RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM MAKES SENSE AFTER ALL

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-231
Author(s):  
Tyler Cowen
Keyword(s):  
Free Variable ◽  
Rule Utilitarianism ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Choice Variable

AbstractIt is commonly claimed that rule consequentialism (utilitarianism) collapses into act consequentialism, because sometimes there are benefits from breaking the rules. I suggest this argument is less powerful than has been believed. The argument requires a commitment to a very particular (usually implicit) account of feasibility and constraints. It requires the presupposition that thinking of rules as the relevant constraint is incorrect. Supposedly we should look at a smaller unit of choice—the single act—as the relevant choice variable. But once we see feasibility as a matter of degree, there is no obvious cut-off point for how broadly we should think about the constraints on our choices. Treating “a bundle of choices” as a relevant free variable is no less defensible than treating “a single act” as the relevant free variable. Rule utilitarianism, rule consequentialism, and other rules-based approaches are stronger than their current reputation.

Parfit’s Final Arguments in Normative Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 213-232
Author(s):  
Brad Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Final Part ◽  
The Third ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Final Volume ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
What Matters

This paper starts by juxtaposing the normative ethics in the final part of Parfit’s final book, On What Matters, volume iii (2017), with the normative ethics in his earlier books, Reasons and Persons (1984) and On What Matters, volume i (2011). The paper then addresses three questions. The first is, where does the reflective-equilibrium methodology that Parfit endorsed in the first volume of On What Matters lead? The second is, is the Act-involving Act Consequentialism that Parfit considers in the final volume of On What Matters as plausible as Rossian deontology? The third is, how is the new argument that Parfit puts forward for Rule Consequentialism supposed to work?

Two Kinds of Reasons

2019 ◽  
pp. 85-112
Author(s):  
Christopher Woodard
Keyword(s):  
Practical Significance ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Good Outcome ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Good Pattern ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Reason For Action

One kind of reason for action is that the action would have a good outcome. According to Act Consequentialism all reasons are like this. However, these ‘act-based’ reasons may be contrasted with ‘pattern-based’ reasons, which flow from the fact that an action is part of some good pattern of action. This chapter argues that both kinds of reasons exist, and explores some of the issues facing any theory of pattern-based reasons. One such issue is whether they can exist in cases where the valuable pattern would not be realized because other agents are unwilling to play their parts. According to idealizing forms of Rule Consequentialism, they can. However, the chapter endorses an argument made by Alexander Dietz that this is incompatible with any plausible account of the strength of pattern-based reasons. It ends by explaining how pattern-based reasons may nevertheless retain their practical significance.

Parfit on Act Consequentialism

2021 ◽  
pp. 233-246
Author(s):  
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek ◽  
Peter Singer
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Limited Success ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Terror Bombing ◽  
What Matters

In the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories—Kantianism, Contractualism, and Consequentialism—are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled as a ‘Triple Theory’. The form of Consequentialism that Parfit argues is compatible with Kantianism and Contractualism is Rule Consequentialism. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on personal correspondence to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider how, in On What Matters, volume iii, which Parfit completed shortly before his death, he seeks to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the Triple Theory. One of the ways in which he does this is to suggest that Impartial Rationality may be an external rival to Morality, in much the same way as egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that this move undermines morality, as shown by Parfit’s own example of the judgements that we may make in the case of terror bombing. We conclude that Parfit’s attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success.

The Rule Worship and Idealization Objections Revisited and Resisted

2020 ◽  
pp. 131-155
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
The Way

There are two familiar and important challenges to the rule consequentialist picture, Smart’s “rule worship objection” and the “idealization objection.” This chapter defends rule consequentialism (RC) against these challenges. It argues that to satisfactorily meet the rule worship objection, we need to reconceptualize RC. We need to think of it as not fundamentally a rival to act consequentialism or deontology or virtue theory. Instead, it can potentially adjudicate among these views. It is best viewed as a “second-order” theory that rests on a view about the nature and point of morality. The rule worship objection can be answered if we interpret RC in this way. The idealization objection can seem more difficult because it appears to arise from the basic RC approach to evaluating rules. This chapter suggests, however, that the idealization objection boils down to a familiar problem about conflicts of pro tanto duties. RC can handle it in the way that it handles such conflict.

Probability in Ethics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McCarthy
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Nonexpected Utility ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Opposite View ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Priority View

It is natural to think that the most basic questions in ethical theory do not have much to do with probability. Given answers to these questions, we can try to extend them to cases involving probability, though this job might best be handled by more technical disciplines. This chapter is an argument for the opposite view. The major ethical problems to do with probability involve very little mathematics; many topics which seem to have nothing to do with probability are arguably all about probability; and thinking about various problems to do with probability can help solve analogous problems which do not involve probability, sometimes even revealing that popular positions about such problems are incoherent. Among the topics discussed are: interpretations of probability; expected utility theory; utilitarianism; egalitarianism; fairness; the priority view; population size; incommensurability; continuity; nonexpected utility theory; evaluative measurement; decision theory; act consequentialism; rule consequentialism; contractualism; and deontology.

Consequentialism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McNaughton ◽  
Piers Rawling
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral View ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
General Acceptance ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
The World ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
The Right

Consequentialism is sometimes taken to be a moral view according to which acts are to be assessed solely by the value of their consequences, in contrast to deontological ethical theories, which hold that certain kinds of action are wrong, and others right, independently of the goodness or badness of their outcomes This account, however, oversimplifies matters. Contemporary consequentialism is a family of moral theories united by their fundamental concern with value. They need not assess acts in these terms; and those that do need not be concerned only with consequences. Act-consequentialism, for instance, although it does assess acts – the right act maximizes the good – need not measure the value of an act only by the value of its consequences: acts themselves may have their own intrinsic worth, for example. Rule-consequentialism assesses rules rather than acts: right acts are those that accord with a set of rules whose general acceptance would best promote the good. Act-consequentialism builds on what seems to be the merest truism, namely that morality is concerned with making the world a better place for all. Certainly, consequentialist considerations figure importantly in issues of public policy – penal, economic or educational programmes are standardly judged by the goodness or badness of their results. Nevertheless, act-consequentialism is at odds with ordinary moral thinking in (at least) three respects. First, it seems excessively onerous, because the requirement to make the world as good as possible would demand all our time and effort. Second, it leaves no room for the special duties that we take ourselves to have to those close to us: family, friends and fellow citizens. Third, it might require us, on occasion, to do dreadful things in order to bring about a good result. Consequentialists standardly try to bring their theory closer to common thinking by amending it in one of two ways: either by tinkering with how we should decide on what to do (the decision procedure), or by assessing something other than our actions. Rule-consequentialism exemplifies the latter strategy: its rules may bear a fairly close resemblance to the moral rules with which we now operate. Indirect act-consequentialism (note that nomenclature varies among authors, so these doctrines may appear in other places under different names) adopts the former approach. Since it is a form of act-consequentialism, it claims that the right act maximizes the good. But, unlike direct act-consequentialism, indirect act-consequentialism denies that we should focus on the maximization of value in deciding what to do. Rather, we should follow ordinary moral thought – we may get closer to making the world as good as possible by caring for our friends and relatives, pursuing our personal projects, and steering clear of radical acts, even when they hold the promise of a better world.

Rule-consequentialism and Internal Consistency: A Reply to Card

Utilitas ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRAD HOOKER
Keyword(s):  
Internal Consistency ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Act Consequentialism

Rule-consequentialism has been accused of either collapsing into act-consequentialism or being internally inconsistent. I have tried to develop a form of rule-consequentialism without these flaws. In this June's issue of Utilitas, Robert Card argued that I have failed. Here I assess his arguments.

Parfit on Act Consequentialism

Utilitas ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 416-426
Author(s):  
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek ◽  
Peter Singer
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
The Third ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Limited Success ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
What Matters

AbstractIn the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories – Kantianism, Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism – are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled in what he calls ‘Triple Theory’. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on correspondence with Parfit to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider Parfit's efforts, in the third volume of On What Matters, to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the triple theory, in part by treating impartial rationality as an external rival to morality, in much the same way that egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that Parfit's attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success.

Consequentialism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McNaughton
Keyword(s):  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
General Acceptance ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Close Resemblance ◽  
The World ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
The Right ◽  
Special Duties

Consequentialism assesses the rightness or wrongness of actions in terms of the value of their consequences. The most popular version is act-consequentialism, which states that, of all the actions open to the agent, the right one is that which produces the most good. Act-consequentialism is at odds with ordinary moral thinking in three respects. First, it seems excessively onerous, because the requirement to make the world a better place would demand all our time and effort; second, it leaves no room for the special duties which we take ourselves to have to those close to us: family, friends and fellow citizens; and third, it might require us, on occasion, to do dreadful things in order to bring about a good result. Consequentialists standardly try to bring their theory more into line with common thinking by amending the theory in one of two ways. Indirect act-consequentialism holds that we should not necessarily aim to do what is right. We may get closer to making the world the best possible place by behaviour which accords more with ordinary moral thought. Rule-consequentialism holds that an action is right if it is in accordance with a set of rules whose general acceptance would best promote the good. Such rules will bear a fairly close resemblance to the moral rules with which we now operate.

scholarly journals The problem of insignificant hands

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Hindriks
Keyword(s):  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Individual Contributions ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
The Individual

AbstractMany morally significant outcomes can be brought about only if several individuals contribute to them. However, individual contributions to collective outcomes often fail to have morally significant effects on their own. Some have concluded from this that it is permissible to do nothing. What I call ‘the problem of insignificant hands’ is the challenge of determining whether and when people are obligated to contribute. For this to be the case, I argue, the prospect of helping to bring about the outcome has to be good enough. Furthermore, the individual must be in a position to increase the probability of its being brought about to an appropriate extent. Finally, I argue that when too few are willing to contribute, people may have a duty to increase their number. Thus, someone can be obligated to contribute or to get others to contribute. This prospect account is consistent with Kantianism, contractualism and rule consequentialism but inconsistent with act consequentialism.

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