Gender, Metaphor, and the Definition of Economics

1992 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie A. Nelson

Let me make it clear from the outset that my main point isnoteither of the following: one, that there should be more women economists and research on “women's issues” (though I think there should be), or two, that women as a class do, or should do, economics in a manner different from men (a position with which I disagree). My argument is different and has to do with trying to gain an understanding of how a certain way of thinking about gender and a certain way of thinking about economics have become intertwined through metaphor – with detrimental results – and how a richer conception of human understanding and human identity could broaden and improve the field of economics for both female and male practitioners.

2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (99) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
José Sérgio Duarte da Fonseca

: No presente artigo partirei das teses de Charles Taylor sobre a necessária vinculação entre a identidade humana e a objetividade do bem para criticar o que chamarei de “naturalismo tardio” e sua “definição fraca” de ser humano, instanciado aqui pela tentativa de naturalização da ética proposta por Daniel Dennett. Defenderei a tese de que a inarticulação do “naturalismo tardio” oculta uma contradição que, juntamente com a possibilidade técnica da revisão eugênica do genoma humano, produz uma crise de nossa identidade moderna, permitindo assim a constituição lenta e gradual de uma sociedade “biocrática” de moldes pré-modernos.Abstract: In this paper I argue that Charles Taylor‘s theses on the necessary relation between human identity and the objectivity of the Good can be used as the basis to criticize what I call “late naturalism” and its “weak definition” of human being, exemplified here by the attempt of naturalization of ethics proposed by Daniel Dennett. I argue that the inarticulation of “late naturalism” hides a contradiction, which, in connection with the technical possibility of the eugenic revision of human genome, produces a crisis in our modern identity, allowing, in this way, a gradual and slow constitution of a “biocratic” society of a pre-modern kind.


1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-398
Author(s):  
Melita Schaum

H. L. Mencken's antagonism to women's issues seems paradoxical in a man so committed to emancipation and the reexamination of conventional social roles — the very goals for which the women's movement was fighting during the early decades of the twentieth century. The apparent discord of Mencken's attacks on suffragettes, his deprecating depictions of womanhood, and his thinly veiled vilification of women as a source of cultural mediocrity have spurred critics to explain, reformulate, or deny Mencken's disturbing prejudice. Edward A. Martin quixotically suggests that Mencken only “posed as an antifeminist,” while Charles A. Fecher wonders why “today's advocates of ‘women's liberation’ have not resurrected In Defense of Women” — Mencken's lashing satire on the female in America, grossly misread by Fecher as a tribute to women's “intelligence.” But Mencken was not “posing” as an antifeminist any more than he was pretending to be anti-Philistine. His views of women were not only consistent with his own cultural philosophy but joined a paradigm of masculinism underlying the definition of American culture during these years.This essay does not deny Mencken's considerable contributions to the scene of American letters in the early twentieth century. Alarm at the recently published diaries — which illustrate Mencken's disposition to be “careless of the decencies” in his random remarks on African-Americans and Jews — while justified, often de-contextualizes his opinions from the wider cultural atmosphere. Regarding his views on women as well, I argue that metaphoric and broadly philosophical foundations place many of his views within a larger climate of opinion seeking to link the rise of the feminine with intellectual mediocrity.


1992 ◽  
Vol 21 (414) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Skak Larsen

<p>Query languages often allow a limited amount of anthmetic and string operations on domain values, and sometimes sets of values can be dealt with through aggregation and sometimes even set comparisons. We address the question of how these facilities can be added to a relational language in a natural way. Our discussions lead us to reconsider the definition of the standard operators, and we introduce a new way of thinking about relational algebra computations.</p><p>We define a language FC, which has an iteration mechanism as its basis. A tuple language is used to carry out almost all computations. We prove equivalence results relating FC to relational algebra under various circumstances.</p>


2018 ◽  
pp. 60-71
Author(s):  
З. В. Шевченко

Philosophical anthropology proceeds from understanding the essence of man as a fundamentally open, unfinished entity in its formation. But it was just such a formation that the representatives of philosophical anthropology understood differently: some saw certain stages, stages of such formation, some distinguished certain classification types, and only in recent decades more and more anthropologists have drawn attention to multiple identities as anthropological characteristics of man. Anthropology, in this case, seeks objective, mainly natural, grounds for such a plurality: the splitting of subjectivity, for example, should not appear as an accursedness of chance, a psychiatric anomaly, but on the contrary - as a hidden mechanism, which gives the appearance of singularity to the surface of consciousness. Such a fundamentality of the anthropological approach is determined by most of its advantages, but it is precisely it that explains certain limits and even, in a sense, shortcomings, to identify which called philosophical anthropology - in any case, as the basic theory and methodology of the study of multiple identity of the individual.Life is heterogeneous, and therefore identity can not be homogeneous - as long as it is the identity of the living person, and not its image, created by the researchers as a certain codified version of the interpretation of this personality.Modern anthropologists, such as the French researchers Philippe Descola and Jean-Marie Schaeffer, focus on the specificity, certainty of human existence more than on its openness, uncertainty. For Descola the question is in defining of certain types of sociality that create the preconditions for the formation of different types of human identity. While Schaeffer goes much further and criticizes the metaphysical foundations of the monologue definition of human nature as the false in its basis, it is the false thesis of the exclusivity of man among all living forms.Deskola sees basic natural certainty of human peculiarities, but only takes into account existing and past versions of human identity. Future versions of human identity should also be taken into account, but this is somewhat problematic on a biological basis. Biology can only capture new versions of personality identity, but it is unlikely that they can be foreseen. However, everything that can be said about human identity has once arisen, that is, it just never existed. If Schaeffer’s critique of metaphysics and phenomenology is perfect in its orientation to the present and the past, then it clearly breaks down about the future. However, in the future, one can hardly expect the negation of most of the existing biological characteristics of a person – rather, we should talk about their very gradual, piecemeal improvement.Returning to the original contrasting theories of personality and the theory of social systems, it can be argued that theories of personality, which tend to humanitarian, interpretive interpretation of values, are closer to transcendentalist version of philosophical anthropology; however, the naturalistic version represented by Schaeffer, corresponds to the functional demands of social system theories and more rigid and invariant approaches of social sciences. Despite all the achievements of the natural sciences, one shouldn’t forget that they only realize the possibilities of actually proving counter-factual values that humanities give them. Thus, dehumanization of modern science does not appear as a world trend, but only as another challenge to the humanities. They have experienced a great number of such challenges – and giving each time new impetus for the development of natural sciences.Contradiction of transcendental and naturalistic approaches within the framework of philosophical anthropology should be regarded as somewhat conditional. In particular, both approaches provide sufficient grounds for substantiating the multiple identity of the individual. However, each of these approaches emphasizes the other aspect of the multiple identity of the individual: the transcendental one – the ability to create new versions of the identity of the person in the future, and the naturalistic one – on the classification, combinatorial opportunity to consider multiple identities in its actual diversity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Oliver D. Crisp

In this paper I offer an argument against one important version of panentheism, that is, mereological panentheism. Although panentheism has proven difficult to define, I provide a working definition of the view, and proceed to argue that given this way of thinking about the doctrine, mereological accounts of panentheism have serious theological drawbacks. I then explore some of these theological drawbacks. In a concluding section I give some reasons for thinking that the classical theistic alternative to panentheism is preferable, all things considered.


1996 ◽  
Vol 33 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 17-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald J. Brady

The Water Protection Approach (WPA) by USEPA is outlined. The historical development of the approach is of an old date, starting since 1980. Definition of the approach and experience to date is summarized. It is not a new programm, but a new way of thinking about how environmental programs have to be managed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-54
Author(s):  
Elisa Buzzi

Il complesso fenomeno del doping presenta notevoli problemi di definizione. Queste difficoltà, che hanno influenzato l’evoluzione delle politiche anti-doping, sono ulteriormente acuite dall’assenza di una cornice etica chiaramente definita, in grado di giustificare inequivocabilmente le azioni di contrasto intraprese dalle agenzie sportive a partire dalla seconda metà del XX secolo. Ai problemi di interpretazione del doping nelle sue forme tradizionali si sono aggiunte, da qualche decennio, le questioni relative al doping genetico. Il contributo analizza le diverse tipologie di tecnologia genetica, potenzialmente utilizzabili per un miglioramento della prestazione atletica, nella prospettiva di una valutazione etica. Oltre ai problemi medici, legali e morali del doping tradizionale, il doping genetico pone dilemmi etici inediti che rischiano di rendere le risposte dell’etica sportiva e delle politiche anti-doping, se non inefficaci, per lo meno inadeguate e anacronistiche. Nonostante la difficoltà di prevedere l’impatto che le tecnologie genetiche potranno avere sul mondo dello sport, la prospettiva del doping genetico, non diversamente da altre forme di doping, ma più radicalmente, pone due tipi di questioni. In primo luogo, costringe a ripensare alla natura e alle finalità dello sport e delle competizioni atletiche come espressioni dell’eccellenza umana. In secondo luogo, solleva questioni fondamentali circa la definizione dell’identità e della dignità umane nella civiltà tecnologica. ---------- Interpreting doping is fraught with difficulties at the very level of a comprehensive and consistent definition of the phenomenon. Such difficulties have influenced the evolution of anti-doping policies, that are further hindered by the lack of a clearly articulated ethical framework. Moreover, in the last few decades, a host of moral dilemmas has been arising in connection with gene doping. This article analyses different kinds of genetic technology that could enhance athletic performances in the light of their moral implications. In addition to the medical, legal, and ethical problems inherent in traditional doping, gene doping raises a whole range of new ethical issues that might render the current formulations of sport ethics and anti-doping policies, if not ineffectual, at least inadequate and anachronistic. Notwithstanding the difficulties in foreseeing how developments in genetic technology might impact the world of sport in the future, the perspective of gene doping radicalises two kinds of issues, that are not stranger to other forms of doping. Firstly, it leads to reconsider the nature and goals of sport as an expression of human excellency, and secondly, it raises fundamental questions about the definition of human identity and dignity in a technological civilization.


Author(s):  
G.A.J. Rogers

Samuel Bold (or Bolde) was a Latitudinarian minister who defended John Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity and his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bold published a series of pamphlets and short books which argued a theological position substantially identical to that of Locke. He also mounted a philosophical defence of Locke’s definition of knowledge and his supposition that it was possible that God could, if he so wished, superadd to matter the power of thought. In a book on the theological issue of the resurrection of the same body he defended Locke’s account of personal identity.


Author(s):  
David Morgan

This chapter moves to formalize the definition of enchantment, considering it in relation to magic, religion, art, and play. The idea of the material network as the matrix in which enchantment happens is presented as the basis for understanding the materiality of enchantment. An extended set of related examples involving the history of the automobile and its material network of roads, gas stations, and so on provide a way of thinking about the utility of network as the site for enchantment. The power of disenchantment is its ability to disrupt the network and disable enchantment—destroying images breaks their idolatrous hold on viewers.


On Inhumanity ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 17-22
Author(s):  
David Livingstone Smith

This chapter defines dehumanization. After emphasizing the importance of laying out a clear definition of the term, the chapter goes on to describe dehumanization as a kind of attitude—a way of thinking about others. To dehumanize another person, in short, is to conceive of them as a subhuman animal. People often mistake dehumanization for its effects on human behavior. This chapter argues that such notions make it much more difficult to comprehend how dehumanization works. When people think of others as subhuman, they often treat them in cruel and degrading ways, and they often refer to them using slurs. But the chapter contends that bad treatment and degrading slurs are effects of dehumanization rather than dehumanization itself.


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