Two Sources of Morality

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 102-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

This essay emerges from consideration of a question in the epistemology of ethics or morality. This is not the common claim-centered question as to how moral claims are confirmed and whether their mode of confirmation gives us grounds to be confident about the prospects for ethical discourse. Instead, I am concerned with the less frequently posed concept-centered question of where in human experience moral terms or concepts are grounded — that is, where in experience the moral becomes salient to us. This question was central to moral epistemology in the form it took among thinkers such as Locke, Hume, and Kant, and it remains of the first importance today.

Elenchos ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-164
Author(s):  
Carlo Natali

AbstractIn the paper I discuss three theses defended by A. Kenny: (1) in antiquity up to Aspasius or to Alexander of Aphrodisias the EE was considered the most important version of Aristotle’s ethical discourse; (2) the idea that the common books belonged to the one or to the other treatise; (3) the opposition between the theory of happiness of EN I and X and that of EE II and VIII.


2001 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-18
Author(s):  
JAN SOKOL

Speaking of a ‘lack of time’, do we mean the same ‘thing’ as the variable ‘t’ in a graph of some time-dependent development? The following article tries to show that both concepts are extreme examples of the two sides, or faces, of the single phenomenon of time, as common and trivial as it is mysterious. Scientific, numerical time is considered first, followed by the time of the common human experience, the time in the present. It is on the basis of this curious ability to ‘keep in presence’ various events that follow one another, that the scientific concept of linear time has been established and, with it, the possibility to measure the time for scientific and practical purposes.


1966 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-136
Author(s):  
Richard C. Hall

The philosophical problem of the relation of symbol to truth is far from solved, but there have been significant advances toward its solution. It is the common Christian understanding that God is Truth (among other things), and that all truths must ultimately find union in him. This is to say that all genuine truths must be compatible. The true conclusions of genuine science must be compatible with the true conclusions of genuine theology. Or, to bring this general statement to a more particular level, the true conclusions of Biblical scholarship must be compatible with the true conclusions of the natural sciences. When this compatibility is lacking, and it so often is, we must assume that the conclusions of one field of truth-seeking or the other do not partake of the Truth which is God. And there is no guarantee that theology as a field of truth-seeking cannot err. Another characteristic of genuine truth is that it is not dependent upon any particular environment or milieu—either social, cultural, philosophical, or even theological. Unless we are to make the common but dangerous division of sacred and secular, of holy and profane, claim that these areas of human experience have nothing to do the one with the other, compartmentalise our thought, and ask, ‘What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?’, it must be concluded that there is no one specifically Christian milieu. Genuine truths must be true at all times, in all places, and for all men. But since we are not gods, we must hold these truths in what St Paul called earthen vessels (II Cor. 4:7), vessels shaped and moulded by our particular milieu.


1989 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray S. Anderson

The culture split between science and theology by which theology tends to abandon the concrete observable world to science, while science tends to dismiss questions of ontology (God), is presented as a framework within which to examine the preceding articles in this issue. The inadequacy of attempting to bridge this dichotomy by constructing a synthesis between psychology and theology on the common ground of religious experience is shown. An alternative approach to theology as having its focus on the interaction between the human self, others and God is presented, suggesting that a convergence between theology and psychology can be found in their common interest in the nature of the human self as being-in-becoming. This convergence is examined as an isomorphic structure where, despite different “ancestry,” theology and psychology attempt to explain and give meaning to human experience as grounded in being (ontology), experienced in a knowing way (epistemology), and open to change by the reality of transcendent being which moves the self toward goals which offer healing and hope (teleology).


1972 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-62
Author(s):  
Regin Prenter

Dem Menschen zugute. - Götz Harbsmeier zum 60. Geburtstag. Hrsg. Von K. E. Løgstrup und Emst Wolf. München 1970. Reviewed by Regin Prenter.On the back cover of the book under review it is claimed that the aim of all its contributors is to establish a positive relationship between Christianity and culture, but without indulging in a systematic Christian cultural synthesis. The reviewer asks the question whether all of them have actually succeeded. He finds that, in his settlement with the theology of Barth in a polemical epilogue, K. E. Løgstrup undisputably has succeeded. Løgstrup agrees with the Barthian theology that the Coming of God’s Kingdom is beyond philosophical cognition, and further, that the Coming of God’s Kingdom presupposes a common core of human experience. But he refuses to accept the point that this common core of human experience should be beyond philosophical cognition.Løgstrup also settles with the conception of this common core to be found in existential theology. It is true that Christ’s own preachings only mention such experience in passing. But this is due to the fact that what he said and did is the consummation of the Coming of God’s Kingdom. This cannot be said of the priest. He speaks of Jesu existence, which we (the priest) betray in our existence. What we say is not a message in itself, but only talk about a message; therefore we must “explain” . And therefore we cannot neglect the common core of human experience.In connection with Kaj Thaning’s interpretation of Grundtvig, Løgstrup emphasises Grundtvig’s repudiation of a Christian cultural synthesis. Although Christianity to Grundtvig was a message of the eternal salvation of the individual, this did not belittle the significance of earthly life. Christianity returns man to this life. Here man makes the experiences of life and death that make the message of an eternal life meaningful to him. It is suggested that in the last analysis Løgstrup agrees with Grundtvig rather than with Thaning. – In what follows the reviewer finds that Thaning’s contribution to the Festschrift is too orthodox in its Grundtvigianism - and this he regrets, for it makes dry reading.Apart from Løgstrup’s article the reviewer draws attention to Niels Thomsen’s article “That we should not despise Mystery and Cult” and Thorkild Bjørnvig’s “The young Dead - the young Living”. He also finds that Jørgen K. Bukdahl’s article on theological critique of Marxism is interesting reading matter. The crucial point is how we should understand man’s attidude to his own history. Is man created in the theological sense of the word, or is there nothing outside himself for him to take refuge to? - But how is the theologian to express his concept of creation in philosophical terms?Now and again Grundtvig is felt to be present in the background; but the book can by no means be regarded as presentation of Grundtvig as a challenge to the German philosophical and theological tradition, not even in Løgstrup’s and Thaning’s articles. This, however, is not a valid reason for not noticing the best of the contributions to the Festschrift. A summary of the last two reviews will appear in Grundtvig-Studier 1973.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-34
Author(s):  
Jason Huber
Keyword(s):  

This paper seeks to refute some of the common presuppositions of traditional Western epistemologies, which center on the claim that subjectivity cannot be as truth-yielding as "objectivity." This paper argues that aspects of the subjective can effectively be utilized in a valid epistemology attempting to approach an understanding of the truth of lived human experience—i.e. that subjectivity can in certain circumstances be as truth-yielding as, or even more so than, the epistemic ideal of objectivity. Ultimately, this paper concludes that the objective-subjective epistemic binary is artificial and disadvantageous in that neither pure objectivity nor absolute relativity are possible.


Author(s):  
Michele Zappavigna-Lee ◽  
Jon Patrick

Much of human experience is below-view, unattended to as we operate in the world, but integral to our performance as social creatures. The tacit knowledge involved in our practice allows us the experiential agility to be at once efficient and creative, to assimilate the novel and the familiar: in essence, to develop expertise. The possessors of skilful practice, the artisan, the witchdoctor or the physician, have occupied a position of both importance and mystery in most cultures since ancient times. Our interest over the ages in such hidden knowledge has caused us to mythologise expertise, placing it beyond the common by constructing it as unspeakable. Thus, in contemporary times it is not surprising that the dominant research perspective on tacit knowledge maintains that it is ineffable, that is, tacit knowledge cannot be understood by looking at what and how people communicate verbally. Indeed the word tacit has its origins in the Latin, tacitus, meaning silent.


2020 ◽  
pp. 325-331
Author(s):  
Raymond Wacks

Do we have a moral duty to obey the law? Do we, in other words, have a moral obligation to comply with legal rules simply because they are legal rules? What about obviously unfair or unjust laws? Or laws that impose unreasonable demands on us? The question of whether we have a duty to follow the demands of the law raises some fundamental issues regarding the nature of law and its moral claims. This chapter examines a number of possible reasons for obeying the law. It will examine the principal justifications for obedience: fair play, consent, the common good, and gratitude.


Author(s):  
Niklas Ellerich-Groppe ◽  
Larissa Pfaller ◽  
Mark Schweda

AbstractIn the wake of the Coronavirus pandemic, intergenerational solidarity and responsibility have become central points of reference in public discourses. However, the use of these concepts is often unclear and ambivalent: On one hand, older people are described as a vulnerable group whose protection requires sacrifices on the part of younger generations, e.g., regarding individual freedom and economic welfare. On the other, they appear as dispensable individuals that should relinquish their claims for the sake of the young and their future prospects. Our contribution offers an analysis of intergenerational solidarity and responsibility in public discourses on COVID-19. The leading question is how both concepts are used and how the corresponding claims can be justified or criticized. We first give an overview of notions of intergenerational solidarity and responsibility in current debates. In the next step, we provide a moral philosophical clarification of both concepts and their normative presuppositions. We then conduct a descriptive ethical discourse analysis of pertinent cases from three areas of European discourse: politics, civil society, and mass media. The analysis focuses on politico-moral claims and their normative premises, ambiguities, and biases. We argue that the discourse involves assumptions about old age and generational relations that need further clarification and justification. An analysis of intergenerational solidarity and responsibility in times of COVID-19 can help understand the dynamics of social cohesion in late-modern societies.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document