And Southeast Asia ◽  
Institutional Linkages ◽  
The Cold War

This book explores the ways in which postwar Asian cinema was shaped by transnational collaborations and competitions between newly independent and colonial states at the height of Cold War politics. The book adopts a simultaneously global and regional approach when analyzing the region's film cultures and industries. New economic conditions in the Asian region and shared postwar experiences among the early cinema entrepreneurs were influenced by Cold War politics, US cultural diplomacy, and intensified cultural flows during the 1950s and 1960s. The book reconstructs Asian film history in light of the international relationships forged, broken, and re-established as the influence of the non-aligned movement grew across the Cold War. The book elucidates how motion picture executives, creative personnel, policy makers, and intellectuals in East and Southeast Asia aspired to industrialize their Hollywood-inspired system in order to expand the market and raise the competitiveness of their cultural products. They did this by forming the Federation of Motion Picture Producers in Asia, co-hosting the Asian Film Festival, and co-producing films. The book demonstrates that the emergence of the first intensive postwar film producers' network in Asia was, in large part, the offspring of Cold War cultural politics and the product of American hegemony. Film festivals that took place in cities as diverse as Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Kuala Lumpur were annual showcases of cinematic talent as well as opportunities for the Central Intelligence Agency to establish and maintain cultural, political, and institutional linkages between the United States and Asia during the Cold War. This book reanimates this almost-forgotten history of cinema and the film industry in Asia.

The Anglo-American Worldview and the Question of World Order

2019 ◽  
pp. 175-190
Author(s):  
Andrew Gamble
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Class ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Military

One of the distinctive features of the idea of an Anglosphere has been a particular view of world order, based on liberal principles of free movement of goods, capital and people, representative government, and the rule of law, which requires a powerful state or coalition of states to uphold and enforce them. This chapter charts the roots as well as the limits of this conception in the period of British ascendancy in the nineteenth century, and how significant elements of the political class in both Britain and the United States in the twentieth century came to see the desirability of cooperation between the English-speaking nations to preserve that order against challengers. This cooperation was most clearly realised in the Second World War. The post-war construction of a new liberal world order was achieved under the leadership of the United States, with Britain playing a largely supportive but secondary role. Cooperation between Britain and the US flourished during the Cold War, particularly in the military and intelligence fields, and this became the institutional core of the ‘special relationship’. The period since the end of the Cold War has seen new challenges emerge both externally and internally to the Anglo-American worldview.

scholarly journals Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. Mearsheimer
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Order ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Middle Classes ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Nation States ◽  
The Cold War

The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe—essential for building that order—faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders—one dominated by China, the other by the United States—poised for waging security competition between them.

Diplomacy and War

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Weiner ◽  
Paul Sharp
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International System ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Order ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Military Diplomacy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Invasion Of Iraq

Scholars acknowledge that there is a close connection between diplomacy and war, but they disagree with regard to the character of this connection—what it is and what it ought to be. In general, diplomacy and war are assumed to be antagonistic and polar opposites. In contrast, the present diplomatic system is founded on the view that state interests may be pursued, international order maintained, and changes effected in it by both diplomacy and war as two faces of a single statecraft. To understand the relationships between diplomacy and war, we must look at the development of the contemporary state system and the evolution of warfare and diplomacy within it. In this context, one important claim is that the foundations of international organizations in general, and the League of Nations in particular, rest on a critique of modern (or “old”) diplomacy. For much of the Cold War, the intellectual currents favored the idea of avoiding nuclear war to gain advantage. In the post-Cold War era, the relationship between diplomacy and war remained essentially the same, with concepts such as “humanitarian intervention” and “military diplomacy” capturing the idea of a new international order. The shocks to the international system caused by events between the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 have intensified the paradoxes of the relationship between diplomacy and war.

Origins and Entrenchment of the Cold War, 1945–1953

2021 ◽  
pp. 113-116
Author(s):  
George W. Breslauer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
The Cold War

Several theories are considered to explain the determinants of Cold War between the United States and the USSR, countries that had been allies until 1945. If Stalin, not FDR, had died in 1945, there might have been a greater prospect of continued cooperation between the two great powers.

Unpacking the Contemporary Strategic Problem in Northeast Asia

2020 ◽  
pp. 137-160
Author(s):  
Barry Buzan ◽  
Evelyn Goh
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Contemporary Problem ◽  
Northeast Asia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
China And Japan ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Political Understanding ◽  
Second World

Chapter 4 begins in present-day NEA, and unpacks its core strategic problem of uncertainty associated with an apparent power transition, relating it squarely to the enforced alienation between the two indigenous great powers, China and Japan. It argues that neither a purely power-political understanding nor one that overly emphasizes nationalism and domestic impediments has been especially helpful to advancing our understanding of how Sino-Japanese alienation serves to constrain the development of East Asia’s post-Cold War order. Instead, one should understand the contemporary problem as resulting from the disintegration of the region’s post-Second World War settlement that centred on the United States acting as a ring-holder between China and Japan. Introducing the great power bargain framework, it shows how we might usefully distinguish between the constitutive and regulative aspects of such bargains. It then employs this framework to analyse Sino-Japanese alienation after the long nineteenth century, examining how efforts to create a partial new bargain between 1945 and 1989 were eventually undermined by the two countries’ changing characters and politics after the Cold War.

The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy

2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Long Range ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Nuclear Exchange ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The U.S

For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy, meaning that it could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia and China with a nuclear first strike. A simple nuclear exchange model demonstrates that the United States has a potent first-strike capability. The trajectory of nuclear developments suggests that the nuclear balance will continue to shift in favor of the United States in coming years. The rise of U.S. nuclear primacy has significant implications for relations among the world's great powers, for U.S. foreign policy, and for international relations scholarship.

A crise do último império: a Guerra Fria e as décadas finais do colonialismo português (1945-1975)

Diálogos ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 126
Author(s):  
Adriano De Freixo
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
International Capital ◽  
Colonial Policy ◽  
Colonial Empire ◽  
Financial Interests ◽  
Portuguese Colonialism ◽  
The Cold War

A partir dos anos 1950, no auge do processo de descolonização afro-asiática, Portugal sofreu diversas pressões internacionais devido à sua política colonial. Marcado historicamente por sua debilidade econômica, o país havia implementado um modelo colonialista baseado na abertura de seus domínios ultramarinos à atuação do capital internacional, em um modelo de colonialismo dependente. Este fato, aliado aos interesses estratégicos dos EUA e da OTAN, no contexto da Guerra Fria, fez com que as grandes potências acabassem esvaziando as pressões contrárias ao colonialismo português. Assim, apesar da política isolacionista implementada pelo regime salazarista e da condenação da opinião pública internacional, os interesses econômicos e financeiros das grandes potências e as determinações político-estratégicas da conjuntura internacional acabaram por garantir alguma sobrevida ao Império Colonial Luso até meados da década de 1970. Abstract The crisis of the last empire: the Cold War and the final decades of Portuguese colonialism (1945-1975) From the 1950s onwards, at the height of the process of Afro-Asian decolonization, Portugal underwent various international pressures due to its colonial policy. Historically marked by its economic weakness, the country had implemented a dependent colonialist model based on the opening of its overseas domains to the international capital. In addition, the strategic interests of the United States and NATO within the context of the Cold War resulted in a deflation of the pressures against Portuguese colonialism by the great powers. Hence, despite the isolationist policy implemented by the Salazar regime and the condemnation of colonialism by international public opinion, the economic and financial interests of the great powers, as well the political and strategic constraints of the international conjuncture, granted the survival to the Portuguese Colonial Empire until the mid-1970s. Resumen La crisis del último imperio: la Guerra Fría y las últimas décadas del colonialismo portugués (1945-1975) Desde la década de 1950, en el apogeo del proceso de descolonización africano-asiática, Portugal sufrió varias presiones internacionales debido a su política colonial. Marcado históricamente por su debilidad económica, el país había implementado un modelo colonialista basado en la apertura de sus dominios de ultramar a la actuación del capital internacional, en un modelo de colonialismo dependiente. Este hecho, junto con los intereses estratégicos de los EE.UU. y la OTAN en el contexto de la Guerra Fría, hizo que las grandes potencias acabaran por vaciar las presiones contra el colonialismo portugués. Así, a pesar de la política aislacionista implementada por el régimen salazarista y la condena por la opinión pública internacional, los intereses económicos y financieros de las grandes potencias y las determinaciones político-estratégicas de la coyuntura internacional acabaron por garantizar alguna sobrevida al Imperio Colonial Luso hasta mediados de la década de 1970

Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack S. Levy ◽  
William R. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Global System ◽  
Power Theory ◽  
Global Power ◽  
European System ◽  
The Cold War

Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable. Its core propositions about balancing strategies and the absence of sustained hegemonies apply to the European system and perhaps to some other autonomous continental systems but not to the global maritime system. Sea powers are more interested in access to markets than in territorial aggrandizement against other great powers. Consequently, patterns of coalition formation have been different in the European system and in the global maritime system during the last five centuries. An empirical analysis demonstrates that counterhegemonic balancing is frequent in Europe but much less frequent in the global system. Higher concentrations of power in the global system lead to fewer and smaller rather than more frequent and larger balancing coalitions, as well as to more frequent and larger alliances with the leading sea power than against it.

scholarly journals The Caribbean Crisis in the Memory Politics of the USSR (Russia) and the United States: Comparative Characteristics

2020 ◽  
pp. 22-28
Author(s):  
V.E. Dergacheva ◽  
Yu.G. Chernyshov
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Memory Politics ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
Archival Documents ◽  
Museum Exhibitions ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Caribbean ◽  
The Cold War

This paper discusses and compares two national versions of memory politics (Soviet/Russian and American versions) in the context of the Caribbean crisis, one of the most resonant events of the Cold war. The paper describes how each country interprets the Caribbean crisis in the context of the changes that took place in the international arena and in domestic political life. The main methods of memory politics implementation that are typical for each of the parties to the conflict are analyzed. An attempt is made to identify common approaches to memory politics implementation and distinctive features specific to each of the parties. The authors pay special attention to the coverage of the Caribbean crisis in schoolbook, in declassified archival documents, in museum exhibitions and memorials dedicated to the history of geopolitical and ideological confrontation between the two superpowers. The paper describes the areas where the policy in question is most often applied. The issue of how the memory politics was related to the evolution of the identities of the two states during the Cold war and after its end is also touched upon.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document