The Analysis of Marine Casualties

1967 ◽  
Vol 20 (03) ◽  
pp. 241-246
Author(s):  
William C. Foster
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Personal Injury ◽  
Material Damage ◽  
Physical Damage ◽  
Or Efficiency ◽  
Loss Of Life ◽  
Marine Safety ◽  
The U.S

The Coast Guard is the leading agency in the United States for analysing collision statistics and generally preventing marine casualties. In this paper, which was presented at an Institute meeting held in London on 30 November 1966, Captain William C. Foster, Chief of the Merchant Vessel Inspection Division, Office of Merchant Marine Safety of the U.S. Coast Guard in Washington, describes the manner in which accidents of all kinds are investigated. The lecture was illustrated with examples of some of the extremely detailed forms which those involved in marine casualties are required to complete and of the statistical casualty returns; these are not reproduced here.Marine casualties and accidents, whether or not loss of life is involved, are investigated by the U.S. Coast Guard for the purpose of determining the cause of the casualty and the persons, if any, who are responsible and to obtain information for the prevention of similar casualties. The Coast Guard regulations require the owner, agent, Master, or person in charge of the vessel involved in a marine casualty to notify the nearest marine inspection officer whenever a casualty results which causes physical damage to property in excess of $1500, material damage affecting the seaworthiness or efficiency of the vessel, any stranding or grounding, any loss of life, or injury incapacitating a person for a period in excess of 72 hours. When a casualty occurs in international or foreign waters, this notice is frequently given upon the American vessel's arrival in the continental limits of the United States on forms CG-2692 (Report of Vessel Casualty or Accident) and CG-924E (Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life).

MEXUSPAC: MEXICO/U.S. PACIFIC REGIONAL RESPONSE COORDINATION TEAM1

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 959-960
Author(s):  
Daniel Whiting
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Mexico City ◽  
Marine Environment ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Hazardous Substances ◽  
Contingency Plan ◽  
Marine Safety ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The Agreement of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and other Hazardous Substances, signed in Mexico City in 1980, provides a framework for cooperation in response to pollution incidents that pose a threat to the waters of both countries. Under this agreement, MEXUSPAC organizes Mexican and U.S. response agencies to plan for and respond to pollution emergencies in the marine environment. The MEXUSPAC contingency plan designates the commandant of the Mexican Second Naval Zone and the chief of the U.S. Coast Guard 11th District Marine Safety Division as the MEXUSPAC Cochairmen, and defines on-scene commanders, joint operations centers, and communications protocols that would be needed to coordinate the response to pollution incidents affecting both countries.

American Bureau of Shipping Activities on Behalf of the United States Coast Guard

1984 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 262-269
Author(s):  
John W. Reiter
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Working Relationship ◽  
United States Coast Guard ◽  
Long Period ◽  
The Past ◽  
The U.S

The American Bureau of Shipping and the U.S. Coast Guard have enjoyed an excellent working relationship for a long period of time. This paper gives a brief description of both organizations, describes some of the past cooperative arrangements, and details the latest agreement concerning commercial vessel plan review and inspection.

Highlights of the Load Line Conference, 1966

1966 ◽  
Vol 3 (03) ◽  
pp. 271-272
Author(s):  
David B. Bannerman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Load Line ◽  
Marine Industry ◽  
The U.S

When it had been decided that a Load Line Conference would be held in 1966, the United States drafted a complete proposed Convention which was based on the work of the United States Load Line Committee, a group sponsored by the Coast Guard, consisting of representatives of both government and the marine industry. This draft was circulated by Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization to all governments in early 1964. Other governments then sent their comments on the U.S. proposal, and all comments were circulated together with the U.S. draft; the USSR prepared a complete draft also, and these were the two basic conference documents.

Implications of OPA 90 in General and Its Effect on the T-AO 187 Class Oilers in Particular

1994 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
Hans Hofmann ◽  
George Kapsilis ◽  
Eric Smith ◽  
Robert Wasalaski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
International Maritime Organization ◽  
The Status ◽  
Oil Tankers ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Hull Construction

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has mandated that by the year 2015 all oil tankers operating in waters subject to jurisdiction of the United States must have double hulls. This paper examines the Act and the status of regulatory initiatives it has generated. Guidance for new hull construction and retrofit of existing vessels is outlined, and both IMO (International Maritime Organization) and U.S. Coast Guard requirements are discussed. Finally, the structural changes necessary to convert the U.S. Navy's T-AO Class oil tankers to meet the requirements of the Act are specified and illustrated.

Uncle Sam’s Efforts

2018 ◽  
pp. 51-86
Author(s):  
Lisa Lindquist Dorr
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Local Law Enforcement ◽  
Eighteenth Amendment ◽  
Local Law ◽  
State And Local ◽  
American Cities ◽  
The U.S

With the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, the federal government developed and enforcement strategy that charged the U.S. Coast Guard with preventing the illegal importation of liquor on the high seas surrounding the United States. The U.S. Customs Bureau guarded the nation's ports and borders, and the Prohibition Bureau working with state and local law enforcement patrolled the nation's interior. Congress, however, failed to appropriate the resources needed to enforce the law. The Coast Guard lacked enough ships to patrol U.S. waters, and faced uncertainty over the extent to which American authority extended out from shore. The Coast Guard picketed, tracked and trailed suspected rum runners, and disrupted the Rum Rows that developed off the coasts of American cities, but could not fully stop liquor smuggling.

RESPONSE TO THE GROUNDING OF THE F/V El JYU MARU NO. 211

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 225-229
Author(s):  
Vance Bennett ◽  
Don Noviello
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Northern Region ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Nesting Sites ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Spill Site ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Republic Of Palau ◽  
Marine Safety

ABSTRACT On December 2, 1991, the Japanese fishing vessel Ei Jyu Maru No. 21 ran hard aground near a remote, sparsely populated island in the northern region of the Republic of Palau, a Trust Territory of the United States. The grounding caused fractures in the hull, through which bilge oil, diesel fuel, and lubricating oils leaked out. The spilled oil, and the fuel remaining in the vessel, threatened environmentally sensitive reefs and bird nesting sites on nearby islands. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Guam and the Coast Guard Pacific Strike Team sent personnel to Palau to mitigate the effects of this spill. The response team, after six weeks of effort under less than ideal conditions, removed the fuel remaining on the vessel and prevented any further pollution. The remote location of Palau, about 7,000 miles from the west coast of the United States, and the undeveloped character of this region of Palau made this response a complex, costly, and time-consuming endeavor. These factors contributed to the problems that hindered this response—for example, long distances between the spill site and support areas, lack of infrastructure at the spill site, unreliable communications systems, and misunderstandings over the role of the Coast Guard.

Raising the Drawbridge to Cuba

2019 ◽  
pp. 101-122
Author(s):  
David Scott FitzGerald
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Remote Control ◽  
Asylum Seekers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Willingness To Accept ◽  
Immigration Laws ◽  
The U.S ◽  
High Seas ◽  
At Home

U.S. policies toward Cubans have oscillated between periods of welcome and restriction embedded in an overall trajectory of restriction. The biggest difference between the treatment of Haitian and Cubans was that only Cubans seeking protection were granted realistic legal paths to enter the United States through visa waivers for air passengers, relaxation of enforcement of immigration laws, more robust asylum screening on the high seas, and in-country processing programs for dissidents and other programs guaranteeing slots in the immigration stream. The favorable treatment of Cubans shows that even tens of thousands of asylum seekers arriving over the course of a few months did not threaten the capacity of the United States to provide sanctuary for those facing persecution at home. The Cuban case also challenges the conceptualization of remote control. Remote control’s efficacy is highly dependent on collaboration by other governments, such as Cuba’s willingness to accept Cubans intercepted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard.

JOINT MEXICO-UNITED STATES OIL SPILL RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS TRAINING ACTIVITIES

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 711-714
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Timothy P. Holmes ◽  
Norma A. Hernandez Ramirez
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Hazardous Substances ◽  
Joint Training ◽  
Response Team ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Exercise and evaluation of the Pacific Annex of the Joint Contingency Plan Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons or Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUSPLAN) uncovered a significant need for joint training between spill responders, planners, decision-makers and stakeholders on both sides of our border. Sponsored by U.S. Coast Guard District 11 (USCG Dll) and the Second Mexican Naval Zone (ZN2), a series of training sessions were held for Mexican officials from the Northern Baja California region and Mexico City in early 2003. The first of these well-attended sessions was held in two locations: San Diego, CA and Ensenada, Mexico in February 2003. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Hazmat facilitated the first session, the Joint Mexico-United States Oil Spill Science Forum. It provided a scientific view of oil spills. The following joint session facilitated by USCG Dll and held in Ensenada was a tabletop exercise designed in preparation for the signing of the MEXUSPAC Annex. Through the use of a spill drill scenario, this session included instruction and dialogue about the roles and responsibilities of both U.S. and Mexican spill responders. Both sessions included presentations from several agencies of the Regional Response Team IX/Joint Response Team: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Dept. of the Interior and California's Office of Spill Prevention and Response. Industry partners also contributed topics of discussion, further complementing the U.S. response landscape. Mexican response agencies, including PEMEX, SAGARPA, SEMARNAT and PROFEPA, provided valuable input ensuring dialogue helping to identify additional joint response gaps. Upon the most significant gaps brought to light was the need for additional information regarding dispersant use by Mexican agencies, particularly in light of the approaching international SONS Exercise in April 2004. To this end, USCG Dll and NOAA HAZMAT developed and presented a modified Ecological Risk Assessment for their Mexican counterparts. Hosted by ZN2 in October 2003, this highly successful workshop brought together many key decision makers, planners and stakeholders from both sides of the border to discuss tradeoffs inherent in the use of existing spill response tools, including dispersants. Joint training and discussion sessions such as these are key to ensuring any measure of success in a joint spill response. Several additional training and discussion topics designed for the Mexican-U.S. joint response forum have been identified with many in the planning phase. Acknowledging the similarities as well as differences in response systems of our two nations' is essential to the success of these joint collaborations. Such continued efforts will help bridge existing gaps.

The North American Moat

2019 ◽  
pp. 71-101
Author(s):  
David Scott FitzGerald
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Asylum Seekers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Military Bases ◽  
The North ◽  
International Pressure ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
International Reputation ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Coast Guard intercepted more than a quarter of a million migrants, including an unknown number of refugees, between 1982 and 2015. Practices developed by the United States to stop Haitians were then copied to prevent Chinese asylum seekers from crossing the Pacific. The 1993 Sale decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to allow refoulement on the high seas still stands. The fact that there are screenings at all, whatever their serious inadequacies, is evidence of diffuse international pressure articulated through the U.S. State Department and the influence of civil society. The Canadian government flirted with maritime refoulement but was constrained by greater deference to international law and the concern that openly flouting it would potentially damage Canada’s international reputation. The United States is a world leader in defining military bases strewn across the globe as territories under its control but not its sovereignty and thus spaces where asylum seekers have limited rights.

POLLUTION RESPONSE DURING NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS: STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND RESPONSE.

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 943-948
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Department Of Homeland Security ◽  
National Convention ◽  
State And Local ◽  
The U.S

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY During the summer of 2004, the First Coast Guard District in Boston, Massachusetts supported both Presidential political nominating conventions for the 2004 election. The Democratic National Convention was held in Boston, Massachusetts on July 26–29, 2004, and the Republican National Convention was held in New York City from August 30th to September 2, 2004. This was the first time both conventions have taken place within the geographic area of responsibility of a single Coast Guard District. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security declared both of these events as National Special Security Events under Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62). PDD-62 formalized and delineated the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in the development of security plans for major events. The 2004 Democratic and Republican Conventions were the first political conventions held in the United States since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the months before the Democratic National Convention, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice stated that there was credible intelligence from multiple sources indicating that al-Qaeda planned to attempt an attack on the United States during the period leading up to the election. (Joint Statement of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and Attorney General John Ashcroft on May 28, 2004) The terrorist attacks on the Madrid rail system were a direct attempt by AI Qaeda to influence the elections in Spain, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was going to take all appropriate steps to prevent a similar attack in the United States. (Schmidt and Priest, Washington Post May 26, 2004; Page A02) The 2004 Conventions offered a significant challenge for the Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local agencies that had dual responsibility for coordinating security operations while being prepared to respond to a disaster including oil spills and hazardous substance releases—the combination of what was previously designated as crisis and consequence management under PDD-39. This paper will examine lessons learned from planning and operations in support of the conventions. Having served as the First District Project Officer for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, this paper is written as my observations of the lessons learned and offers some insight into what went well and possible areas for improvement as I observed throughout the more than 18 months of planning for these events of national significance. The Coast Guard planning and operational support for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions demonstrated the importance of a team approach to planning, interagency coordination and partnerships, pre-event preparedness activities, and pre-deploying personnel and resources for response. It is my hope that the observations contained in this paper can benefit federal, state, and local agencies as they prepare for large significant events in the future including National Special Security Events.

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