Compromising Islam with Empire: Bureaucracy and Class in Safavid Iran

2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-382
Author(s):  
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Economic Justice ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
The Political ◽  
General Trust ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Imperial Court ◽  
The Rich

Socio-economic justice lies in the normative core of Islam. The concepts of fard-al-kifāyah and zakāh reveal its commitment to protect the poor from the arbitrariness of the rich and treat the state as an institution that maximises collective welfare. The political economy of Safavid Iran indicates that the establishment of Islam as Iran’s state religion facilitated the empire’s administrative modernisation, economic development and class formation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that religion did not only offer legitimacy grounds to the Safavid government. It also provided institutional incentives that transformed clerics into intermediaries between people and the Imperial Court, improved fiscal capacity and increased general trust toward the central government.

scholarly journals THE PROTECTION OF THE RICH AGAINST THE POOR: THE POLITICS OF ADAM SMITH’S POLITICAL ECONOMY

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-158
Author(s):  
James A. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Political Culture ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
General Attitude ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Natural Forms ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Point Of Departure

AbstractMy point of departure in this essay is Smith’s definition of government. “Civil government,” he writes, “so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.” First I unpack Smith’s definition of government as the protection of the rich against the poor. I argue that, on Smith’s view, this is always part of what government is for. I then turn to the question of what, according to Smith, our governors can do to protect the wealth of the rich from the resentment of the poor. I consider, and reject, the idea that Smith might conceive of education as a means of alleviating the resentment of the poor at their poverty. I then describe how, in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith refines and develops Hume’s taxonomy of the opinions upon which all government rests. The sense of allegiance to government, according to Smith, is shaped by instinctive deference to natural forms of authority as well as by rational, Whiggish considerations of utility. I argue that it is the principle of authority that provides the feelings of loyalty upon which government chiefly rests. It follows, I suggest, that to the extent that Smith looked to government to protect the property of the rich against the poor, and thereby to maintain the peace and stability of society at large, he cannot have sought to lessen the hold on ordinary people of natural sentiments of deference. In addition, I consider the implications of Smith’s theory of government for the question of his general attitude toward poverty. I argue against the view that Smith has recognizably “liberal,” progressive views of how the poor should be treated. Instead, I locate Smith in the political culture of the Whiggism of his day.

The Political Economy of Land Reform in China's “Newly Liberated Areas”: Evidence from Wuxi County

2008 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 675-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kai-Sing Kung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Land Inequality ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Farm Survey ◽  
Class Status ◽  
The Rich

AbstractA farm survey conducted in Wuxi county in the 1950s found that the Chinese Communist Party had successfully “preserved the rich peasant economy” in the “newly liberated areas”: the landlords were indeed the only social class whose properties had been redistributed, yet without compromising on the magnitude of benefits received by the poor peasants. A higher land inequality in that region, coupled with an inter-village transfer of land, allowed these dual goals to be achieved. Our study further reveals that class status was determined both by the amount of land a household owned and whether it had committed certain “exploitative acts,” which explains why some landlords did not own a vast amount of land. Conversely, it was the amount of land owned, not class status, that determined redistributive entitlements, which was why 15 per cent of the poor peasants and half of the middle peasants were not redistributed any land.

scholarly journals LAND REFORMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Gersbach ◽  
Lars-H. R. Siemers
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Human Capital ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
The Political ◽  
Land Markets ◽  
Human Capital Formation ◽  
Land Reforms ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Rights Issues

We examine the nexus between land transfers and human capital formation. A sequence of land redistributions enables the beneficiaries to educate their children and thus to escape from poverty. A successful land reform allows the transition of a society from an agriculture-based state of poverty to a human capital–based developed economy. We find that a temporary state of inequality among the poor is unavoidable. Finally, we discuss the political economy of land reform, whether access to land markets should be allowed for beneficiaries of land reforms, and property rights issues.

Explanatory Notes on the Political Economy of Africa

1976 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude Ake
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Ethnic Conflict ◽  
Party System ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Repression ◽  
The Poor ◽  
High Incidence

I Want to indicate how the political economy of contemporary Africa is to be explained, and what might reasonably be conjectured about its development. I am mainly interested in the salient features, namely: intense ethnic conflict, the single-party system, the high incidence of efficiency norms in political competition, the recurrence of military coups, political repression, and the poor performance at economic development.

Political Economy Approaches

2019 ◽  
pp. 124-131
Author(s):  
Frank Bönker
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Economics And Politics

This chapter discusses two strands of transformation research that focus on the interaction of economics and politics and start from the assumption of rational, self-interested actors. The political economy of policy reform approach deals with the political preconditions for successful large-scale economic reforms. It emerged from the analysis of economic reforms in developing countries in the 1980s, played a major role in the analysis—and the design—of economic reforms in postcommunist transition countries in the 1990s, but has lost importance since. The second strand of transformation research discussed in the chapter addresses the economic origins of democracy and dictatorship. Two distinct yet complementary approaches can be identified—one focusing on the struggle between the rich and the poor, the other emphasizing conflicts between the governing elite and the citizens.

The Contributions of the political economy approach: An analysis of Socio-economic development in Indonesia

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Falih Suaedi ◽  
Muhmmad Saud
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Southeast Asia ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
The Political ◽  
Developmental Studies ◽  
Socio Economic Development ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Political Economy Approach

This article explores in what ways political economy as an analytical framework for developmental studies has contributed to scholarships on Indonesian’s contemporary discourse of development. In doing so, it reviews important scholarly works on Indonesian political and economic development since the 1980s. The argument is that given sharp critiques directed at its conceptual and empirical utility for understanding changes taking place in modern Indonesian polity and society, the political economy approach continues to be a significant tool of research specifically in broader context of comparative politics applied to Indonesia and other countries in Southeast Asia. The focus of this exploration, however, has shifted from the formation of Indonesian bourgeoisie to the reconstitution of bourgeois oligarchy consisting of the alliance between the politico-bureaucratic elite and business families. With this in mind, the parallel relationship of capitalist establishment and the development of the state power in Indonesia is explainable.<br>

The Political Economy of Post-Independence India—A Review Article

1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 787-797 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akhil Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Newly Industrialized Countries ◽  
The Past ◽  
Nation States ◽  
Balance Of Forces ◽  
The Third World

Economists and political scientists have become increasingly interested in the political economy of India during the past decade and particularly during the past three or four years. The titles under review will be valuable not only to India specialists but also to comparative scholars because of the intriguing mix of conditions found in India. More like a continent than a country in its diversity, India is in some ways very similar to densely populated, predominantly rural and agricultural China, differing most perhaps in the obstinacy and depth of its poverty. In the predominant role played by the state within an essentially capitalist economy, it is closer to the model of Western social democracies than it is to either prominently ideological capitalist or socialist nation-states; like other countries in the “third world,” the state in India plays a highly interventionist developmental role. Finally, since Independence it has pursued, more successfully than most nation-states in Latin America and Asia, policies of importsubstituting industrialization and relative autarchy. In terms of its political structures, India differs from most newly industrialized countries (NICs) in that it generally continues to function as a parliamentary democracy. The federal political system creates an intriguing balance of forces between central and the regional state governments, which are often ruled by opposition parties with agendas, ideologies, and organizational structures quite different from those of the central government.

Inequality, Collective Action, and Democratization

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (04) ◽  
pp. 661-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Keefer
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Working Classes ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich

Epic redistributive struggles between the rich and poor lie at the heart of prominent theories of economic development and the emergence of democracy (e.g., Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The poor pursue democracy to secure credible redistribution away from wealthy elites; elites, fearing redistribution, but also the costs of revolution, decide whether to repress these efforts or to surrender to them. These theories, and the historical examples of working classes exacting redistributive or political concessions from elites, have been interpreted as suggesting that inequality and redistributive struggles should be central features of development and democratization. Where inequality is high, democracy should be unlikely to emerge, or to emerge and be unstable. Because elites in unequal societies are unwilling to adopt institutions that encourage growth and investment (such as institutions that protect non-elites from predation by elites), incomes should be lower as well.

Class Politics, American-Style

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 659-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Waddell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Middle Class ◽  
Political Science ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rich ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson's Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class is both a work of political science and a contribution to broad public discussion of distributive politics. Its topic could not be more relevant to a US polity wracked by bitter partisan disagreements about taxes, social spending, financial regulation, social insecurity, and inequality. The political power of “the rich” is a theme of widespread public attention. The headline on the cover of the January–February 2011 issue of The American Interest—“Inequality and Democracy: Are Plutocrats Drowning Our Republic?”—is indicative. Francis Fukuyama's lead essay, entitled “Left Out,” clarifies that by “plutocracy,” the journal means “not just rule by the rich, but rule by and for the rich. We mean, in other words, a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense of others.” Fukuyama makes clear that he believes that this state of affairs obtains in the United States today.Readers of Perspectives on Politics will know that the topic has garnered increasing attention from political scientists in general and in our journal in particular. In March 2009, we featured a symposium on Larry Bartels's Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. And in December 2009, our lead article, by Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, starkly posed the question “Oligarchy in the United States?” and answered it with an equally stark “yes.” Winner-Take-All Politics thus engages a broader scholarly discussion within US political science, at the same time that it both draws upon and echoes many “classic themes” of US political science from the work of Charles Beard and E. E. Schattschneider to Ted Lowi and Charles Lindblom.In this symposium, we have brought together a group of important scholars and commentators who offer a range of perspectives on the book and on the broader themes it engages. While most of our discussants are specialists on “American politics,” we have also sought out scholars beyond this subfield. Our charge to the discussants is to evaluate the book's central claims and evidence, with a focus on three related questions: 1) How compelling is its analysis of the “how” and “why” of recent US public policy and its “turn” in favor of “the rich” and against “the middle class”? 2) How compelling is its critique of the subfield of “American politics” for its focus on the voter–politician linkage and on “politics as spectacle” at the expense of an analysis of “politics as organized combat”? 3) And do you agree with its argument that recent changes in US politics necessitate a different, more comparative, and more political economy–centered approach to the study of US politics?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

The Political Economy of Alcohol

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard Sasges
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
The Political ◽  
New Era ◽  
New Ways Of Working ◽  
Enterprise Groups ◽  
Step Down ◽  
Traditional Industry ◽  
State Protection

When A.R. Fontaine arrived in Tonkin in 1886, he was quick to see the potential of applying new technologies to a traditional industry, and to grasp the importance of state protection for the success of his fledgling enterprise. From modest origins, he built a business empire that included everything from distilleries to coal mines to bicycle factories. Fontaine’s was one of the colonial conglomerates that played a central role in the economy’s “Indochinese moment,” introducing new technologies and familiarizing Indochinese with new ways of working, consuming and being. However, the downturn that began in Indochina in 1928 exposed the weakness of many of these enterprise groups. When A.R. Fontaine was forced to step down as President of the SFDIC in 1932, it signified the start of a new era of economic development directed not from Hanoi or Saigon, but rather from Paris.

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